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THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS--THE CASE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS IN JAMAICA.
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INQUIRY INTO THE PROCESS, AS MEDIATED THROUGH VARIOUS SOCIAL AGENCIES, BY WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL ACQUIRES POLITICALLY RELEVANT ATTITUDINAL DISPOSITIONS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY. THE HYPOTHESIS WAS THAT FAMILY STRUCTURE WOULD HAVE A DIFFERENT EFFECT UPON THE SOCIALIZATION OF THESE ATTITUDES. DATA REGARDING THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS WERE COLLECTED THROUGH THE USE OF A QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO A MULTISTAGE RANDOM SAMPLE OF 1,287 JAMAICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS DURING THE WINTER AND EARLY SPRING OF 1964. ADDITIONAL DATA WERE EXTRACTED FROM GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, CENSUS REPORTS, REPORTS AND OBSERVATIONS BY SCHOLARS, AND PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. MAJOR COMPARISONS WERE ACROSS FAMILY TYPES, GROUPS, SCHOOLS, AND CLASSES. THE HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE WAS GENERALLY CONFIRMED. THE PATTERN REMAINED WHEN A CONTROL FOR SOCIAL CLASS WAS INTRODUCED. ONLY THE EFFICACY DIMENSION WAS FOUND TO BE ESSENTIALLY A WORKING CLASS PHENOMENON. IN THIS CASE, THE MORE EFFICACIOUS MIDDLE - AND UPPER-CLASS POLITICAL CULTURE APPEARED TO COUNTERACT THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE. WITHIN THE MATERNAL FAMILY A PREDICTED PATTERN DEVELOPED IN WHICH FATHER ABSENCE AND MATERNAL DOMINATION WERE SHOWN TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT UPON THE AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL INTEREST OF MALE STUDENTS WHILE HAVING LITTLE EFFECT ON FEMALES. (HB)

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THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS:
THE CASE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS IN JAMAICA

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A THESIS

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and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
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Doctor of Philosophy

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The occurrence of patterned behavior is one of the better documented generalizations in social research. Such patterns may well be interpreted as the result of contemporary influences in the lives of particular individuals or groups. Yet the continuity of many patterns over time and place suggests that the individual has been modified in the course of his development in such a way that he often demonstrates enduring behavior apart from transitory stimulations in his contemporary environment. It is this observation that has led many scholars to the study of socialization: the individual's acquisition of social patterns and values as mediated through various agencies of society.

The study of socialization is not a new field of endeavor, but it is only in recent years that the results of empirical research on the political relevance of the socialization process have begun to appear in the literature.

A major weakness of the contemporary literature is the lack of broad conceptualization to guide research in political socialization. It is with this problem in mind that the first chapter of this report presents an organizational framework for the study of political socialization. The data reported in this study on the political socialization of Jamaican secondary school adolescents--the case in point--attempts to add empirical form to this framework.

Jamaica is similar to the other societies in transition to industrialization that together compose well over half of the world's population. Although primarily agrarian, Jamaica is striving for industrial expansion and economic development while coping with the common problems of population pressure, unemployment, and illiteracy. Important changes are occurring in the distribution of economic and political power, and in traditional norms and values.

Since 1944 there has been a relatively stable transfer of power within a well established two party system and a peaceful transition from colonial rule to independent self government.

These developments have been greatly influenced by those who hold positions of power and prestige in various social institutions: government, business, education, labor, etc. It is important to ask to what extent future leaders and citizens are being prepared to accept their roles within a democratic political system.

As the Jamaican secondary school system is one of the most important recruitment channels into the educated citizenry and leadership of Jamaica, a study of the political socialization of the secondary school population will be of manifest practical significance.

The graduates of these schools will be called upon in the future to make decisions that will effect the newly laid foundations of a democratic political order.

This research will be of scientific interest to the extent that it provides substance for the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter I.

The study is reported in seven parts. The first part is introductory. It seeks to place this research in the context of socialization research and attempts to provide broad guidelines which will serve as an organizational framework for future research and a basis for cumulative knowledge.

Chapter II discusses the research design and methodology that were used in the planning and execution of this study. This research is based upon the systematic collection, analysis, and presentation of data with explicit statements of procedures used. This is, of course, standard practice in modern social research. It permits the reader to evaluate the validity of the data, to assess the interpretations put to the data, and--if he feels so inclined--to reinterpret them for himself.

Chapter III presents a description of the heterogeneous milieu that is Jamaica. It surveys the social, economic, and political structure of the nation.

Chapters IV, V and VI present the body of data. In Chapter IV the role of the family and family structure is scrutinized to determine its influence on the socialization of selected politically relevant variables. As the constancy of these resultant attitudes over the life cycle of the individual should not be treated as a premise, a quasi-longitudinal research design is utilized to make inferences concerning their stability over time.

In Chapter V, such intermediary agencies as the peer group and school are examined to determine their reinforcement and resocialization roles within the political socialization process.

Chapter VI investigates the comparative role of the family, peer group, and school in the socialization of political efficacy. The interaction between the intermediary agencies and the family is examined to see if the former effectively overcome the differential effects of early family socialization.

Chapter VII is concluding. It summarizes the study within a conceptual context and evaluates its limitations and the need for further cross-cultural research.

The major financial support for this study came from a grant awarded by the United States Office of Education. I am also indebted

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To Professors Robert Mendelsohn and Robert Agger I am deeply obliged, for they are as responsible as anyone for my general intellectual interests out of which this dissertation has developed.

I spent six months in Jamaica during 1964, collecting the data reported here. Without the good offices of Lloyd Braithwaite, Director of The Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, this field expedition would have been much more difficult to carry out, if not impossible. The intellectual guidance and cooperation of Mr. Braithwaite and members of his staff far exceeded the usual standards of academic courtesy.

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The first chapter of this study is introductory. Definitions are examined and the contribution of various theoretical approaches to the understanding of the socialization process are investigated. The discussion of the study of socialization seeks to place this research in the general context of socialization research and attempts to provide broad guidelines which will serve as an organizational framework for future research and a basis for cumulative knowledge.

The occurrence of patterned behavior among adult individuals is one of the better documented generalizations in social research. Such patterns of behavior may well be interpreted in terms of contemporary influences in the lives of particular individuals or groups. However, the continuity of many patterns over time and place suggests that the individual has been modified in the course of his development in such a way that he often exhibits persistent behavior apart from transient stimulations in his contemporary environment. One is directed to the area of socialization: the individual's acquisition of social patterns and values as mediated through various agencies of society.

Certainly the study of socialization is not a new field of endeavor; such inquiries have been prominent in social psychology. Yet the investigation of political behavior as a consequence of socialization is just developing as a field of study for political scientists. This does not mean that those interested in politics have not been aware of its importance. "Citizenship" training and civic socialization are strongly emphasized in Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, and Rousseau's Emile. But it is only in recent years that the results of empirical investigations on the relationship between the socialization process and political behavior have begun to appear in the literature.

A major weakness in the contemporary literature is the lack of broad conceptualization to guide research in political socialization. It is hoped that the following discussion will be a step toward providing a guide to research and a meaningful basis for cumulative knowledge.

Political Socialization: A Definition

Most attempts at defining socialization have generally agreed that it is a process in which individuals incorporate into their own attitudinal structure and behavior patterns the ways of their respective social groups and society. Whiting and Child describe this in more colorful terms:

> In all societies the helpless infant, getting his food by nursing at his mother's breast and, having digested it, freely evacuating the waste products, exploring his genitals, biting and kicking at will, must be changed into a responsible adult obeying the rules of his society.[1]

LeVine defines socialization in its most general sense as the "acquisition of dispositions toward behavior that is positively valued by a group, and the elimination of dispositions toward behavior that is disvalued by the group."[2] Implicit in this definition is the important concept of resocialization. Both Aberle and Fagen see socialization as those patterns of action in any society or subsystem of society "which inculcate in individuals the skills (including knowledge), motives and attitudes necessary for the performance of present or anticipated roles."[3] Sidney Verba has a similar conception in his paper on "The Comparative Study of Political Socialization." He refers to socialization as a process by which norms associated with certain social roles as well as "fundamental values and guiding standards of social behavior are learned."[4] Verba calls the mechanism of socialization a "learning process."[5] Herbert Hyman adds to these definitions by giving more explicit substance to the socialization environment when he speaks of the process being "mediated through various agencies of society."[6]

The definition which will be used in this study adopts some of the concepts discussed earlier while avoiding others. It is as follows: political socialization is the process as mediated through various agencies of society by which an individual acquires politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behavior patterns.

In order to avoid premature conceptual limitation, the definition is broad in its scope. Yet the avoidance of the more operational learning mechanism for the vague term "acquires" might seem unnecessarily ambiguous. Unfortunately it is a reflection on the state of the discipline. The verbal battle between the learning, psychoanalytical, and role theorists' explanation of the socialization process has not been resolved into a single, neat conceptual framework.[7] Instead, each approach adds something to our understanding of the process and any attempt at this point to utilize the rather narrow but more operational concept of "learning" as used by learning theorists would be an unnecessary conceptual restriction.[8] On the other hand, the definition of the subject matter in terms of attitudes and behavior rather than vague "social patterns" is a step toward conceptual specificity and operational clarity.

Although the specification of politically relevant attitudes and behavior still provides the core of empirical research in political science, theory and research have developed sufficiently to indicate the following as examples of relevant attitudes and behavior: attitudes regarding political legitimacy; participation in voting, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and decision-making which affects the authoritative allocation of values in the system; feelings of personal competency to influence decisions affecting the authoritative allocation of values; and attitudes toward allocation of authority.[9] Thus the concept of political socialization is as broad in its empirical referents as those aspects of social behavior that can be meaningfully related to the political system.

The Study of Political Socialization

The study of political socialization is concerned with (1) how politically relevant attitudes are developed and the relationship of various social institutions to this process;[10] (2) the relationship between the socialized attitudes and politically relevant behavior; (3) the stability of these attitudes and behavior over the life cycle; and (4) the roles of secondary socialization agencies in the political socialization process and their influence upon the stability of attitudes and behavior developed in primary socialization institutions.

Environmental Agencies, Attitudes and Behavior

Political socialization involves the influence of "various agencies in society." The importance of such environmental agencies as the family, peer group, school, and mass media is stressed in the literature on voting and political behavior.[11] This list does not exhaust the environmental categories; for example, class, sex, and age subcultures might also be included.

Richard Fagen suggests that the major weakness of what he calls the "sociopsychological approach" to political socialization is that its concentration on the experiences of childhood has caused it to focus on only the early or primary socialization agencies.[12] He urges that the socialization of adults deserves attention equal to that given to the socialization of children and that increasing attention be paid to such agencies as labor unions, political parties, the military, bureaucracies, and mass organizations.

Certainly we can agree that secondary as well as primary institutions, adults as well as children, and quasi-longitudinal and longitudinal research designs as well as cross-sections are necessary additions to the study of political socialization. However, this is a commentary on a gap rather than a necessary weakness of the so called "sociopsychological" approach.[13]

In our investigation of attitude formation and the various social institutions related to this process, it must be remembered that the relevance of these attitudes is determined by their relationship to politically meaningful behavior.[14] A great deal of literature has concerned itself with the relationship between social institutions and attitudes[15] and between attitudes and behavior.[16] Unfortunately there has been little research which has attempted to connect all three: the environmental agency to the psychological disposition and the disposition to politically relevant behavior. If we find, for instance, that feelings of personal political efficacy are related to political behavior, we must also ask how these attitudes are formed and investigate the important socialization agencies in the process.

The inclusion of attitudinal dispositions as intervening variables (or hypothetical constructs) is conceptually important for the following reasons. First, this intervening factor is immediately necessary in situations where the environmental stimuli appear to be the same but behavior is different or, conversely, environments are different but behavior is the same. Secondly, this may lead to more parsimonious theories to the extent that explanations of behavior can be funneled through a smaller number of psychological dispositions rather than be dependent on a more complex environment.[17] Finally, to the degree that inclusion of attitudinal dispositions illuminates the linkage between environmental agencies and behavior, the predictive value of our socialization theories will be enhanced; equally--if not more--important, the explanatory power will be increased. The lack of the power to explain discovered relationships has been one of the major weaknesses of those conceptual approaches which attempt the direct linkage between environment and behavior.

Stability of Attitudes and Behavior

It is now time to make explicit an assumption that has been implicit in most socialization research concerning the constancy of attitudinal dispositions or "personality traits" and behavior from one situation to another and over time.[18] Numerous studies have generalized too easily from childhood experiences to adult political attitudes and behavior. Fromm, for instance, connects democratic government to the development of the "democratic" personality within the family.[19] The major body of literature which relates early family training to adult political behavior is that of the "national character" school. This group is concerned with finding the dominant psychological patterns within societies--personality patterns which are developed in primary groups and come to characterize the "modal" person in that society. These different modal personalities are seen to result in different national political styles in later life.

Thus the source of German attitudes toward governmental authority is said to derive from authority patterns in the family. Germans raised in authoritarian families will want and expect their political leaders to maintain a similar authoritarian relationship to them.[20] Russian political behavior is traced to a modal personality that alternates between acceptance and rejection of authority, while American political behavior is related to the modal personality that thrives on signs of love and acceptance. Both personality types are traced to such early family experiences as weaning or toilet training.[21]

When we examine primary socialization agencies such as the family to determine their influence upon what appear to be politically relevant attitudes (dogmatism, efficacy, etc.) and behavior (latent leadership behavior, e.g.), we usually try to select and measure what we believe will be reasonably pervasive, reasonably enduring attitudinal dimensions and behavior. Certainly family authority patterns may have an important effect on an individual's attitude toward political authority, particularly in less structurally differentiated societies.[22] The authority patterns in the family are his first exposure to authority. It is also likely that his first view of the political system even in more structurally differentiated societies may represent a generalization from these experiences.[23] Yet to think of the political system as the family writ large is too simple.

Early socialization experiences significantly affect an individual's basic personality dispositions and may therefore affect his political behavior; however numerous other factors may intervene between these earliest experiences and later political behavior that greatly inhibit the impact of the former upon the latter. Orville Brim draws our attention to the difficulty of assuming attitudinal stability from situation to situation.[24] Levy points out the utility of making some socialization variables more specific to the situations they are intended to predict, i.e., for some variables at least, we should be studying socialization separately within roles.[25]

The same situation may prevail with respect to attitude and behavior constancy over time. In their study of the stability of passive and dependent behavior over time, Kagan and Moss were able to take repeated measurements of the "dependency trait" in the same group of individuals--measurements which began at the age of three and continued into the late twenties. The most notable feature of their findings is the absence of continuity in this trait. The children who are dependent at age three and four are not the same individuals who emerge as dependent adults.[26]

The first and obvious point is that investigators of the political socialization process cannot make a priori assumptions about the stability over the life cycle of psychological dispositions found in childhood. This does not mean that the only correlations we can hope for between socialization practices and attitudes (or behavior) are at one point in time. It is, of course, not unlikely that with a longitudinal or quasi-longitudinal research design and the proper experimental or statistical controls on early socialization environments, the lingering effects of this environment on selected dependent variables can be traced over a significant part or the whole life cycle of the individual.[27] But the important point in this discussion is that the constancy of early socialized attitudes and behavior over the life time of an individual must be treated as a researchable question rather than as an explicit or implicit premise.

Intermediary Socialization Institutions

The study of political socialization is also concerned with the influence of intermediary agencies upon the political socialization process and upon the stability of attitudes and behavior developed in primary institutions like the family. The step from early family socialization to adult political attitudes and behavior is a long one and, as will be suggested, can be fully understood only in terms of the intervening effects of secondary institutions.

The error of omission by the anthropologists and psychologists of the early "national character" school was in their narrow focus on the family to the exclusion of such important intermediary institutions as the peer group, school, work group, as well as the host of adult organizations to which an individual can belong. These organizations and groups play important roles as reinforcing agents of social patterns developed earlier or they may serve as significant resocialization agencies. The latter may be particularly true in more structurally differentiated societies.

The stability of social patterns over generations is testimony to the reinforcement function. Peer groups and schools with a homogeneous class environment, for instance, are found to play important reinforcing roles in the socialization process.[28]

Resocialization takes place when individuals are inducted into new statuses for which no role models previously existed in the society. Most preindustrial political systems undergoing rapid social change are faced with burdensome tasks of resocialization.[29] The literature on totalitarian political systems has also devoted considerable attention to resocialization.[30] Another form of resocialization takes place when a group inducts an individual into a status for which role models previously existed in the society but for which his earlier training did not prepare him. Social mobility would be a case in point.[31]

Only when the socialization role of these secondary or intermediary institutions is understood with more confidence will we be able to "map" the political socialization process in a society. We will then be better equipped to explain the "well trained" generation that leads a revolution against the established order or the radical Japanese adolescent who becomes a conservative adult.

The Socialization Process

Many different conceptual frameworks have been advanced to explain the process by which socialization occurs. Some are based on the study of the maladjusted; others have their roots in the study of primitive people; others in highly controlled laboratory experiments on animals and children; and still others on the study and observation of "normal" children and adults in primarily western societies. Considering the varied perspectives and sources of information, differences in interpretation are not surprising. As of this time no one approach has received what could be called general acceptance.[32] In this final section we shall examine in a limited and simplified form three of the major theoretical approaches to socialization: learning, psychoanalytical and role theory.[33]

Although each of these theories set different problems for themselves and have different orientations, they are to a considerable extent complementary--as will be seen when role theory is discussed. All three approaches assume that an individual acquires behaviorial predispositions in the course of social interaction, and that these social patterns are not likely to be acquired and reinforced unless, in some way, they are gratifying.

Psychoanalytical theory, with what is often its clinical orientation, focuses on individual personality development, emphasizing especially the development and significance of emotional attachments.[34] Perhaps the most important psychoanalytical concepts relating to socialization are "identification" and "superego." When a child is very young, he does as his parents wish to win their affection and avoid being punished. In the later "latency" phase, however, the child through a process of emotional identification places himself in the position of his parents and introjects the standards they affirm; he begins to behave as they do because he believes their ideas and behavior are right. The superego is a complementary concept. The individual's personality structure, composed of id and ego, now develops a superego through the process of identification. Freud says the superego is an agency which

> . . . continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the corresponding people in the external world; it observes the ego, gives it orders, corrects it and threatens it with punishment, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We . . . are aware of it, in its judicial functions as our conscience.[35]

Identification and the superego are particularly relevant to socialization. The former has been incorporated into learning and role approaches to socialization while the latter serves as a significant hypothetical construct, the development of which is related to the accord between the internalized patterns of the individual and the patterns of the groups and society of which he is a member.

Learning, as used by psychologists, is a broad term applying to all behavior which derives from training procedures.[36] That limited aspect of learning which is concerned with social behavior among human beings is germane to socialization. Learning theorists attempt ordinarily to break down behavior into measurable stimuli and responses, and to determine the principles by which they are linked. The skeletal linkage is usually provided by the concepts of conditioning and reinforcement. The former seeks to explain how an individual learns to give old responses to new stimuli while the latter explains new responses to new stimuli.

An important concept in explaining socialization is imitation, a response pattern which occurs under given conditions as a result of the learning process. A young child usually learns early that life is more rewarding if he follows in the footsteps of the older and more powerful people with whom he interacts. In order to gratify his needs he may form the habit of imitating the people upon whom he is dependent. Behavior which is rewarded is reinforced, that which is not is dropped.

Perhaps a child seeking parental attention overhears his father announcing proudly that he is a Republican, his father and father's father were Republicans, and that any honest and decent man could not be anything but a Republican--an obvious cue. The child responds by announcing he is a Republican, and is rewarded by receiving attention. Judging from this well structured situation parental attention will not be negative. To the extent that the child repeats this strategy to gain attention he has learned new behavior. However, at this stage in the socialization process the child's imitation of parental party preference is probably without regard to the complexity of values and beliefs that have become related to the parent's partisan preference.

Imitation is closely related to the process of identification in which the child, or older individual for that matter, tries to be another person. There are different theories regarding the basis for identification; some psychologists believe that the young individual identifies first with the person who gratifies his needs; others believe the individual identifies with the person whose status he envies and who withholds from him the things he wants.[37] In any case, the child, consciously or unconsciously, begins to identify with the important "other" individual and to internalize his attitudes as well as imitate his behavior.

Usually identification begins with the family where parents are taken as models. As the child matures he takes other referents for his behavior: peers, teachers, and work group members; then persons outside his immediate environment--imaginary as well as real--such as historical figures.

Identification may represent a more advanced stage in the formation of party identification. In this process the individual is not only imitating behavior but internalizing attitudes which are often associated with party preference, for example, attitudes toward government ownership. The extent to which the individual identifies and internalizes related attitudes may determine the stability over time of his partisan identification.

This example of how learning theory might be utilized to explain the development of partisan identifications does not preclude the possibility that an underlying psychological dimension might explain more parsimoniously not only the conformity of 75 per cent of American voters but also the non conformity of the other 25 per cent.

Since research in learning has been developed largely under laboratory conditions, it is ordinarily more controlled and methodologically precise than psychoanalytical or social role research. However, it has been less than successful in explaining social situations involving complex motivations and feelings of ambivalence.

Utilizing many of the concepts of social learning, role theorists maintain that every individual becomes socialized by learning a set of social roles. A role is a pattern of expected behavior which is attached to a social status by other members of society. This concept serves as a bridge between the person and society. Role is related to the individual to the extent that he internalizes appropriate attitudes and behavior, and it is related to society in that particular expectations exist--however ambiguously. Thus there are sets of reciprocal expectations regulating the behavior of individuals toward each other depending on their positions in the system. One learns these reciprocal requirements from interacting with others in a variety of social situations and by gradually developing the ability to take the role of the other. The degree of role consensus, the individual's knowledge of these expectations, his ability to discharge successfully his role in each situation, and his motivation to perform up to the level which the expectations require are all variables explaining individual differences in behavior.[38]

In the area of socialization, the task of role theory is to explain how an individual comes to function within a system of statuses. How does he learn to recognize relevant status positions, to know and internalize their expectations, and to perform those roles which are appropriate for him? The possibility for the integration of learning theory is manifest.

The role approach suggests a somewhat different orientation to socialization problems. This includes greater attention to the ways in which children are taught in the family to be aware of different social roles. For example, how does the parents' perception of the social structure influence what they pass on to the child? Which roles in the social structure do parents ignore or insist that the child learn? What is the effect of the absence of certain early role models on later socialization or resocialization, and what is the influence of family structure on the socialization process--not only size and constellation characteristics but also internal power differentials? These are some of the concerns suggested by the social role approach to socialization.

In the foregoing discussion it was maintained that the study of socialization must be concerned not only with the relationship between politically relevant attitudes and behavior but also the environmental agencies that are important in socializing these patterns. The stability of these attitudes and behavior should not be treated as a premise; instead, appropriate research designs should be utilized to test the constancy of patterns over the life cycle. Finally, secondary socialization institutions should be investigated so that their reinforcement and resocialization roles can be explicated, and their influence on the stability of attitudes and behavior developed in primary institutions examined.

The following study focuses on certain attitudinal dispositions and examines their political relevancy in a less industrialized society. The role of the family and family structure is scrutinized to determine its influence on the socialization of these politically relevant attitudes. The employment of a quasi-longitudinal research design allows us to make inferences concerning the stability of these attitudes over time. Finally, such intermediary socialization agencies as the peer group and school are examined to determine their reinforcement

and resocialization roles as well as their effect upon the stability of selected attitudinal dimensions which are developed in the family environment.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

[1] John W. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, Child Training and Personality: A Cross-Cultural Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 63.

[2] Robert LeVine, "Political Socialization and Cultural Change," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 280.

[3] David F. Aberle, "Culture and Socialization," in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), Psychological Anthropology (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 387. See Richard Fagen for an elaboration of this definition in International Politics and Cuba (forthcoming).

[4] Sidney Verba, The Comparative Study of Political Socialization, Paper delivered at 1964 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, p. 1.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 25.

[7] Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Choice of Variables in the Study of Socialization," Sociometry, 24 (December, 1961), 357-371.

[8] For the contribution of learning theory, as well as other approaches to the understanding of the socialization process, see pages 30-37.

[9] For a discussion of these and other variables and their utilizazion in political research, see e.g., Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[10] Although this study is concerned with the role of various "social institutions" in the political socialization process, this is not to deny

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I-*continued*

the effect of droughts, earthquakes and other natural cataclysms upon socialization. However it is not unlikely that such effects may be mediated in large part by various social institutions.

[11] See, e.g., A. Campbell *et al.*, *Ibid*; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1963); Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955); and H. Hyman, *op. cit.*

[12] R. Fagen, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[13] The present study concentrates on such socialization agencies as the family, peer group and school. A quasi-longitudinal design is used so that the lingering effects of early socialization experiences can be traced through the secondary school period. A future longitudinal study is anticipated which would investigate the continued socialization of respondents identified in this study after they assume adult statuses in the society.

[14] Those who are not interested in the development of empirically based analytical theory may disagree with this statement. Certainly, if one argues normatively that the whole point of establishing and maintaining governmental structure is to meet the needs of the governed, then one can also maintain that their affective attitudes regarding governmental output, etc., may have "political" relevance aside from their relationship to behavior.

On the other hand, a behavioral criterion does not mean that a map of mass legitimacy attitudes, e.g., would not have political significance in time one, but this is dependent to a major degree on whether it can be used to explain and predict future behavior--either on the part of the masses or the leadership--in time two. The need for more longitudinal studies to test the relevance of what appear to be manifestly political attitudes is obvious.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I-continued

[15] E. g., Fred J. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (December, 1960), 934-944; Robert D. Hess and David Easton "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Winter, 1960), 632-644; Martin L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596-606; Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 107-111; R. Lane, *op. cit.*, Section IV.

[16] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954); pp. 197-266; Robert E. Lane, "Political Character and Political Analysis," and Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, "Political Efficacy and Political Participation," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, (eds.), *Political Behavior* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 155-124 and 170-174; and Lester W. Milbrath, "Predispositions Toward Political Contention," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (March, 1960), 5-18.

[17] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Personality and Political Socialization," *The Journal of Politics*, 23 (May, 1961), 348-349.

[18] This influence can probably be traced to the work of the clinical psychologists and personality theorists who have commonly assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that a person gradually forms characteristic behavior patterns guided by an enduring personality structure or set of central traits. See: Gordon Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Explanation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1937); Raymond B. Cattell, *Personality, A Systematic, Theoretical, and Factual Study* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950); and Hans J. Eysenck, *The Structure of Human Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

[19] Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), pp. 287ff.

[20] Bertram Schaffner, *Fatherland: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); and David Rodnick, *Postwar Germans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I-continued

[21] Geoffrey Gorer, The People of Great Russia (London: Cresset Press, 1949); and Geoffrey Gorer, The American People (New York: Norton, 1948). For a discussion of the "national character" school see Margaret Mead, "The Study of National Character" in Daniel Learner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 70-85, and Verba, Small Groups, op. cit., Chapter 2.

[22] LeVine, op. cit., makes a more cautious attempt to relate family authority patterns to attitudes towards governmental authority in the East African kingdom of Buganda.

[23] Hess and Easton, op. cit., explain that the child's first image of the President represents a generalization from family experience, but the child begins to differentiate between political and family roles as he grows older.

[24] Orville Brim, "Personality Development as Role Learning," in I. Iscoe and H. Stevenson (eds.), Personality Development in Children (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960), pp. 127-159.

[25] Edwin Levy, "Children's Behavior under Stress and its Relation to Training by Parents to Respond to Stress Situations," Child Development, 30 (1959), 307-324.

[26] Jerome Kagan and Howard Moss, "The Stability of Passive and Dependent Behavior from Childhood through Adulthood," Child Development, 31 (September, 1960), 577-591.

[27] In the present study a quasi-longitudinal design and statistical controls are utilized to study the lingering effect of early family socialization on relevant political attitudes over the whole secondary school experience (see Chapter IV).

[28] See Chapter V for a discussion of the influence of homogeneous class environments in schools and peer groups.

[29] Lucian W. Pye, "Communications and Civic Training in Transitional Societies," in Lucian Pye (ed.), Communications and

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I-continued

Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 124-127.

[30] Franklin W. Houn, To Change a Nation (New York: The Free Press, 1961); Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (New York: Norton, 1961); and Stephen and Ethel Dunn, "Directed Cultural Change in the Soviet Union: Some Soviet Studies," American Anthropologist, 64 (April, 1962), 328-339.

[31] See Chapter V for a discussion of this form of resocialization.

[32] See: William H. Sewell, "Some Recent Developments in Socialization Theory and Research," The Annals of the American Academy, 349 (Setember, 1963), 163-181; and Frederick Elkin, The Child and Society (New York: Random House, 1960), for a discussion of different theoretical approaches to the study of socialization.

[33] "Theory" is not used here in the sense of a logically interrelated set of propositions; rather we are referring to a conceptual orientation which leads one to look in certain directions and ask certain questions.

[34] For a discussion of psychoanalytical propositions that have been subjected to empirical tests see: Harold Orlansky, "Infant Care and Personality," Psychological Bulletin, 46 (January, 1949), 1-48; Whiting and Child, Child Training, op. cit; and Irwin L. Child, "Socialization" in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesely, 1954), pp. 655-692.

[35] Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1949), p. 77.

[36] Ernest R. Hilgard, Theories of Learning (2nd ed., New York: Appelton, 1960); Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, Social Learning and Imitation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); and William E. Martin and Celia B. Stendler, Child Behavior and Development (New York: Harcourt, 1959 rev.).

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I-continued

[37] Jerome Kagan, "The Concept of Identification," Psychological Review, 65 (September, 1958), 296-305; Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Freudian Theories of Identification and Their Derivatives," Child Development, 31 (1958), 15-40; and Roger V. Burton and John W. M. Whiting, "The Absent Father and Cross-Sex Identity," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 7 (April, 1961), 84-95.

[38] Talcott Parsons deserves major credit for the impetus given to the recent development of role theory in his attempt to produce a conceptual scheme for the analysis of the structure and process of social systems, focusing on the system of institutionalized roles. See: The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951). His position is further elaborated in his writings on family structure and the socialization of the child, which presents a detailed analysis of the child's internalization of roles as he passes through various stages of psychosexual development and integration into the family system. See Talcott Parson and Robert F. Bales, Family Socialization and the Interaction Process (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955). For a more recent discussion of role learning and socialization see O. Brim, op. cit.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Data regarding the socialization process described in this study were collected through the use of a questionnaire administered to a multi-stage random sample of 1287 Jamaican secondary school students during the winter and early spring of 1964. Additional material came from varied sources: government documents, census reports, reports and observations by other scholars, and personal observation.

Scope and Sample Design

Inferences concerning the stability of attitudes and behavior over time are facilitated by the student sample which is based on a set of cross sections (measurements made at one point in time), and which assume quasi-longitudinal conditions. That is, students are sampled in the first, fourth, and fifth forms,[1] and assumptions are made about the development over time as if the students in the first form closely resemble the students in the fifth form after the passage of four years.[2]

Assumptions of this kind obviously necessitate data on the rate and background of dropouts. Although the Jamaican Ministry of Education had no reliable statistics on dropouts, the headmasters of each of the schools in the sample were able to provide the necessary information. There was some student movement between government aided schools as families moved, but in no school was the net dropout rate more than three per cent from the eighth to the twelfth grade. Jamaican students do not take lightly the fact that they are among the select six per cent (N=16,300) of the total population of secondary school age who have been given the opportunity to attend government aided secondary schools.[3]

Headmasters were unable to give precise information on the background of the dropouts. Their general estimate was that most students dropped out because they were unable to do the academic work; the rest left school due to lack of funds. In either case, the percentages are so slight that dropouts have no significant effect on the quasi-longitudinal assumptions.

The multi-stage sample design was based on a stratified cluster sample of unequal clusters.[4] To ensure an adequate representation of class backgrounds and family structures, a panel of educators was asked to stratify the population of forty-one government aided schools as to the estimated class background of the students in attendance.[5]

Schools were classified into high, intermediate and low status on the basis of the panel's recommendations. It was later found that there was a high correlation between the status of the school as ranked by informants and the socio-economic status (SES) of the students as measured by objective indicators.

Among this population of government schools fourteen were all-female, seven male, and twenty coeducational. In the mixed or coeducational schools 56 per cent of the students were female and 44 per cent male.[6] Since it was not particularly desirable to have an unduly heavy loading of females in the sample it was decided to eliminate all-girl schools from the sample population. This would leave twenty-seven schools with a total population of 13,483 males and females.

From this stratified population of male and mixed schools, one high status school, two intermediate status, and two low status schools were randomly selected. Time and cost precluded the sampling of additional schools so that sample size was restricted to 1287 students. In each of the five schools all students in the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth grades were administered questionnaires.[7] Of the five schools included in the sample one is all-male and the other four are coeducational; two are located in the Kingston metropolitan area; two are in rural areas; and one is located in a middle-sized Jamaican city.

The level of generality of the analytical results is intended to be broad enough to apply to students in government secondary schools throughout Jamaica with the exception of those who attend all-girl schools. However, because such a large percentage of females was included, the findings from this sample can be generalized with some confidence to all females in government secondary schools.

Obviously, to explore in full the variations in the civic socialisation process among all Jamaican adolescents would require not only a longitudinal study, but a much larger study than this one. In this strict sense the project must be considered as a study of the socialization of a select stratum of Jamaican adolescents who have found their way into an exclusive channel for the recruitment of the Jamaican elite--the government secondary school system.[8]

Field Operations

Pretest

A copy of the first draft of the questionnaire was administered to the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth grades in an intermediate status school in Kingston.[9] The pretest was not used to make any preliminary tests of hypotheses. Its major purpose was to identify problems in timing, rapport, and self-identification; and to uncover semantic difficulties. Comments were solicited from the students concerning the wording and intent of the questions. A number of helpful suggestions were received. The responses were tabulated and used as a guide in the final drafting of the questionnaire.

In most cases forced choice questions were used in an attempt to structure the responses of students.[10] They were, however, encouraged to express their views more fully on any question, or to comment on relevant issues not covered in the questionnaire.

Administration of Questionnaires

The headmasters of the schools in the sample received personal letters from John J. Figueroa, the Professor of the Faculty of Education (UWI), which introduced the study and urged their cooperation and support. An appointment was made by telephone to visit each headmaster and to explain the nature of the study. Armed with various letters of introduction the project director spent approximately one hour with each headmaster to ensure his confidence and cooperation in the study. Each of the schools included in the sample agreed to allow the administration of the questionnaire. The headmaster in each school arranged for the place of administration.

In most cases, all the students in one grade were gathered together in one large hall, although occasionally it was necessary to use two adjacent classrooms simultaneously.

The project director gave a standard oral explanation to the students regarding the purpose of the study. The set of instructions for completing the questionnaire,which was placed on the first page of the schedule,was read to each group. Students were assured that their responses would be treated confidentially and a manifestly satisfactory rapport was established with each group. As far as can be judged, all students took seriously the answering of the questions and only one-half of one questionnaire had to be discounted for being completed in a facetious or incomplete manner.

The questionnaires were passed out by student leaders in each group; in no case were teachers or other school personnel in the room during the administration. The questionnaires were collected by the director after they had been completed by the students.

Each question in the schedule was read to the eighth grade students. This took approximately 55 minutes for each group. The eleventh and twelfth grade respondents read the questionnaire independently. Most students took from 45 to 55 minutes to complete their questionnaires, although a few took as long as 70 minutes. In each case sufficient time was available for every person to finish the questionnaire.

In some cases it was not possible to administer the questionnaire to all grades on the same day, or at the same time on a given day.

In this situation an attempt was made to schedule the administration of the different groups as closely together as possible.

Processing and Data Analysis

All data obtained by questionnaire were coded and punched on IBM cards. Most of the percentages, cross-tabulations, statistical controls, and tests for statistical significance were run on an IBM 1620 computer at the University of Oregon.

Major comparisons in this study are across family types, groups, schools, and classes. Sub-group comparisons under statistically controlled conditions are utilized throughout the analysis. This serves as an approximately of the experimental control and manipulation of groups.[11]

Statistical Analysis

A number of criteria are utilized to judge the extent to which percentage differences are due to the operation of the variables being considered rather than chance. The first is the magnitude of the difference. The second is the consistency with which the difference is observed--especially when statistical controls are introduced. The third is the use of tests of statistical significance. These tests are used to indicate the probability that the difference between two or more groups is due to sampling error.

Tests of statistical significance should be applied with caution and understanding. They may be used to understate or overstate the importance of the findings in a number of ways. First, these tests do not show the "strength" of a relationship. One cannot infer a high level of association from a high level of significance. They merely indicate that a particular difference is unlikely to be due to chance errors in the sample. As a convention, differences so large that they could have been due to sampling error only one out of twenty times are generally accepted as statistically significant.

Second, the tests may not be rigorous enough; they may lead to the acceptance of findings as statistically significant which have little conceptual significance. This is particularly true when the sample is large. A statement about statistical significance is a statement about sample errors and, since sampling errors are a function of sample size, such a statement is also a function of the sample sizes involved. The larger the sample the greater the chance that a difference of a given size will be found statistically significant. Conversely, the smaller the sample the less likely that "significant" differences will be found.

Third, statistical tests of significance are considered appropriate only when the differences being reported are based on prior hypotheses. In most cases the differences being reported in this study are based on antecedent hypotheses. Nevertheless, I have not hesitated to report other interesting and relevant findings that emerge from the data.

Finally, and possibly most important, statistical "significance" and substantive (e.g., political, sociological, economic) significance are not the same.[12] In practice the two are often confused: effects are written off as unimportant simply because they have not "come up" significant or are given great prominence because they have. An excessive emphasis on "significance" tests (very noticeable in social science literature) may be particularly wasteful when a consistent pattern of differences is found. Many of the tables reported in this study show a consistent pattern of difference, and in the predicted direction. In many of these cases statistical controls are introduced to deal with possible confounded variables. These controls decrease the size of the sample on which the test of significance is computed. This of course decreases the likelihood that differences will be statistically significant. In this situation a mechanical dismissal of a set of patterned relationships because they do not meet certain conventions is the proverbial case of throwing the conceptually significant baby out with the methodological bath water.[13]

The important point in this discussion is that caution is necessary in interpreting the meaning of tests of statistical significance.[14]

The author has included them in this study as only one link in a chain of logical evidence and one should not place undue weight on the discovery that a particular difference is or is not statistically significant. Instead, the consistency of the differences noted between subgroups for the major explanatory variables utilized is probably one of the most useful tests of conceptual significance in the social sciences and will lend the greatest confidence to the assertion that the differences noted are due to the operation of the variables rather than to chance.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

[1] The Jamaican secondary school is patterned after the British grammar school rather than the American high school. The first, fourth, and fifth forms in Jamaica are comparable to grades eight, eleven, and twelve, respectively, in most American school systems. Hereafter, references to Jamaican forms will be in terms of their American analogs.

[2] For a discussion of the problems involved in quasi-longitudinal and longitudinal research of this type, see Allen H. Barton, Studying the Effects of College Education: A Methodological Evaluation of "Changing Values in College" (New Haven: Edward W. Hazen Foundation, 1959).

[3] To the six per cent should be added another four per cent who attend private secondary schools. With a few notable exceptions, the hodgepodge of private secondary schools are inferior to government schools in quality of education, qualifications of teachers, and generally enjoy a much lower status in the eyes of the Jamaicans. O. C. Francis, The People of Modern Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1963), Table 1.7 and 3.9, pp. 1-14 and 3-19.

These percentages are based on the 1960 Jamaican national census. In private communications, the Jamaican Ministry of Education estimated that as of January, 1963, the number of students in government secondary schools was approximately 20,000. No comparable figures are available on the increase in the population of secondary school age. However, it is unlikely that the percentage of the population attending government aided schools has changed appreciably.

[4] Frederick F. Stephan and Philip J. McCarthy, Sampling Opinions: An Analysis of Survey Procedures (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 200-207. With this type of sampling procedure the desired elements in the population have a known probability of being selected.

[5] Panel members occupied the following statuses in the Jamaican social structure: Professor in Faculty of Education (University of the West Indies), Senior Lecturer in Faculty of Education, Senior Lecturer in Faculty of Education, Senior Lecturer in the Department

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II-continued

of Sociology, Acting Head of the Department of Government, and Education Officer in the Jamaican Ministry of Education.

[6] Data supplied by private communication from the Ministry of Education, Government of Jamaica, Kingston, 1964.

[7] Because of scheduling difficulties it proved impossible to administer questionnaires to fifty-five eighth graders in the anticipated sample. Information on the background of these students was acquired from teachers, the headmaster, and registration records. They do not appear to be significantly different from other eighth graders in the sample and therefore should not affect its level of generality.

[8] In 1960, only 6.6 per cent of the Jamaican population over the age of 15 had received some secondary education. Francis, op. cit., Table 3.5, p. 3-13. Wendell Bell found in his study of Jamaican elite that as early as 1954, 46 per cent of the elected political leaders, 54 per cent of the political appointees, and 58 per cent of the higher civil servants had attended secondary schools. Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), Table 5, p. 58.

[9] The first draft was distributed to a number of persons and comments were solicited. Helpful suggestions were received from Professor Daniel Goldrich, University of Oregon; Lloyd Braithwaite, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies; and James Whetton, Research Fellow in Institute of Social and Economic Research (UWI).

[10] See Appendix F.

[11] Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), Chapter 6.

[12] L. Kish recommends that the word significance be dropped in the phrase "statistical tests of significance." He offers the somewhat longer but proper phrase "test against the null hypothesis." Kish maintains that significance should only be attached to the

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II-*continued*

substantive question: "Is there a relationship here worth explaining because it is important and meaningful?" Leslie Kish, "Some Statistical Problems in Research Design," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (June, 1959), 337.

[13] John Tukey, *Some Possible General Idiosyncrasies in the Use of Statistical Techniques and the Quantitative Approach* (unpublished manuscript, 1963). Professor Tukey, a Princeton statistician, conducts a humorous and penetrating dialogue on social scientists' "badmandments" and their fetish about "safety, rules of the game," etc. H. Selvin, although overstating his case, presents an explicit and critical discussion on the relevance of tests of significance for survey research. Hanan C. Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (October, 1957), 519-527. Also see C. A. Moser, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), Chapter 15.

[14] L. Kish also cautions about the interpretation of tests of significance when complex sampling designs are used. He suggests that patterned differences may serve as acceptable alternative tests of significance. Leslie Kish, "Confidence Intervals for Clustered Samples," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (April, 1957), 154-165.

CHAPTER III

THE JAMAICAN MILIEU

In many respects Jamaica is similar to other societies in transition to industrialization who together compose well over half of the world's population. Although primarily agrarian, Jamaica is striving for industrial expansion and economic development while coping with the universal problems of population pressure, unemployment, and illiteracy. Important changes are occurring in the distribution of economic and political power, and in traditional norms and values.

Since 1944 there has been a democratic transfer of power within a well established two party system and a peaceful transition from colonial status to self rule.

These developments have been greatly influenced by those who hold positions of power and prestige in the various social institutions: government, business, education, labor, etc. It is important to ask to what extent future leaders and citizens are being prepared to accept their roles in a democratic political system.

As the Jamaican secondary school system is one of the most important recruitment channels for Jamaican leadership, a study of the political socialization of the secondary school population will be of manifest practical significance. The graduates of these schools will be called upon in the future to make decisions which will affect the newly laid foundations of a democratic political order.

This research will be of scientific interest to the extent that it provides substance for the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter I.

To provide insights into the heterogeneous milieu that is Jamaica, this chapter begins with a brief survey of early Jamaican history and more recent political developments. This is followed by a discussion of the economic and social structure of Jamaica.

Jamaica is centrally located in the Caribbean Sea, over 1,000 miles northwest of Trinidad, one hundred miles west of Haiti, and approximately ninety miles south of Cuba. With an area of 4,411 square miles and a population of some 1.6 million, it is the largest and most heavily populated island in the formerly British West Indies. The climate is tropical but relatively mild, being cooled by the trade winds. The mean annual temperature at Kingston, the capital, is 80°F., and the average annual rainfall is 77 inches.

Almost a quarter of the Jamaican population (376,520) is concentrated in the metropolitan area of Kingston, the main port and administrative, industrial, and cultural center. The next largest towns are Montego Bay (23,610) and Spanish Town (14,424).[1]

Jamaican History to 1938[2]

When Columbus discovered Jamaica in 1494 and claimed it for Spain, the only inhabitants were the Arawaks, an unwarlike and docile tribe of Amerindians. They had almost been completely exterminated by the time the British captured Jamaica in 1655.

During the Spanish occupation Jamaica served as a supply base for Spanish mainland expeditions. A few crops were planted for the sustenance of the occupants and sugar cane was introduced. In 1502 the first African slaves were brought into the Caribbean to work on the few established plantations. By 1611 about 44 per cent of the Jamaican population were of African origin while the Arawaks had been reduced to less than five per cent.[3]

Little remains today of the 146 years of Spanish rule in Jamaica. A few historical sites and decaying buildings are left; probably none of Jamaica's present population can trace its ancestry to the pre-1655 population, despite fanciful claims. Linguistically a few place names have remained and there are a few everyday words that may be left from the Spanish period, although it is difficult to differentiate these from the Spanish terms that have been brought back from Cuba and Central America by migrant laborers in the last eighty years.

An English party sent out by Cromwell captured Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655. A short period of military government followed the English occupation. Thereafter, an administration similar to that in existence in the mainland colonies of America was introduced and was to last until 1865. It had a governor appointed by the Crown, a council nominated by the Governor from among the local people, and an elected House of Assembly. This form of government has been called the "old representative system," because the Assembly that formed the lower house was elected. The system was not representative of the population in the modern sense of the term. The electorate was very small, consisting essentially of land-owning whites, and the assembly came to represent primarily the planting and land-owning interests, although near the end of the period some professional and mercantile interests were represented as well. Though most of the members of both Council and Assembly were plantation owners and represented the same small class, there was constant competition between them. While the Council sided with the British Parliament, the Assembly became extremely aggressive in pursuing the planters' interest, especially in questions connected with the slave trade and emancipation.

The British made great efforts to develop the agricultural potential of the island, and within fifty years there were numerous indigo, cacao, and sugar plantations. Large numbers of slaves were brought from Africa to work on the plantations. Over a million slaves were brought to the island in all, 200,000 were re-exported and 800,000 remained to replenish the island's own labor force. Yet by 1834, the date of the Emancipation Act, the slave population was no more than 311,000, a figure which suggests that conditions did not favor a long life for an African.[4]

Although there were many minor slave rebellions prior to emancipation, there was nothing comparable to the disaster which befell white slave owners in Haiti, only 100 miles away. Jamaican slave owners were more fortunate. In each uprising a few estates were burned and some settlers were murdered, but the rebels were usually caught and executed or, as in the case of the leadership of the famous Tacky's rebellion, committed suicide when they recognized that they had no hope for freedom. Thus, unlike Haiti, the white squirearchy was able to maintain its dominant position in Jamaica.

The eighteenth century was one of prosperity in the sugar trade and great fortunes were made by Jamaican plantation owners. The decline of the sugar trade coincided with the restriction of the slave trade and the later emancipation of slaves in 1834. Jamaica's slaves were set free, but the slaves' new freedom was very much a freedom to starve. Little provision was made for the 311,000 new citizens and they had no legal property of their own. The former slave could of course stay with his ex-master as a wage laborer, and many planters evicted their former slaves from their huts in hope of making them so dependent on their wages that they would stay on the plantations. As it turned out, most of the slaves could not be persuaded to continue voluntarily their old life. Many worked for wages and saved enough money to buy their huts and gardens from their masters; most ran off into the unsettled hills and squatted on Crown lands. Others were helped by the missionaries to establish their own farms and villages. It was in these ways that a class of small landed peasantry came into existence. The pattern of land settlement and ownership established during this period has remained until the present. Large plantations devoted to sugar, bananas, cocoanuts, etc., occupy the most valuable agricultural land in the valleys, while small peasant holdings are dispersed throughout the mountain regions. The relatively conservative demands of the independent small farmer in rural areas has been an important element in modern Jamaican politics.

From emancipation to 1864, the Jamaican Assembly stubbornly resisted the new conditions of emancipation. The Assembly passed legislation which raised the property qualification on the franchise to a level which would automatically exclude ex-slaves. Thus by 1864, the island contained a small number of white oligarchs at the apex of the power pyramid, a small number of mulatto or colored leaders, and the black masses.

The Morant Bay rebellion in 1865, under the leadership of a small group of coloreds, marked the end of an era. Although the rebellious acts were on a relatively small scale, the Assembly was frightened into breaking its long opposition to constitutional and social reforms urged by the Crown and voted itself out of existence. From 1865 to 1884, a Crown Colony government reigned in Jamaica in which the British Governor exercised dictatorial powers. It was during this period that the vast majority of Jamaican Negroes tasted the first fruits of emancipation.

In 1884 a semi-representative government was again introduced, but the major political powers still remained with the Governor. This power structure was not seriously challenged again until 1938.

Recent Political History

In 1938, unemployment and poverty were widespread; a long series of strikes and disturbances set in motion mass labor movements which reinforced nationalist movements for independence. The process culminated in 1944 with the grant of representative government based on universal adult suffrage. The disturbance in 1938 launched the political careers of the two men who have dominated Jamaica's political scene ever since--Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley.

Alexander Bustamante (later knighted), who in 1938 was a "pass-for-white" money-lender, became the first champion of the Negro laboring class, the father of trade unionism, and the first successful, popular Jamaican leader. Bustamante figured largely in the disorders, appearing at the center of almost every incident until he was arrested and charged with sedition. The arrest only enhanced his popularity. His

> . . . . magnetic appeal to the masses flowed from his impressive physical stature, his use of oratorical pyrotechnics to arouse his listeners to a pitch of emotional frenzy, his earthiness which seemed but a large projection of his followers, his physical courage in times of stress and his shrewdness in sensing and mastering a particular political tide. There was, too, his overweening self-confidence in manipulating his followers, expressed in the boast that they 'would vote for a dog' if he so directed.[5]
>
> An adventurer appearing out of the blue to lead the toiling multitude, he was the charismatic leader of all charismatic leaders. With his towering stature, wild hair, striking features and high-pitched voice, he combined a histrionic flamboyance with a rare understanding of the bread and butter issues which went straight to the worker's heart.[6]

Norman Manley--the most prominent barrister at the time--and his cousin Bustamante, united to negotiate on behalf of the strikers. Together they made a highly successful bridge between workers and employers; while Manley's reputation reconciled the employers to negotiate with Bustamante, the latter's popularity with the workers gave Manley a mandate to speak on their behalf.

Norman Manley's background was in sharp contrast to that of Bustamante. From childhood on, his career was uniformly successful. He was awarded a Rhodes scholarship, attended Oxford and earned high honors at Gray's Inn. He quickly established himself in Jamaica and began an outstanding career at the bar. Manley is characterized by some of his supporters as by instinct an aristocrat, whose interest in the working classes is primarily intellectual Fabianism. If this characterization seems unfair, there can be little doubt that Norman Manley brought to the Jamaican political scene a first-rate mind and a comprehensive diagnosis and remedy for Jamaica's ills based on Fabian Socialist principles.

During the tension filled days of 1938, Bustamante was engaged in organizing a blanket labor union, one which would include all trades--the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU). Meanwhile, Manley was actively involved in the formation of the People's National Party (PNP), a Socialist party affiliated with the British Labour Party, aimed at national independence under socialism.

Although a working alliance was established between the BITU and the PNP, friction developed between Manley and Bustamante.

> To him [Bustamante] the P.N.P. objective of self-government would mean 'brown man rule' or colored middle class government for Jamaica, scarcely a palatable prospect for the heavily black membership of the B.I.T.U. . . . He deplored the mild socialism adopted by the P.N.P. in 1940. The essential atmosphere of a P.N.P. meeting, serious middle-class intellectuals self-consciously striving to introduce a rationalist political movement in Jamaica, could hardly be congenial to Bustamante. His natural preference was for spur-of-the-moment improvisation and skillful mass manipulation to achieve his narrower trade union objectives.

The rivalry between Bustamante and Manley--which has characterized Jamaican politics to the present--led Bustamante to withdraw his support from the PNP and to form his own political party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Thus the stage was set for what has developed into a fairly stable two-party system in Jamaica with the leadership of the government and opposition swinging back and forth between Bustamante and Manley.

In the first election of 1944 under the new form of government, Bustamante and the JLP won the majority of seats in the legislature. This victory was repeated again in the elections of 1949, although by a reduced majority. In 1949 the PNP actually polled more votes, but did not gain a majority of the seats. During both campaigns Bustamante fought Manley's socialist platform of "two acres and a cow" for every peasant with the effective counter-argument that "If you have two cows, Manley will take one away."

Manley's personal efforts were no match for the charisma of Bustamante. The program of the PNP was appreciated primarily by the educated minority. It therefore remained a middle-class party without the working-class support that Bustamante could rely on from the BITU.

In an effort to improve the fortunes of the PNP, three important changes were made. First, the leadership of the PNP in an effort to broaden its own support among the working class, organized its own trade union, the National Workers Union (NWU). Second, the leadership of the militant, socialist left-wing of the PNP was expelled on the charge of communist intrigue. The expulsion helped remove the "red" label which the JLP had so effectively hung on the PNP. Third, the party decided to build the charisma of Manley by the manipulation of his public image. Manley was projected as "Man of Destiny" and "Father of the Nation." His national portrait was one of epic greatness, a benevolent father figure whose policies could be trusted, if not understood.

In the elections of 1955 the PNP won a comfortable victory, and in 1957 Manley became the first Prime Minister of an all-elected Government with full internal power. Little further was heard about the early socialism of the PNP and the party steadily moved to the right. Economic development became its major objective.

Through a series of negotiations dating from 1947, the islands of the British West Indies agreed to form the Federation of the West Indies, which was established in 1958. After winning a major victory in the national elections of 1959, the PNP leadership announced that it would submit the question of remaining in the Federation to the people of Jamaica through a referendum.

Once again Manley made the campaign mistake of casting his intellectual arguments in favor of the Federation over the head of the masses. Bustamante conducted a remarkable campaign against the Federation. He spoke of loss of jobs to immigrating "small-islanders"; he made the price of bread and salt-fish central issues of the campaign and reminded his audiences of his sacrifices for them in 1938. The Jamaicans voted against the Federation by a substantial majority, a resounding victory for Bustamante.

The referendum battle was somewhat complicated by the emergency of a third party, the People's Political Party (PPP). Millard Johnson, the leader of the PPP, placed his party's appeal clearly on racial lines. He accused "The Cousins" (Bustamante and Manley) of having done nothing at all in their periods of office to end discrimination against the black man. He pointed to the high status of the white and brown people compared to that of the black. Discrimination must end, he said, and with it the suffering of the black people. Not to be outdone by "Mr. Freedom Fighter" (Bustamante) and "Mr. Referendum" (Manley), Johnson entered the federation campaign as "Mr. Emancipator."

The PPP had no positive economic program but its racist appeal led to considerable public attention. The question was how far could this extremely limited racist policy take a party in present-day Jamaica. In the general election of 1959, the PNP and JLP together accounted for over 99 per cent of the votes cast. In the general election of 1962, the PPP obtained less than one per cent of the votes while the PPP and JLP together garnered 98.6 per cent.[8] The PPP entered candidates in 16 of the 45 Jamaican constituencies. All of the PPP candidates lost their fifty pound deposits due to the failure to secure as much as one-eighth of the number of votes cast in their constituencies.[9]

> To add insult to injury, a white Syrian and a Harvard University graduate in Sociology running against a medium-brown candidate who called himself 'Burning Spear' [although a PNP, not a PPP candidate] won a seat in an urban slum composed mostly of unemployed and underemployed blacks where racists' appeal should not have fallen upon deaf ears unless racial factors were of considerably less importance than economic factors to the depressed classes of Jamaica.[10]

In the election of 1962, the JLP won 54 per cent of the total vote and 26 of the 45 seats in the House of Representatives.[11] Where in the past Bustamente's Government had "no programme, no policy and no sense of direction except opposition,"[12] he was now fortunate in drawing to himself a group of talented young men who were able to provide the party with well formulated policies.

The JLP has generally followed a more economically conservative national policy than has the PNP, although many of the more liberal supporters of the PNP decry its own moderate, middle-of-the-road policies while in office.[13] Since independence, Jamaica has followed a pro-Western foreign policy for the most part. Minutes after his 1962 election victory, Bustamante offered Jamaican territory to the United States as a military base. Jamaica has signed a military aid pact with the United States and its voting record in the United Nations has a generally pro-Western pattern, although on questions of colonialism it generally sides with the neutralist countries.[14] The JLP foreign policy has been sharply criticized by the PNP and other elements as being too unabashedly aligned with the West.

Jamaica became an independent nation within the British Commonwealth on August 6, 1962. Sir Alexander Bustamante, jailed for sedition by the British a quarter of a century before, became the first Prime Minister.

The new constitution provides for a form of government modeled after the British parliamentary system. The lower house, the House of Representatives, is the major legislative body of the government.

The upper house, called the Senate, has only advisory and delaying powers. The leader of the majority party becomes the Prime Minister upon the formality of being so designated by the Governor. The Governor, who represents the Crown, has very limited powers. The Prime Minister selects the other ministers (with the formality of designation by the Governor), and forms a cabinet. General elections are to be held every five years or less. Universal adult suffrage was established in 1944, and all Jamaican citizens over the age of 21 are eligible to vote.[15]

The Economic System

Since 1950 rapid economic growth and diversification of the Jamaican economy have taken place. The exploitation of bauxite and an expanding tourist trade have aided in this development.

As can be seen in Table 1, the Gross National Product (GNP) has more than doubled between 1953 and 1962, although the annual percentage increase declined between 1960 and 1962. From 1953 to 1961, fixed capital expenditure has represented a high percentage of the Gross National Product. It rose from 12.4 per cent in 1953 to 26.1 per cent in 1957, and then decreased until it stood at 19 per cent in 1961. National income per capita has more than tripled from 15.1 pounds in 1938 to 50.4 pounds in 1950; between 1950 and 1960 per capita income more than doubled to 136.7 pounds.[16]

TABLE 1.--Annual Increase in Gross National Product, Jamaica, 1953-1962.*

Year	Gross National Product	Annual Percentage Increase
1953	114.6	. .
1954	127.7	11.5
1955	145.3	13.7
1956	166.7	14.8
1957	199.6	19.7
1958	207.0	3.7
1959	221.2	6.8
1960	240.8	8.8
1961	254.6	5.7
1962	260.0	2.1

Source: Central Planning Unit, Economic Survey, Jamaica, 1962 (Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 1963), p. 29.

*Current value in millions of pounds (one Jamaican pound equals approximately $2.80).

While a good many persons benefited from this development, it is clear that in many sectors of the population conditions did not materially improve. In an era of rapid development, particularly in the earlier stages, it is the people with advantages such as education or ownership of property or capital who reap the greatest rewards. Approximately 37 per cent of the island's labor force is in the agricultural sector, yet the share of the gross domestic product going to this sector is only 12.4 per cent.[17] Data on income distribution are notoriously deficient in most countries, and Jamaica is no exception. But available evidence suggests that there are serious imbalances in income distribution in Jamaica, as a function of the distribution of land; levels of education; and the insufficiency of employment opportunities.

The contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product at factor cost has increased by nine million pounds from 1953 to 1962 (at current values), but its share of the total product fell from 21.2 per cent to 12.4 per cent. Over the same period, industry, construction, and manufacturing increased in absolute value and in contribution to gross domestic product.[18]

In the past decade there has been a rapid rise in exports and imports, but the increase in exports has not kept pace with imports. The visible deficit reached a peak of 22.5 million pounds in 1959, and was still at 15 million pounds in 1962. This overall deficit has been somewhat decreased by the "invisible export" of tourism.[19] A deficit at this stage of development is inescapable since capital goods are necessary for growth and must be imported. The problem is to prevent the deficit from assuming excessive proportions which would be detrimental to further development.

The total value of domestic exports in 1962 was 61.9 million pounds (compared to 46.8 in 1958), to which bauxite and alumina contributed 20.1 million; sugar, rum and molasses 16.4 million; bananas, whose contribution has been declining, 4.2 million; citrus, cocoa, coffee, pimento and ginger 4.2 million; and other products, 7 million.[20]

There has been a gradual shift in the direction of Jamaica's trade away from the sterling area to the dollar area (USA and Canada). In 1962 the dollar area took 57 per cent of Jamaica's exports and provided 41 per cent of its imports; the sterling area took only 30 per cent of its exports and provided 39 per cent of its imports.[21] With independence,Jamaica is faced with the task of working out arrangements for the satisfactory disposal of the island's exports in competition with other producers and against a background of disappearing preferential tariffs.

Although Jamaica has experienced a relatively high rate of economic growth, this has been partially offset by population increases. The rate of natural increase of the population rose from about 1.7 per cent in 1943 to 3.2 per cent in 1960. Soon after 1950, Jamaicans began migrating to the United Kingdom in increasing numbers. In the past 15 years some 175,000 have emigrated to that country and only 12,000 are estimated to have returned. This movement relieved population pressure considerably. The natural increase in population from 1951 to 1962 amounted to 521,000. Net migration, including a small movement to countries other than the United Kingdom, amounted to 191,000 or about 37 per cent of the natural increase. But in July, 1962, Britain placed restrictions on immigration from Commonwealth countries. In the first six months of 1962 about 19,000 Jamaicans emigrated to Britain. Between July when the restrictions came into effect and December, emigration dropped to 4,000.[22] The closing of the doors to emigration poses a potentially serious threat to Jamaica's economic development and a severe political challenge to the Government.

Economic progress has been achieved in the face of serious difficulties, and future growth and development will depend on the degree to which Jamaica can compensate for or overcome these difficulties. The island is small with very limited natural resources; less than one-third of its total area is suited for continuous cultivation. The economy of the island is almost wholly dependent upon conditions beyond its domentic control: foreign investment capital, foreign tourists, foreign bauxite and agricultural markets, and foreign areas to which Jamaica can siphon its unemployed. The country must achieve a satisfactory rate of economic growth while providing increasing services and amenities for the population to keep the protests of groups such as the Rastafarians,[23] The Unemployed Workers Council,[24] and the Young Socialist League,[25] who seriously question the legitimacy of the present social and political order, from spreading to significantly larger sectors of the population.

Jamaican Social Structure and the Significance of the Jamaican Secondary School Population

Class and Color

The population of Jamaica is predominantly of African descent, with small but influential minorities. Multi-racial relationships are the dominant reality in the country as expressed in the national motto: "Out of Many, One People."

Historical influences, however, have so far hindered the achievement of full integration. Social and economic stratification still follow racial lines to a major degree, although this correlation appears to be diminishing.

The basic racial pattern of Jamaica was established by the eighteenth century. At the bottom of the social and economic ladder were the quarter of a million black slaves. In the middle rungs the Afro-Europeans (Coloreds or Browns) were already being differentiated from the Blacks. They were moving into positions of intermediate responsibility where a vacuum had been created by the lack of a sizeable white population. The highest status positions were occupied by the absentee landlord, resident planters, estate attorneys, well-to-do Scottish and Jewish merchants--all whites.[26]

The racial and color characteristics of the Jamaican population have remained relatively stable since 1911.

In 1960 the racial and color composition of the population was reported as follows: Black 76.8 per cent, Colored 15.1 per cent, White .9 per cent, Chinese and Afro-Chinese 1.2 per cent, East Indian and Afro-East Indian 3.4 per cent, and other 3.2 per cent.[27]

As Jamaica entered the twentieth century it could still be divided into three broad social classes. In his examination of the Jamaican Census data of 1943, Broom was able to relate color to education, income, high status occupations, and size of farm holdings. In each case the least advantaged were the Blacks, and the most advantaged were the Whites. The Coloreds occupied the middle positions.[28]

In his study of the Jamaican social structure, M. G. Smith found the same situation with Whites overrepresented in the upper stratum, Browns in the middle and Black in the lower.[29] He also found that the legal positions of the strata are different. Jamaican laws have historically reflected the interests of the dominant section in controlling the subordinate. National laws relating to ganja (marijuana),bastardy, praedial larceny, and obeah (witch-craft) are all directed towards the lowest sector. The high cost of legal advice, illiteracy, and unfamiliarity with legal details effectively deprives individuals in the lower strata of justice in civil issues against their "superiors."[30]

While emphasizing the characteristics of the three major social strata in Jamaican society one must avoid oversimplification and not overlook the transitions that has taken place in Jamaica, particularly among the political elite. Table 2 reports the color distribution of members of the elected House of Representatives and of the appointed Legislative Council for 1951 and 1958.

Table 2.--Percentage of Members of the House of Representatives and the Legislative Council According to Color, 1951 and 1958.

	Elected House of Representatives		Appointed Legislative Council	
COLOR	1951 (per cent)	1958 (per cent)	1951 (per cent)	1958 (per cent)
White and light	11	9	86	47
Olive and light brown	36	41	7	29
Dark brown	42	28	7	18
Black	11	22	0	6
Total	100	100	100	100
Number of Cases	(28)	(32)	(15)	(17)

Source: Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders, Political Attitudes In A New Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), Table 9, page 83.

In both groups for each reported year the dark brown and black elements are underrepresented, if one's sole criterion is population proportionality. However, we can see that there has been a shift in the locus of power away from the historically dominant Whites to the darker skinned Jamaicans. In the higher status Legislative Council there was a decrease in the percentage of white and light members from 1951 to 1958, from 86 to 47 per cent. The largest increase was in the percentage of olive and light persons.

The House of Representatives was more representative in 1951 of the color characteristics of Jamaica than was the appointed Council. This was even more true in 1958. Between 1951 and 1958 the relative number of black representatives doubled. However, the percentage of dark brown and black representativescombined was nearly the same, about 50 per cent. Also the percentage of white and light brown combined remained about the same.[31]

Although there has been an increase in black skinned persons among the political elite, Jamaica still had a long way to go in 1958 to achieve a proportional political representation of the black masses.

Family Organization

The pioneer studies of West Indian family organization have generally offered competing historical explanations based on African cultural persistence or the after effects of slavery.[32] Only recently have detailed quantitative studies of family organization among West

Indians been published.[33] An important finding in each study is the dominant role of the female in the family. R. Smith in his study of the Negro family in British Guiana,and E. Clark in her study of family relations in Jamaica, both point to the "matrifocal" relations in the domestic family.

Anthropologists have long been aware of the incidence of maternal (or mother only) families in less industrialized countries. It has been estimated that approximately 25 per cent of the families in Jamaica are continuously maternal. Table 3 presents a percentage distribution of Jamaican mothers by union status and age. In no age group does the percentage of mothers who are living with their conjugal partners rise about 70 per cent. By the age of 39, 13.4 per cent of the mothers have yet to live with the father of their children.

A considerable body of literature has been devoted to the effect of father-absent families on child and adolescent socialization.[34] The effects of father absence has been traced to low academic achievement;[35] inability to delay gratification;[36] poor psychological adjustment with excessive submissiveness and dependency;[37] and low leadership performance.[38] Moreover, it may be inferred from political studies that the absence of the father may remove an important political stimulant from the family environment.[39] This literature strongly underlies the emphasis in this study upon the differential effects of

TABLE 3.--Percentage Distribution of Mothers by Union Status and Age, 1960.

Union Status	Age				
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39
Never lived with partner	67.1	41.7	22.8	16.0	13.4
No longer living with husband or common-law partner	6.4	9.4	11.3	13.2	15.4
Living with husband or common-law partner	25.0	47.4	64.4	69.4	69.7
Not stated	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: O. C. Francis, The People of Modern Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1963). This data is adapted from Table 5-8, p. 5-16.

selected types of Jamaican family structure upon the political socialization process.

The Secondary School System and Students as a Politically Significant Group

The inequality of educational opportunities in Jamaica is an important mechanism of social, economic and political differentiation. A restrictive educational system governs the distribution of the skills, knowledge, and statuses which are conditions of recruitment to elite positions.

Historically, people in the upper strata of the Jamaican population have monopolized the local franchise on the basis of educational and property qualifications. They have used their political influence to secure large government grants at high tuition secondary schools while keeping expenditures on free elementary education very low.[40] Thus differential allocation of political rights which was based on educational and economic differences was used by its beneficiaries to maximize educational differences which underlay the economic and political equalities.

It was not until 1957 that this ring of inequality was significantly altered. In that year a "free place" scholarship program was instituted. Under this plan all students who desire to enter government-aided secondary schools are required to take a common entrance examination. This examination is taken between the ages of 10-1/2 and 13 years. A fixed number of those persons with the highest scores are awarded "free places." This is a type of scholarship in which the government pays the tuition fees of the students. Additional grants are made to "needy" students for school board and lodging, books, clothing, etc. Free place scholarships are generally only given to children whose parents earn less than 100 pounds each year.[41]

Persons who pass the common entrance exam but are not awarded a free place must pay normal fees to attend secondary school. Students who do not pass this exam are permitted to attend secondary schools upon payment of the school fees plus a sum equal to the government grant-in-aid per pupil to that school. These last two groups of students are given places in the school only if the places have not already been taken by free place winners. In 1963 these "full payee's" numbered only 900 or two per cent of the entering eighth graders.[42]

From 1958 to 1963, approximately 60 per cent of the entering students have had free place scholarships. An additional 38 per cent had passed the common entrance examination and were paid partial grants-in-aid by the government (presumably many students from middle and upper class families are included in this category). Only two per cent of entering students have been paying the full cost of their education.[43]

The Ministry of Education estimated that the cost of one year's attendance at a government-aided secondary school might be as follows:

tuition 70 pounds, boarding costs 140-150 pounds, plus the cost of transportation, clothes, books, etc. Even if the student was not boarding at the school, it is clear that until free place scholarships were instituted the other costs effectively barred children of working class families from obtaining a secondary education.

The secondary educational system plays a major role in the elite recruitment process of most countries. It has become increasingly important in less industrialized nations, and by the 1960's in both less industrial and industrial countries a secondary education was "indispensable for most people who [wanted] to be considered for high positions in the government, in large business, in politics, and in the professions."[44]

Students in less industrialized nations, although they may not occupy formal positions of power, often have great prestige and are accorded high status. It is expected that in the future they will hold positions of power and will have considerable influence in the affairs of the nation. Therefore, they are accorded status in conformity with their anticipatory status.[45]

There is every reason to believe that these generalizations also apply to Jamaica. Only an extremely small portion of the Jamaican school age population (six per cent) has been able to gain entry into the government secondary school system. Thus these students are already "elite" in the educational sense.[46] As high correlations have been found between education on one hand, and high status occupations, income, and formal government positions on the other, it can probably be stated safely that within a few years a significant number of these students will hold elite positions with regard to these other variables as well.[47]

Because the Jamaican secondary school system appears to be one of the most important recruitment channels for Jamaican leadership, the population of secondary school students provides a politically significant focal point for the study of the political socialization process in a preindustrial country.

Herbert Hyman's review of the literature on "political socialization" dispelled the doubts of most skeptics concerning the early crystallization of political attitudes.[48] Among Jamaican students we find that 63 per cent have formed definite party identifications by the time they are in the eighth grade (first form). In this first year in secondary school fourteen per cent of the Jamaican students are already active political spectators; they report that they read articles on "politics and government every day" in the Gleaner, Jamaica's national daily newspaper. Thirty-two per cent are "very" or "somewhat" interested in politics in the eighth grade and this rises to 48 per cent among twelfth graders. Only 55 per cent of the students' families were reported to be "very" or "somewhat" interested in politics. This would indicate that by the time the average student reaches the twelfth grade he is about as interested in politics as are his adult parents. Not only are many Jamaican students interested in politics, 52 per cent of those in the eighth grade already see the national government as being relevant to their day-to-day lives.[49]

The relatively high rate of interest and political sensitivity described by this data suggests that when we probe the socialization process among this select group of adolescents, it will not be in politically barren soil.

In the next chapter, we shall examine the role of the family and family structure in the political socialization of Jamaican secondary school students.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

[1] Handbook of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica: The Government Printing Office, 1962, Chapter 2; and O. C. Francis, The People of Modern Jamaica, (Kingston, Jamaica: Jamaican Department of Statistics, 1963), Table 1.4, p. 1-9. The population figures are based on the 1960 national census.

[2] J. H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1963); Clinton V. Black, History of Jamaica (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1958); and Central Office of Information, Jamaica: The Making of a Nation (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962).

[3] Frank Cundall and Joseph Pietersz, Jamaica Under the Spaniards (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Jamaica, 1919), p. 34.

[4] Katrin Norris, Jamaica: The Search For An Identity (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chapter 1.

[5] C. Paul Bradley, "Mass Parties in Jamaica: Structure and Organization," Social and Economic Studies, 9 (December, 1960), 395-396.

[6] K. Norris, op. cit., p. 20.

[7] Bradley, op. cit., p. 393.

[8] Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, General Election 1959 (Kingston, Jamaica: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 5; and Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, General Election 1962 (Kingston, Jamaica: The Government Printer, 1962), p. 4.

[9] General Election 1962, ibid., p. 2.

[10] Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 20.

[11] General Election 1962, op. cit., p. 4.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III-continued

[12] O. W. Phelps, "Rise of the Labour Movement in Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies, 9 (December, 1960), 456.

[13] Each major party seems to receive some support from all sections of Jamaican society, although the JLP allegedly receives its major support from rural small farmers and large estate owners; a majority of the BITU membership; big business; and conservative small businessmen. The PNP is alleged to draw heavily from middle-class intellectuals and professionals; progressive businessmen; a majority of the N. W. U.; and the urban proletariat. It is not uncommon for a worker with upwardly mobile aspirations to make a rather ostentatious display of his preferences for the PNP. This is often accompanied by some deprecation--"only dem ignorant people [lower class] who like the JLP."

[14] Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell, "Emergent Caribbean Nations Face the Outside World," Social Problems, 12 (Summer, 1964), 24-41.

[15] James B. Kelley, "The Jamaican Independence Constitution of 1962," Caribbean Studies, 3 (April, 1963), 18-83; Jesse H. Proctor, "British West Indian Society and Government in Transition 1920-1960," Social and Economic Studies, 11 (December, 1962), 273-304; Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search For Self-Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960); and Douglas G. Anglin, "The Political Development of The West Indies," in David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 35-62.

[16] Per capita income data was taken from George Cumper, "Notes on Social Structure in Jamaica," Report of the Conference on Social Development in Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: The Herald Ltd., n.d.), p. 15; and Ministry of Development and Welfare, Five Year Independence Plan, 1963-1968 (Kingston, Jamaica: The Government Printer, 1963), pp. 20,29.

[17] Five Year Plan, op. cit., p. 39.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III-continued

[18] Ibid.,p. 16; and Central Planning Unit, Economic Survey of Jamaica, 1962 (Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 1963), p. 31.

[19] Ibid.,p. 23.

[20] Ibid., p. 18.

[21] Five Year Plan, op. cit., p. 24.

[22] Ibid., pp. 8-9; and R. B. Davison, West Indian Migrants (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[23] The Ras Tafarian cult is the outstanding manifestation in the island of extreme alienation through prolonged social and economic deprivation with no hope for improvement. Jamaican (Western) values are strongly rejected, African ones are substituted (or what are thought to be African values). The Ras Tafarians demand for repatriation to Africa, "the good life," is loudly articulated and provides both a psychic and physical escape. M. G. Smith, Ray Augier, and Rex Nettleford, The Ras Tafari Movement in Kingston, Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: University College of the West Indies, 1960).

[24] The Unemployed Worker's Council, like the Ras Tafarians, expresses the radical discontent and alienation of the economically deprived Jamaicans. This small but highly articulate group loudly protests the injustices dealt the Jamaican masses. Economic solutions offered generally follow socialist lines.

[25] Shortly after the 1962 elections, a small set of acutely politically conscious Jamaicans began organizing what has come to be called the Young Socialist League. Tired of the "middle-reading" policies of the PNP and JLP, the Young Socialists are convinced that the island must move left if it is to go forward. League membership is open to people between the ages of 16 and 35. The League either has not attempted to recruit government secondary school students or it has been singularly unsuccessful. For only two students in the sample report participation in the League.

Through a series of Area Councils it is endeavoring to "expose the political corruption and social conditions on the island," and most

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III-continued

important, to educate the people in the principles and philosophy of socialism. The League is potentially one of the most dynamic innovations in Jamaican politics since 1938. At present it provides "counsel" and support for (and is being used by) the liberal wing of the People's National Party.

The middle-class, intellectual background of League members removes it from the same category as the "Rastas" and the Worker's Council. Its democratic socialist proscriptions are peaceful, well reasoned, and not broadcast in the "radical" tone of the Worker's Council. It is only in private conversation with members that one detects a profound cynicism concerning the utility of democratic political forms in the speedy movement toward economic and social reform, and the "equalitarian society." For additional information concerning the Young Socialist League see: "Young Socialists," Spotlight, 25 (February, 1964), 12.

[26] Leonard Broom, "The Social Differentiation of Jamaica," American Sociological Review, 19 (April, 1954), 115-125.

[27] O. Francis, op. cit., Table 4.1, p. 4.2.

[28] Broom, op. cit., pp. 115-125.

[29] M. G. Smith, "Plural Framework of Jamaican Society," British Journal of Sociology, 12 (September, 1961), 249-262.

[30] Ibid., pp. 256-257;and "Police advised: Don't arrest well known people on 'frivolous charges,'" Daily Gleaner, April 16, 1964, p. 29.

[31] In Table 2, Wendell Bell's 1951 data was adapted from Leonard Bloom, op. cit., p. 125. Unfortunately, Bloom has no data for four members of the House in 1951, so color differences between 1951 and 1958 must be accepted with caution.

[32] M. J. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past (New York: Harper, 1941); and Dom Basil Matthews, The Crisis in the West Indian Family (Trinidad: Port of Spain, Extra Mural Department, University College of the West Indies, 1953).

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III-continued

[33] M. G. Smith, West Indian Family Structure (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962); Edith Clarke, My Mother Who Fathered Me (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957); and Raymond T. Smith, The Negro Family in British Guiana (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956).

[34] See Bronfenbrenner for a summary of some of this literature. Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Some Familial Antecedents of Responsibility and Leadership in Adolescents," in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (eds.), Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 265ff.

[35] John D. Herzog, "Deliberate Instruction and Household Structure," Harvard Educational Review, 32 (Summer, 1962), 301-342; John D. Herzog, Additional Parameters for Educational Planners: Some Thoughts from Research in Barbados, Unpublished Manuscript, 1964; Roger V. Burton and John W. M. Whiting, "The Absent Father and Cross Sex Identity," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 7 (April, 1961), 84-95; and Glen H. Elder, "Family Structure and Educational Attainment: A Cross National Analysis," American Sociological Review, 30 (February, 1965), 81-96.

[36] W. Mischel, "Preference for Delayed Reinforcement: An Experimental Study of Cultural Observation," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 (1958), 57-61.

[37] Bruce H. Sclarew, "Relationship of Early Separation from Parents to Differences in Adjustment in Adolescent Boys and Girls," Psychiatry, 22 (November, 1959), 399-405; David Lynne and William Sowery, "Effects of Father Absence on Norwegian Boys and Girls," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59 (September, 1959), 258-262; Murray A. Straus, "Conjugal Power Structure and Adolescent Personality," Marriage and Family Living, 24 (February, 1962), 17-25; and Lois M. Stolz, Father Relations of Warborn Children (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1954).

[38] Bronfenbrenner, op. cit., pp. 239-271.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III-continued

[39] Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 84, 101; and Daniel Goldrich, "A Comparative Study in the Political Socialization of Panamanian and Puerto Rican Schoolboys," in Frank A. Pinner (ed.), Genesis of Political Behavior (forthcoming).

[40] Smith, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

[41] Private communication with the Jamaican Ministry of Education, Spring, 1964.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 100.

[45] Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New Nations," World Politics, 12 (April, 1960), 329-368.

[46] See Chapter II, footnote 8.

[47] James T. Duke, "Equalitarianism Among Emergent Elites In A New Nation" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1963), p. 95.

[48] Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

[49] The descriptive political data on Jamaican students were collected in this study.

CHAPTER IV

THE FAMILY AND POLITICS

It has been agreed generally that the family is one of the most important primary socialization agencies. In this chapter the role of the family and family structure is examined to determine its influence on the socialization of politically relevant attitudes.

In the first section the conceptual base is laid for the hypothesized influence of family structure and the cross-sex effect of maternal families. This is followed by an inquiry into: (1) the political relevance of the dependent attitudinal variables; (2) the differential effects of family structure upon these dependent variables; and (3) the stability of attitudes socialized in the family over the secondary school experience. In the final section other general effects of the family upon the political socialization process are examined.

The Family and Socialization

From the concept of self to his interpretation of sensory impressions, the individual is shaped, within limits of his biological heritage, by his social experiences. The family is the first social group in which he holds membership, and the first socializing agency in his life. The mother, father and siblings are the first people with whom he has contact and the first to teach him how to live with other people.

It is within the family that the individual learns his first set of social roles, and in doing so, takes a major step in the process of socialization. He learns what is expected of him as a child and how he should relate to other people. He learns his role within the family power structure and which family statuses control the resources which he covets (food, freedom from pain, warmth, affection). By cross-sex imitation and identification he learns, also, what behavior is sex-appropriate in the society and what behavior is inappropriate. It is within the social setting of the family, furthermore, that the individual first forms his self-concepts: the kind of person he perceives himself to be, what assets and liabilities he sees himself as possessing, and what he expects of himself in the present and the future.

The individual will carry with him into the school environment a set of role-behaviors and a self-concept that are largely the result of his family training. These may be greatly modified or they may be reinforced by his experiences in the peer group and school. In either case, the attitudinal dispositions and behavior patterns established in the family will constitute the foundations upon which further socialization must rest.

There is a scarcity of empirical research in political science on the role of the family in the political socialization process. However, on the basis of parent-child party identification correlations, the family has assumed an important conceptual position in models of voting behavior. Bernard Berelson comments that "it would not be inappropriate to consider the family as the primary unit of voting analysis."[1] Studies of voting behavior indicate that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the American electorate vote for their father's party.[2] Family environment may also influence the general political orientations, rather than the specific party for which an individual votes. Gabriel Almond found that members of the Communist Party tend to come from radical and left-wing, but not necessarily Communist families.[3] Similarly, Herbert Hyman found positive correlations between parent-child opinions on a number of politically relevant issues.[4]

In the more contemporary literature on early learning in the family, Robert Hess and David Easton[5] and Fred Greenstein[6] found that affective and evaluative orientations toward political authority roles precede the acquisition of factual knowledge about the behavior involved in political role performance. In both studies evidence is produced to support the assertion that the earliest affective-evaluative images of political authority are derived from parents and familial relations. Hess and Easton infer that the youngest children in their sample generalize from paternal role models in the family to the President of the United States.[7]

In some of the literature on family socialization, particularly in the national character school, there have been implicit and occasionally explicit allusions as to the possible differential effect of the parents on the political socialization of their children.[8] Sociologists have long been interested in the relationship between conjugal power structure and socialization. They reason that variations in family role structure (maternal vs. paternal dominance, e. g.) have consequences for both the internal processes of the family system and the socialization environment it provides.[9] Different power structure or gross differences in household composition (father absence, e. g.) may provide vastly different household personnel with which the child can interact and identify. Thus different household systems provide different constellations of "significant others" in the early learning process; these varied interaction patterns have differential effects on the socialization of the individual.

Certainly the maternal household environment where the child lives exclusively with his mother contrasts strikingly with the nuclear household where both father and mother are present. In the first instance, the mother is the controller of virtually all resources desired by the child; in the second, another person is present to mediate and is available as a model for imitation and identification. The "status envy" model of child development would hypothesize that these two types of households would have significantly different effects on the socialization of children. The central concept of this model is that the individual's envy of persons who control resources which he himself would like to control leads to covert practice of the envied role, and that in this process the individual begins to identify with the important "other" person and to internalize his (or her) attitudes as well as imitate his behavior.[10]

Thus the physical absence of the father has greater effect upon male than female children. Father absence leads to male cross-sex identification and the impedence of such male characteristics as independence and achievement orientation. Empirical evidence in support of this contention comes from studies of father-absent families; they show that male children and adolescents in such families tend to have lower academic achievement and be less achievement oriented than those in nuclear families.[11] Other studies report that boys from father-absent households develop decidedly effeminate behavior patterns.[12] Males from maternal families are also found to be more infantile, dependent, and submissive than those from households where the father is present.[13]

These findings have been explained by their authors in the following ways. First, male children from mother-child households lack appropriate male figures with whom to interact and identify, and thereby learn sex-appropriate role behavior. As a result, their ego development is retarded as they face debilitating conflicts over their cross-sex identification confounded by the insecurity of being the "sole male provider" in the maternal household. Secondly, mothers in mother-child households are more protective than mothers in nuclear households. They tend to keep their children physically and emotionally dependent upon them longer than do mothers of father-present males. Finally, given the tendency for the parent to be relatively more affectionate and over-solicitous toward the child of the opposite sex, the presence of the father may counteract and check the tendency of the mother to overprotect her son.

The foregoing conceptualization and empirical findings have led us to hypothesize that nuclear and maternal family structures will have differential effects upon the political socialization process in Jamaica. It is hypothesized that maternal households will have a greater effect upon male than female respondents in the following ways: (1) males from father-absent families are more likely than females to react to the anxiety of an insecure paternal identification with compensatory closed belief systems as measured by the dogmatism scale; (2) the absence of a paternal political stimulant and role model is more likely to retard the political interest of males than females;

and (3) maternal dominance will have a more debilitating effect on the feelings of political efficacy among males than females.

This model of maternal family socialization leads us to a final set of hypotheses which are as follows: (1) male respondents from maternal families have more authoritarian attitudes, are less politically interested, and feel less politically efficacious than male respondents from nuclear families; and (2) family structure (nuclear vs. maternal) has no differential effect upon the authoritarian attitudes, political interest and sense of political efficacy among female respondents.

Authoritarianism, Efficacy and Politics

The scale of authoritarianism used in this study is based on the research of Milton Rokeach.[14] Rokeach has developed a scale of general authoritarianism--both left and right--which he refers to as the Dogmatism Scale.[15] People who score high on this scale are distinguished by having adopted a "closed belief system" as a defense against anxiety. The dogmatic type is characterized as having a relatively rigid organization of beliefs and expectations, an authoritarian outlook on life, and an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs. These individuals

> may become disposed to accept or to form closed belief systems of thinking and believing in proportion to the degree to which they are made to feel alone, isolated,

> and helpless in the world in which they live and thus anxious of what the future holds in store for them.[16]

If we examine the political orientations of these dogmatic or authoritarian types, we find, for example, that those Jamaican students who have high authoritarianism scores are most inclined to "agree strongly" with a statement of explicit political authoritarianism: "what this country needs is a few strong, courageous and tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith" (Table 4). It is evident that this type of person finds the charismatic strongman or caudillo regime most appealing. A logical correlate is the authoritarian student's skepticism about the viability of political democracy in Jamaica (Table 4). Although the relationship is not as strong, a consistent pattern continues to form as a positive relationship is reported between high authoritarianism and the belief that "if a government is doing a good job it should be kept in office, even if this means the putting off of elections" (Table 4). The pattern continues to develop as high authoritarians are less disposed to perform their citizenship obligations (voting) than low authoritarians (Table 4).

This same snydrome was observed when a number of conceptually significant, but weaker relationships (5-6 per cent differences) were also found between high authoritarianism and the feeling that

TABLE 4.--Authoritarian Attitudes and Politics

Authoritarianism	Dependent Variable			x^2[*]
	Explicit authoritarianism: Country needs strong leaders in whom the people can put their faith			
	+3[**]	+2/-3	N	
Low and Medium	69	31	887	
High	82	18	336	.001
	Democracy will not work in Jamaica			
	+3/+2	+1/-3	N	
Low and Medium	27	73	838	
High	39	61	343	.001
	If government doing good job elections should be put off			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Low and Medium	60	40	847	
High	68	32	361	.01-.001
	It doesn't matter if I vote			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Low and Medium	25	75	862	
High	32	68	363	.01-.001

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[*] In this and the following tables, percentages are given for each cell and all row percentages total 100. All tables are tested for statistical significance by chi-square, unless otherwise noted. If the expected frequency in any cell is smaller than 5, Yate's correction for continuity is used. For each table a range of statistical probabilities is given that the differences found could be due to sampling error. A probability of less than .001 is reported as .001.

[**] In this and following tables, where responses to Likert-type statements are shown, the responses may be designated as follows: +3 agree strongly; +2 agree somewhat; +1 agree slightly; -1 disagree slightly; -2 disagree somewhat; -3 disagree strongly.

election campaigns are a waste of time, that a good job and plenty of money are more important than political freedom, and that selected minority groups "should not be allowed to hold public meetings even if they gather peacefully and only make speeches."

Thus within the Jamaican political system the authoritarian respondent has developed a network of beliefs which dispose him toward a strong-man or caudillo regime, and away from the trappings generally associated with democratic political systems.

It should be observed that the differences reported in Table 4 and mentioned in the above discussion are not of great magnitude, even though they are in the predicted direction and form a consistent pattern. The fact that the dogmatism or general authoritarianism dimension does not account for more of the variance in variables dealing with explicit political authoritarianism may be disappointing, particularly to those investigators who implicitly base their estimate of the significance of a relationship upon mono-casual models. However, most social scientists have long accepted multivariate models as the most likely explanation of selected human behavior and the fact that a number of variables as well as their interaction may each account for a certain percentage of the variation. It is within this frame of reference that the theoretical significance of a reported relationship or relationships should be viewed.

Natural scientists often accept a reported difference of one per cent as theoretically significant. However, the lack of reliable measuring instruments and the ability to control social variables normally does not allow the social scientist to accept such a small difference as conceptually significant. If he must work with small differences (although not as small as one per cent), the social scientist must often depend on the development of consistent patterns within his data as a link in his chain of evidence.

Because the differences reported above are in the predicted direction and form a consistent pattern, and as the explanation of explicit political authoritarian beliefs undoubtedly rests on a multivariate base, the magnitude of the reported differences is accepted as theoretically significant for a sample as large as that on which this study is based. Moreover, the psychological dimension of dogmatism, which is later shown to have important roots in family socialization, is considered to contribute additional explanatory power to the interpretation of explicit political authoritarian beliefs and provides a conceptually significant link between an environmental agency, the individual respondent, and his attitude toward the processes and structure generally associated with democratic political systems.

Efficacy

The attitude of an individual that he can effectively participate in politics and that by doing so has some control over the action of political elites and political decisions, has important consequences for the political system.

Variables of this sort, in contrast to measures of issue opinions, may be conceived as lying at a relatively "deep" level in a hierarchy of dispositions. That is, they represent highly generalized orientations toward the world of politics and are probably among the more stable attitudinal dimensions.

A belief in personal political efficacy may have many roots. An individual might base his estimate of his capacity to influence governmental policy upon direct experience with that government or its agencies; or he might base his efficacy on more indirect evidence.

Secondary institutions are important socialization agencies and their influence on the development of political efficacy will receive considerable attention in Chapter VI. However, the assumption in this study is that people begin at an early age to develop an initial sense of their own capacity to manage the world around them. Some people develop at an early stage a self-confident, positive attitude with which they meet the emergent problems of political life while others see themselves as giving way to the political environment, unable to manage the complex political forces which they encounter. Some individuals may project their early status in the family to the political arena; others might observe their parents attempting to be politically influential and learn from their experience; still others may base their personal estimate on what they hear about the extent to which the "common man" can influence politics. No doubt some if not all of the above factors enter into the development of political efficacy, with some being more important at different stages in the life cycle.

If in most political systems the management of political decision making is concentrated in the hands of a few, and the degree to which people believe they can influence governmental decisions is not necessarily related to their actual level of influence, then why does the belief in one's political efficacy have important consequences for the polity?

In the first place, a sense of political efficacy may contribute to the political legitimacy of the system and therefore lead to political stability. In three of the five countries which they studied, Almond and Verba found that as subjective feelings of "personal competency" to participate meaningfully in the political system increased, so did expressions of pride in the political system.[19] Furthermore, feelings of political efficacy have been found by others to be related to voting, organizational membership, and sense of civic duty.[20]

Political Efficacy and Political Participation

Considering the important political role that students often play in underdeveloped countries, any dimension such as efficacy which might effect the above-mentioned political attitudes and behavior of the Jamaican secondary school population would seem to be of manifest political importance.

Table 5 reports the linear relationships between the Jamaican student's sense of political efficacy and participation in latent political and leadership activities.[21] The least politically efficacious tend to participate less in student organizations and are less likely to assume positions of leadership in such organizations than are the more efficacious respondents. Both of these activities might be considered to be of a latent political character.

TABLE 5.--Relation of Political Efficacy to Latent Political Behavior

Efficacy	Dependent Variable			x^2
	Number of Student Organization Memberships			
	None or one	Two or more	N	
Low	67	33	364	
Medium	57	43	755	
High	54	46	126	.01-.001

TABLE 5-Continued.

Efficacy	Dependent Variable			x^2
	Leadership in Student Organizations			
	Yes	No	N	
Low	20	80	335	
Medium	25	75	683	
High	28	72	116	.20-.10

The relationship between efficacy and activity of a more explicit political nature is striking. Table 6 reports the relationship between political efficacy and spectator politicization (see Appendix E). The more efficacious a respondent feels the more likely he is to engage in such political spectator activities as discussing politics with family, peers, and teachers, and reading political articles every day or three to four times a week in the national daily newspaper.

TABLE 6.--Relation of Political Efficacy to Spectator Politicization.

Efficacy	Spectator Politicization			N	x^2
	Low	Medium	High		
Low	54	27	19	383	
Medium	31	32	37	772	
High	26	29	45	130	.001

The student who feels politically efficacious is also more likely to be an active political participant. The rate of attendance at political or election meetings was found to increase uniformly with the strength of the individual's sense of political efficacy. (Table 7).

TABLE 7.--Relation of Political Efficacy to Attendance at Political or Election Meetings

Efficacy	Rate of Attendance		N	x^2
	Never	Many times or sometimes		
Low	71	29	376	
Medium	64	36	763	
High	56	44	127	.01-.001

Students were also asked if they planned to become active in politics after they completed their studies. There is a definite linear relationship between increased efficacy and the decision to become active full-time or part-time in politics. (Table 8).

TABLE 8.--Relation of Political Efficacy to the Decision to become Active in Politics

Efficacy	Future Political Activity		N	x^2
	Not at all	Part-time or full-time		
Low	75	25	217	
Medium	66	34	455	
High	62	38	78	.05-.02

Political Efficacy and Political Legitimacy

The term legitimacy is used in this study as a measure of the support an individual accords the political system and/or its functional sub-systems. Political support can be oriented in many directions. It may be directed toward political demand channels (input system), it may be oriented toward the structure of government output (output system), or it may be directed in a general and diffuse way toward the political system as a whole.[22] This more diffuse attachment to the system, which in the long run is not unrelated to input satisfaction or specific output performance, may be crucial for the long-run stability of the system.[23]

Political theorists have suggested that the legitimacy attitudes of certain categories of citizens may be crucial in assuring the stability of the political system. David Easton writes that a limited number of citizens is sufficient to insure system equilibrium as long as their power is sufficient and the rest of the population remains at a low level of politicization.[24] Crane Brinton and Edward Shils both point to intellectuals (and students) as significant social categories in the process of political change.[25] As Jamaican secondary school students are considered to be emergent intellectuals, an analysis of their legitimacy attitudes as it is related to political efficacy may be particularly instructive.

Table 9 reports the relationship between the individual's sense of political efficacy and his attitude toward the political system as a whole.[26] As efficacy increases, support for the system also increases while ambivalence and opposition decrease. It is evident that variance in political efficacy has greater effect on system support and ambivalence than on system opposition. This suggests small but possibly "hard core" opposition to the political system which is not greatly affected by feelings of political efficacy--opposition which may be better explained by other independent variables.

TABLE 9.--Relation of Political Efficacy to System Legitimacy.

Efficacy	System Legitimacy					N	x^2
	Support	Tend Toward Support	Ambivalence	Tend Toward Opposition	Opposition		
Low	19	33	26	15	6	337	
Medium	30	35	23	10	2	750	
High	45	38	9	6	2	128	.001

Respondents were also asked to evaluate certain output structures of the system.[27] As the individual's sense of political efficacy increases so does his support for the output system, while feelings of ambivalence decrease. A sense of personal political efficacy apparently has little relation to opposition toward the output system (Table 10).

TABLE 10.--Relation of Political Efficacy to Output Legitimacy

Efficacy	Output Legitimacy			N	x^2
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition		
Low	30	53	17	325	
Medium	33	47	20	729	
High	41	39	20	127	.30-.20

Finally, the students were asked how they felt about those input structures or processes which are involved or perceived to be involved in demand articulation--such as political parties and elections.[28] One would expect that the individual who believes himself politically efficacious would be more likely to be satisfied with the input structures and processes. Table 11 indicates that this is generally the case. As a sense of political efficacy increases so does the individual's support for the party system and election campaigns, while ambivalent feelings or opposition toward these institutions and processes decrease.

TABLE 11.--Relation of Political Efficacy to Input Legitimacy

Efficacy	Dependent Variables				x^2
	Political Party System				
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	
Low	42	47	11	351	
Medium	53	41	6	758	
High	63	30	7	129	.001

TABLE 11-Continued.

Efficacy	Dependent Variables				x^2
	Election Campaigns				
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	
Low	38	33	29	333	
Medium	64	24	12	765	
High	84	14	2	127	.001

As we "mapped" the network of politically relevant beliefs associated with the authoritarian respondent, so can we summarize the political relevance of the Jamaican student who has developed a sense of political efficacy. The efficacious student is less ambivalent and more supportive of the Jamaican political system and its input and output subsystems than is his less efficacious counterpart. Equally if not more important, the politically efficacious student is more likely than his less efficacious colleague to participate in latent political and leadership activities; to be an active political spectator; to participate actively in political and election meetings; and to want to engage in politics part-or full-time after he graduates.

Now that the political relevance of the major dependent variables in this chapter has been explored, we turn to an examination of the role of the Jamaican family and family structure in the socialization of these dependent variables.

The Differential Effects of Family Structure upon The Political Socialization Process

It was hypothesized earlier that nuclear and maternal family structures[29] will have differential effects upon the political socialization process; that respondents from maternal families will have more authoritarian feelings, be less politically interested, and will have a weaker sense of political efficacy than students from nuclear families. Table 12 indicates that this is generally the case.

TABLE 12.--Relation of Family Structure to Authoritarianism, Political Interest, and Political Efficacy

Family Structure	Dependent Variable				x^2
	General Authoritarianism				
	Low and Medium	High	N		
Nuclear Family	73	27	463		
Maternal Family	60	40	89		.01-.001
	Political Interest				
	Low	High	N		
Nuclear Family	56	44	463		
Maternal Family	65	35	89		.10-.05
	Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	
Nuclear Family	24	63	13	463	
Maternal Family	37	56	7	89	.02-.01

Because of the possibility that the relationships reported in Table 12 were confounded by the class origins of the different family structures, it will be necessary to control for social class. In addition it will be necessary to control for sex, since it is maintained that male respondents will be more affected by the environment of the maternal family and the absence of the father than will female respondents. More specifically, it was first hypothesized that males from maternal families are more likely than females to react to their insecure paternal identification with compensatory closed belief systems as measured by a general authoritarianism scale. Second, the absence of a paternal political stimulant and role model in the maternal family is more likely to retard the development of political interest among male than female respondents. Third, maternal dominance will have a more debilitating effect on male than female children. Therefore, male respondents from maternal families should feel less politically efficacious than female respondents.

This model of maternal family socialization leads us to a final set of hypotheses which are as follows: (1) male respondents from maternal families have more authoritarian attitudes, are less politically interested, and feel less politically efficacious than male respondents from nuclear families; and (2) family structure (nuclear vs. maternal) has no differential effect upon the authoritarian attitudes, political interest and sense of political efficacy among female respondents.

Before proceeding to an empirical examination of this model of family socialization, the reader should be cautioned that multivariate analysis with controls both for class and sex reduces the number of units available for sub-group comparisons. Therefore, tests of statistical significance will not always reflect the important consistencies and conceptual significance of the findings.

Tables 13-14 report the relation between family structure and authoritarian attitudes among male and female students in different social classes. As hypothesized, male students from maternal families have more authoritarian attitudes than male students from nuclear families. This is true in all social classes.[30]

TABLE 13.--Relation of Family Structure to Authoritarianism among Male Students of Different Social Classes

	Authoritarianism			
	Low and Medium	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	75	25	83	
Maternal Family	57	43	28	.10-.05
Middle Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	74	26	81	
Maternal Family	53	47	15	.20-.10
Upper Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	71	29	122	
Maternal Family	38	62	13	.05-.02

Family structure appears to have little or no effect upon authoritarianism among females.[31]

TABLE 14. --Relation of Family Structure to Authoritarianism among Female Students of Different Social Classes

	Authoritarianism			
	Low and Medium	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	80	20	64	
Maternal Family	77	23	17	.90-.80
Middle Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	52	48	27	
Maternal Family	50	50	4	.000
Upper Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	61	39	23	
Maternal Family	70	30	10	.80-.70

A similar pattern is reported in Tables 15-16. Family structure has a differential effect on political interest among male students while having little effect on females.[32]

TABLE 15. --Relation of Family Structure to Political Interest among Male Students of Different Social Classes

	Political Interest			
	Low	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	60	40	81	
Maternal Family	75	25	28	.20-.10
Middle Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	49	51	81	
Maternal Family	73	27	15	.10-.05
Upper Class, Males				
Nuclear Family	50	50	122	
Maternal Family	46	54	13	.80-.70

In both the working class and middle class, male students from maternal families are less interested in politics than male students from nuclear families. It is only among the more highly politicized upper class that this relationship begins to weaken. Apparently the highly politicized, upper-class, political culture counteracts the normal inhibiting effect of maternal families.

TABLE 16. Relation of Family Structure to Political Interest among Female Students of Different Social Classes

	Political Interest			
	Low	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	62	38	64	
Maternal Family	65	35	17	.90-.80
Middle Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	35	65	27	
Maternal Family	75	25	4*	.30-.20
Upper Class, Females				
Nuclear Family	56	44	23	
Maternal Family	50	50	10	.80-.70

*Because of the small cell frequencies among middle class females in maternal families, little significance can be attached to differences found among this class.

The predicted findings concerning low political interest among males from father-absent families is not surprising when we see in Table 17 that among those male respondents from nuclear families who see their parents as the most important source of political advice and influence rather than some outside individual or group, almost three-quarters look to their father, rather than their mother, for political advice and as a source of political influence. It is apparent that the absence of the father as an "important other" in the maternal family constellation removes a powerful political stimulus for the male child.

TABLE 17.--The Most Important Source of Political Advice and Political Influence among Male Students from Nuclear Families

	Father	Mother	N
Political Advice*	69	31	223
Political Influence**	73	27	139

*Respondents were asked: "Suppose the voting age was lowered so that you could vote in the elections. Which one person or group would you most likely go to for political advice?"

**Respondents were asked: "Generally, which one of the following people or groups has influenced your own opinions the most on Jamaican politics?"

In the foregoing analysis, a predicted pattern has developed in which family structure is shown to have a differential effect upon the political socialization of male students while having little effect upon females. Tables 18-19 report the relation between family structure and political efficacy among male and female students of different classes. It will be remembered that a significant relationship was found between the two variables: family structure and political efficacy. However it was hypothesized that maternal dominance may retard the ego development of the male children which may have a debilitating effect on their sense of political efficacy.

TABLE 18.--Relation of Family Structure to Political Efficacy among Male Students of Different Social Classes

	Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Males					
Nuclear Family	35	54	11	83	
Maternal Family	46	54	0	28	.30-.20
Middle Class, Males					
Nuclear Family	18	61	21	81	
Maternal Family	20	53	27	15	.95-.90
Upper Class, Males					
Nuclear Family	17	71	12	122	
Maternal Family	15	77	8	13	.98-.95

As can be seen in Table 18, it is only among the working class that male respondents from maternal families tend to feel less politically efficacious than those from nuclear families. Differing family structures appear to have no significant effect upon the sense of political efficacy among middle and upper class males.

TABLE 19.--Relation of Family Structure to Political Efficacy among Female Students of Different Social Classes

	Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Working Class, Females					
Nuclear Family	25	63	12	64	
Maternal Family	47	53	0	17	.20-.10
Middle Class, Females					
Nuclear Family	26	56	18	27	
Maternal Family	25	50	25	4	.99-.98
Upper Class, Females					
Nuclear Family	18	78	4	24	
Maternal Family	40	60	0	10	.70-.50

Among working class females, those from maternal families feel less efficacious than those from nuclear families. This relationship disappears among the middle class and reappears weakly among the upper class. Like male students, the relation of family structure to a female's sense of political efficacy is primarily a working-class phenomenon.

Our cross-sex model of the socialization process in the maternal family is not predictive of the findings in Tables 18-19. Maternal family structure appears to affect the sense of political efficacy among both male and female respondents.

In the previous analysis, family structure is found to have a differential effect upon the socialization of authoritarian attitudes, political interest, and feelings of political efficacy among Jamaican secondary school students. This is true for all social classes when general authoritarianism and political interest are examined.

However, the relationship between family structure and a sense of political efficacy is primarily a working class phenomenon. The authors of the American Voter and of The Civic Culture report a strong relationship between education and a sense of political efficacy (or subjective political competence).[33] It is very likely that the greater sense of efficacy found among the more highly educated middle and upper class Jamaicans counteracts any differential effect family structure might have on the socialization of political efficacy.

This suggests that we must look to other environmental factors as well as the family, if we seek to explain the variation in a political attitude or behavior.

Within the maternal family a predicted pattern develops in which father absence and maternal domination is shown to have an important impact upon the authoritarian attitudes and political interest of male students while having little effect on females. Contrary to expectations, no sexual differentiation is found when we investigate the influence of family structure upon the development of a sense of political efficacy.

As stated previously, other studies have found that mothers in mother-child households are more protective than mothers in nuclear households where the presence of the father counteracts and checks the tendency of the mother to keep her son dependent upon her. Thus it was hypothesized that a maternal family environment would have a more debilitating effect upon male than female children, and it was further hypothesized that male respondents from maternal families would feel less politically efficacious than female respondents.

The lack of sexual differentiation on the efficacy dimension is difficult to explain. However, an explanation might develop if we remember that the absence of the father removed an important political stimulant from the family (see Table 17). The absence of this paternal political role model with whom the male respondent could identify plus the increased potential for maternal domination was the interpretation given to the effect of the maternal family upon adolescent political interest.

It is the absence of the father and the greater economic demands made upon the mother--which may leave her little time for politics--that leads to the proposition that the environment in maternal families is probably much less politicized than that in nuclear families.[34] This brings us to the next point. Is there a relationship between group politicization and the development of a sense of political efficacy among its members? Are children who are reared in family environments where parents are interested in politics, discuss politics within the family, and participate in political activities more likely to view politics as amenable to personal control, i.e., to feel more politically efficacious?[35] If this is the case, then the variation found between both male and female respondents from nuclear and maternal families on the efficacy dimension may be explained in part as a result of the different levels of politicization associated with the different family structures. While the debilitating effects of maternal dominance plus the lower absolute levels of politicization (these variables are obviously confounded) lead to a weaker sense of political efficacy among male adolescents from maternal families, the same low level of politicization also causes females from maternal families to have less of a sense of political efficacy than their counterparts in nuclear families.

The hypotheses concerning the differential effects of family structure on the political socialization of Jamaican secondary school students have been generally born out. More research is needed, however, on the effects of maternal domination. In addition, a wider array of dependent variables should be examined. The work by Bronfenbrenner on maternal dominance and leadership behavior suggests a possible avenue of research on the relationship between family structure and latent political leadership behavior.[36] Also, maternal dominance in nuclear families may provide an important analog to the maternal family.[37]

The fact that approximately 25 per cent of the Jamaican families are matri-focal and the significantly high incidence of mother-child families reported by Murdock in his "World Ethnographic Sample"[38] would seem to indicate the significance of the findings in this study on the differential effects of family structure. However, the array of dependent variables is not so broad nor is the magnitude of the differences so large as to give support to the rather easy generalizations often made as to the almost singular importance of early family socialization to later political attitudes and behavior. Moreover, the stability of these early-learned attitudes during the maturation of the individual is a matter of no small concern to social scientists interested in the political socialization process. It is the stability of these early learned attitudes and behaviors that provides the crucial link between the family and the political system.

In the next section the lingering effect of early family socialization over the secondary school experience is examined.

The Stability of Early Learned Attitudes: The Lingering Effects of Family Structure

In Chapter I it was emphasized that the consistency of early socialized attitudes and behavior over the lifetime of an individual must be treated as a researchable question rather than as an explicit or implicit premise. This does not mean that the only correlations we can expect between early socialization practices and political attitudes (or behavior) are at one point in time. It is, of course, not unlikely that with a longitudinal or quasi-longitudinal research design and the proper experimental or statistical controls on early socialization environments, the lingering effects of this environment on selected dependent variables can be traced over a significant part or the whole life cycle of the individual.

The quasi-longitudinal research design employed in this study is utilized to inquire into the continuing influence of early family socialization in nuclear and maternal families throughout the student's secondary school experience. The reader should be reminded that the dropout rate was so low as to have no significant impact upon the assumptions of the quasi-longitudinal design.[39]

In the findings reported in Tables 20-22, we will be looking at two things: first, do the differential effects of early family learning endure through the twelfth grade in Jamaican secondary schools? Second, does early family socialization in maternal vs. nuclear families also have a differential effect upon the degree of attitudinal change over the secondary school experience?

Respondents from maternal families enter the eighth grade with more authoritarian attitudes, feeling less politically interested and less politically efficacious than their colleagues from nuclear families, and this relationship continues into the twelfth grade.

While 30 per cent of the twelfth graders from maternal families have highly authoritarian attitudes, only 19 per cent of those from nuclear families are highly authoritarian. The same pattern of lingering family influence can be observed in Tables 21 and 22. Among twelfth grade students from nuclear families, 55 per cent have a high interest in politics and 18 per cent have a strong sense of political efficacy. On the other hand, only 39 per cent of the respondents from maternal families have a high interest in politics while less than 5 per cent have a strong sense of political efficacy.

TABLE 20.--The Lingering Effects of Family Structure: The Relation of Family Structure to Authoritarian Attitudes over the Secondary School Experience

	General Authoritarianism			
	Low and Medium	High	N	x^2
Nuclear Family				
Eighth Grade	75	25	177	
Twelfth Grade	81	19	136	.20-.10
Maternal Family				
Eighth Grade	53	47	32	
Twelfth Grade	70	30	23	.30-.20

TABLE 21.--The Lingering Effects of Family Structure: The Relation of Family Structure to Political Interest over the Secondary School Experience

	Political Interest			
	Low and Medium	High	N	x^2
Nuclear Family				
Eighth Grade	67	33	177	
Twelfth Grade	45	55	136	.01-.001
Maternal Family				
Eighth Grade	72	28	32	
Twelfth Grade	61	39	23	.50-.30

TABLE 22.--The Lingering Effects of Family Structure: The Relation of Family Structures to Political Efficacy over the Secondary School Experience

	Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Nuclear Family					
Eighth Grade	36	57	7	177	
Twelfth Grade	17	65	18	136	.001
Maternal Family					
Eighth Grade	44	53	3	32	
Twelfth Grade	35	61	4	23	.90-.80

Although students from both maternal and nuclear families appear to increase their political interest and sense of political efficacy as they move from the eighth to the twelfth grade--which suggests among other things, the socializing influence of the peer and/or school environment--the greatest increase is among respondents from nuclear families. The increase in political interest from the eighth to the twelfth grade for this latter group is 21 per cent, but only 10 per cent for respondents from maternal families. Similarly, the decrease in a low sense of efficacy from the eighth to the twelfth grade is 19 per cent among respondents from nuclear families but only 9 per cent for those from maternal families.

The debilitating effects of maternal family living appear to insulate their offspring to some degree from the influences of secondary socialization agencies. However, the decrease in authoritarian attitudes through the secondary school experience was significantly greater for students from maternal families than those from nuclear families. This is not surprising. The student who leaves the particularistic and closed family system and enters into the more universalistic and rationalized educational environment of the school may find it more difficult to maintain the simple clichés and close-minded beliefs that characterized his more authoritarian outlook in the family. Yet students from maternal families do enter the eighth grade with more authoritarian attitudes than their counterparts from nuclear families, and by the time they are in the twelfth grade they are still appreciably more authoritarian.

In this section a quasi-longitudinal design and selected statistical controls were utilized to trace the continuing effect of early family socialization upon certain politically relevant attitudes over a significant part of the respondent's life cycle--the secondary school experience. It was found that respondents from maternal families enter and leave the secondary school feeling more authoritarian, less politically interested, and less politically efficacious than those from nuclear families.

Thus the early differential socializing effect of family structure, although diminished, appears to follow the student throughout his enrollment in the secondary school and remains a significant variable in explaining an adolescent's perception of his role in the political system as he approaches adulthood.

The Family: Political Partisanship, and the Change of Party Identifications

Before proceeding to the next chapter and an examination of selected secondary socialization agencies, the influence of the family on the development and maintenance over time of political partisanship will be examined. This is followed by a brief exploration of the influence of the authoritarian family environment upon an adolescent's change of party identification away from his family and toward the party preferences of his peers.

The Family and the Partisan Political Culture

Since 1944, Jamaica has enjoyed a relatively stable two party system in which the major parties and their supporters, by and large, have accepted the rules of political competition laid down in laws and custom while avoiding the intense partisan antagonisms which have characterized so many other newly independent countries.

There has been sufficient support and opposition to make the system competitive, but political partisanship has been of a limited character. Partisan conflict has never been so hostile as to jeopardize the willingness of either major party to accept the risk of finding itself in a minority position or in "opposition."

There have been many factors that contributed to the history of open but limited political competition within the Jamaican political system. Undoubtedly the presence of a common antagonist--the colonial power of Great Britain--provided a powerful integrating and limiting force within the polity. However, a possible threat to this limited partisanship and stable exchange of power has been underscored by many observers of the Jamaican political system. They point out that the steady withdrawl of the heavy hand of colonial rule over the last 10-15 years has coincided with an intensification of the conflict between Jamaican political elites as more national power devolved from the British to the Jamaican government.

An influential Jamaican described this transition in partisan climate in the following way:[40]

> In the old days we would all proudly wear our different party buttons and there was none of the abuse that is heaped on one today if we were to try to do the same thing. The openness is gone. No one would wear such a button now and everyone tries to keep their party [identification] secret. They fear what the other party might do to them and their jobs if they came to power. .

In a letter to the editor of the national daily newspaper, a Jamaican protested:[41]

> There is widespread belief that the only way to secure promotions and other benefits in white collar employment, particularly in the civil service, is to belong to a certain trade union and its affiliate political party. Many persons therefore who would not normally join either that union or party are obliged to do so, or suffer the consequences. . .

Another letter writer asks:[42]

> Why is it like this? A parent told me he can't afford to send his child to a certain school because the head is a P. N. P. [presumably the parent is a J. L. P.]. Again P. N. P. teachers can't flog J. L. P. children or the Ministry of Education [under the JLP Government] would hear about it--but JLP teachers can even cut their throats. Why is it that parents should teach their children and introduce politics to them causing hatred?

What is illuminating in each of these people's observations is their concern over a perceived intensification of partisan conflict in Jamaican society.

In order to tap the partisan attitudes of our respondents they were asked the following question: "How important is it to you that the person you marry supports the same political party as you?" The answer to the question will provide an estimate of the degree to which party affiliation will be a determining factor in the formation of marriage ties. This, in turn, reflects the intensity of partisan antagonism. It will also reflect the potential characteristics of one of the primary socialization agencies in the political system--the family. For the family can inculcate a form of partisanship that is intolerant of opposition and suspicious of broad cooperation with one's fellow citizens.

Table 23 reports the frequency distribution of the responses to the partisanship question. One half of the students feel that it is important or very important not to marry across party boundaries while 15 per cent are unsure. Less than one-third of this sample of Jamaican government secondary school students feel that party affiliation is of little or no importance in the selection of one's mate.

TABLE 23.--Partisan Responses of Jamaican Secondary School Students

How Important Is It That the Person You Marry Supports the Same Party as You?	Percent	N
Very Important	36	462
Important	15	191
Unsure	15	189
Of Little Importance	14	176
Not Important At All	18	238
No answer or Don't Know	2	31
	100	1287

Since a large percentage of the respondents have strong partisan feelings it is important to examine the family environment to determine its impact on the socialization of partisan attitudes. If, as it has been alleged by Jamaican observers, the tenor of political interaction has become more antagonistic in the last decade, then adults who are actively engaged in this increasingly hostile process are more likely to inculcate in their children an intolerance of opposition and a suspicion of extra-party contacts. Therefore, we would predict that students from politicized families are more likely to have strong partisan orientations than those from less politicized families. Table 24 indicates that this is generally the case. While there is little difference in partisanship between respondents from low and medium politicized families, there is a significant difference in partisanship between these latter groups and those respondents from highly politicized families. Respondents from highly politicized families are by far the most partisan.

TABLE 24.--Relation of Family Politicization to Their Adolescent Children's Partisanship

Family Politicization*	Importance of Intra-Party Marriage				
	Very Important or Important	Unsure	Little Importance or Not Important	N	x^2
Low	51	13	36	309	
Medium	52	13	35	602	
High	72	18	10	81	.001

*See Appendix D for discussion of the Family Politicization Index

Our expectations are that after the adolescent enrolls in the secondary school the intensity of partisan attitudes socialized in the early family environment will diminish as he interacts less with his family; this is, of course, barring recruitment into partisan political organizations which in Jamaica are reported to have very few adolescents of secondary school age in their membership.[43]

Although the intensity of partisan feelings may diminish as the student moves through the secondary school, it is predicted that this will be affected differentially by earlier family environment. As can be seen in Table 25, respondents from highly politicized families not only enter but also leave the secondary schools with significantly more intense partisan feelings than do those students from low and medium politicized families. Moreover, the reduction in partisan intensity from the eighth to the twelfth grade is different for each group. There is an inverse linear relationship between the degree of family politicization and the reduction in partisan intensity over the secondary school experience. The difference in high partisanship between eighth and twelfth graders from low and medium politicized families is 33 and 25 per cent, respectively. The relationship between grade level and high partisanship is curvilinear among respondents from highly politicized families. However, if we compare high partisanship among eighth and twelfth graders in this group, the difference is only 10 per cent.

Thus family environment appears to have a significant effect upon the intensity of partisan attitudes throughout the student's enrollment in the secondary school. Respondents from politicized families enter and leave the secondary school with more partisan attitudes than their counterparts from less politicized families. And, although the intensity of partisan beliefs diminishes among all students as they appear to move through the secondary school, the reduction is less among respondents from highly politicized families than from less politicized families.

TABLE 25. --The Lingering Effects of Family Environment on Partisan Attitudes throughout the Secondary School Experience of Jamaican Students

	Importance of Intra-Party Marriage				
	Very Important or Import (High Partisanship)	Unsure	Little Importance or Not Important (Low Partisanship)	N	x^2
Low Family Politicization					
Eighth Grade	63	14	23	163	
Eleventh Grade	44	15	41	80	
Twelfth Grade	30	11	59	66	.001
Medium Family Politicization					
Eighth Grade	64	13	23	185	
Eleventh Grade	51	14	35	236	
Twelfth Grade	39	14	47	181	.001
High Family Politicization					
Eighth Grade	80	17	3	35	
Eleventh Grade	62	12	26	26	
Twelfth Grade	70	30	0	20	.30-.20

It seems probable that the realization of classical democratic theory's normative preference for higher politicization and citizenship participation might create important problems for the stability of the Jamaican political system. Given the highly antagonistic tone of Jamaican politics, high politicization is generally associated with a type of intense partisanship which is suspicious of extra-party contact and cooperation. Moreover, this highly partisan atmosphere is being reinforced and inculcated among the more politicized families within the Jamaican political system.

The Authoritarian Family and Adolescent Rebellion: Party Identification Deviancy From Family to Peer Group

A considerable body of literature has been devoted to the influence of authoritarian child rearing practices upon adolescent attitudes and behavior. Adolescent and child ethnocentrism, guilt, and hostility have all been correlated with autocratic family environments.[44] Social scientists interested in political behavior have attempted to relate strict family control to adolescent political rebellion. In her study of the young voter, Eleanor Maccoby reports that "It is the children of the parents who attempt to exercise strictest control over their children in their teens who most often change away from the political preferences of their parents."[45] She infers that young voters who were subjected to strict control by their parents were rebelling against such treatment by taking different party identifications as an object of their protest.

In the current study an attempt is made to measure the strictness and rigidity of parental control over the respondents.[46] This is based on a number of conceptual considerations. First, is overstrict parental control in the Jamaican culture likely to be manifested among the respondents as deviancy from family party identifications ? Second, is the authoritarian family environment and the resultant adolescent deviancy likely to be reflected by the respondents in stronger identification with the party preferences of their peers ? Third, do we find a rebellion-conformity threshold of family authoritarianism beyond which family dominance discourages rather than encourages political deviancy? Finally, is political deviancy higher when politics is a salient issue in the family than when the family is less politicized?

In order to investigate the preceding questions, a "party preference deviancy from family toward peer group" index was created. For the purposes of this analysis the index is composed of two broad categories. The first category includes all respondents whose party preference is the same as their family and peer group. The second category includes all respondents whose party preference is the same as their peer group but different from that of their family. Table 26 reports the relation of family authoritarianism to political deviancy.

TABLE 26.--Relation of Family Authoritarianism to Party Preference Deviancy from Family toward Peer Group

Family authoritarianism	Party Preference: Same as Family	Party Preference: Same as Peers but Different from Family	N	x^2
High 1	89	11	36	
2	77	23	58	
3	83	17	278	
Low 4	86	14	57	.50-.30

There is a decrease in respondents' compliance with the party preferences of their parents as family authoritarianism increases--until the most highly authoritarian group is reached. Eighty-six per cent of the students from families where parental dominance is minimized have the same party identification as their parents. Compliance decreases as we move up from group four to group two in the authoritarian family index. This relationship, although not strong, suggests a growing tendency on the part of secondary students to manifest their rebellion against parental dominance by bolting their parents' political party.

It is not until the most authoritarian families are included that the relationship becomes curvilinear. Eighty-nine per cent of the respondents from the most autocratic families have the same party orientations as their parents. This group rivals the students from the least authoritarian families in its compliance with parental party identification. This would seem to indicate a conformity-rebellion threshold of family authoritarianism. We hypothesize that while students in group two were raised in authoritarian households, they did not feel the total parental dominance found among those in group one--a dominance so oppressive that it discourages rather than encourages political deviancy.

In Table 27 where a control for family politiciation is utilized, the same pattern and "threshold" emerges. Among respondents from families of low and medium-high politicization, there is a linear increase in political deviancy away from the party preference of the family and toward that of the peer group as family authoritarianism increases. Among the most authoritarian families the relationships again becomes curvilinear as there is a sharp increase in adolescent compliance with parental party orientations.

Eleanor Maccoby and others found that the effects of parental training methods on the political deviancy of young voters seemed greatest when the parents had a high level of interest in politics.

In Table 27, young people from highly authoritarian families are among those least likely to deviate from parental preferences, but this conformity does decrease as family politicization increases. Although the number of cases is small among respondents from highly authoritarian and lowly politicized families, this would seem to be

TABLE 27.--Relation of Family Authoritarianism to Party Preference Deviancy from Family toward Peer Group within Different Levels of Family Politicization

		Party Preference			
		Same as Family	Same as Peers but Different from Family	N	x^2
Low Family Politicization:					
High Family Authoritarianism	1	100	0	4	
	2	67	33	6	
	3	76	24	53	
Low Family Authoritarianism	4	81	19	16	.50-.30
Medium-High Family Politicization:					
High Family Authoritarianism	1	89	11	26	
	2	79	21	47	
	3	86	14	204	
Low Family Authoritarianism	4	92	8	36	.30-.20

consistent with Maccoby's finding which indicates greater deviancy from authoritarian families as politics becomes more salient to the family. On the other hand, for our data on the relevance of political saliency to be completely consistent with Maccoby's, respondents from group two of the authoritarian family index should show greater political deviancy when they are from more politicized families than when they are from less politicized families. This is definitely not the case, in fact, the opposite is true. Respondents from the more highly politicized families in group two are more conforming than their counterpart from less politicized families. It is possible that political saliency may be as indicative of a process of indoctrination as an object of protest. Further cross-cultural research would seem necessary to establish the relationship between political saliency and party preference change as a manifestation of protest.

In the preceding chapter the focus was on one of the most important environmental agencies in the political socialization process--the family.

A conceptual base was laid to test the differential influence of family structure and the cross-sex socialization effect of the maternal family upon selected politically relevant attitudes. Data from the sample of Jamaican secondary school students was utilized to provide empirical substance to this model of family socialization.

A quasi-longitudinal design and statistical controls were utilized to trace the continuing effect of early family socialization upon the selected dependent variables over a significant part of the respondent's life cycle--the secondary school experience.

In the final section, the influence of the family on the development of political partisanship in the Jamaican milieu, and the relationship between authoritarian family background and the Jamaican student's tendency to change his party preference away from his family and toward his peers are both examined.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

[1] Bernard R. Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 93.

[2] Ibid., pp. 88-93; Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), chapter 7; and E. Havemann and P. West, They Went to College (New York: Harcourt, 1952), p. 117.

[3] Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 221-224.

[4] Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 71.

[5] Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (Winter, 1960), 632-644.

[6] Fred Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, 54 (December, 1960), 934-943.

[7] Hess and Easton, op. cit., pp. 640-642.

[8] See Chapter I; also see Robert Lane for a summary of paternal role models from the national character school and a discussion of the effects of paternal rearing practices upon the psychopolitical outlook of the male offspring. Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," American Sociological Review, 24 (August, 1959), 502-511.

[9] Murray A. Strauss, "Conjugal Power Structure and Adolescent Personality," Marriage and Family Living, 24 (February, 1962), 17-25.

[10] Roger V. Burton and John W. Whiting, "The Absent Father and Cross-Sex Identity," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 7 (April, 1961), 85-95.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV-continued

[11] John D. Herzog, Additional Parameters for Educational Planners: Some Thoughts from Research in Barbados, Unpublished Manuscript, 1964, pp. 12-13; and David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 374.

[12] George R. Bach, "Father-Fantasies and Father-Typing in Father Separated Children," Child Development, 17 (March-June, 1946), 63-79; Lois M. Stolz, Father Relations of War Born Children (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1954); and Burton and Whiting, op. cit.

[13] David Lynne and William Sowery, "Effects of Father Absence on Norwegian Boys and Girls," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59 (September, 1959), 258-262; E. Gronseth, "The Impact of Father Absence in Sailor Families Upon the Personality Structure and Social Adjustment of Adult Sailor Sons," in N. Anderson (ed.), Studies of the Family, Vol. 2, Part I (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1957), pp. 97-114; P. O. Tiller, "Father Absence and Personality Development of Children in Sailor Families," in N. Anderson (ed.), Studies of the Family, Vol. 2, Part II (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1957), pp. 115-137; and Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Some Familial Antecedents of Responsibility and Leadership in Adolescents," in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (eds.), Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 237-289. A. F. Henry also reports that males from families where the mother is the chief disciplinarian rank higher on feelings of "self blame" than males from families where the father is the chief disciplinarian. Andrew F. Henry, "Family Role Structure and Self Blame," Social Forces, 35 (October, 1956), 34-38.

[14] Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[15] Using a technique suggested by Ford for determining scalability of less than six items, three of Rokeach's dogmatism items were combined into a Guttman-type scale. Robert N. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Procedure For Scaling Attitude Questions" in Matilda W. Riley et al., Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. 273-305.

The three items are as follows:

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV-continued

(1) To work with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
(2) It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
(3) When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to give in to those who believe differently from the way we do.

Respondents were asked to give the intensity of their agreement or disagreement to each of these statements on Likert-type six interval scales.

This dogmatism scale met the criteria for acceptability outlined by Ford. Scale error was 5.75 per cent, well below the 10 per cent suggested maximum. The computed per cent of error for each question was 4.7 per cent, 7.1 per cent, and 7.0 per cent. Each is well below the 10 per cent suggested maximum.

[16] Rokeach, op. cit., p. 69.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 127.

[19] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 247.

[20] Angus Campbell et al., "Sense of Political Efficacy and Political Participation" in Heinz Eulau et al. (eds.), Political Behavior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 170-173; Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 257; and Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 103-105, 480-481.

[21] Using the technique suggested by Ford (see footnote 15, Chapter IV), the following four items were combined into a Guttman-type political efficacy scale:

(1) When people like me become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.
(2) The political views and activities of students are very important.
(3) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

FOOTNOTE FOR CHAPTER IV-continued

(4) So many other people vote in national elections that it won't matter much to me whether I vote or not when I become an adult.

Respondents were asked to give the intensity of their agreement or disagreement to each of these statements on Likert-type, six interval scales.

This efficacy scale met the criteria for acceptability outlined by Ford. Scale error was 7.3 per cent which is below the 10 per cent suggested maximum. The computed per cent of error for each question was 4.8 per cent, 7.7 per cent, 7.0 per cent, and 8.6 per cent. Each is well below the 10 per cent suggested maximum.

[22] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). See chapter I for a discussion of the functional categories of a political system.

[23] For an interesting case in point, see Almond and Verba's analysis of the legitimacy orientations of the Mexicans. Op. cit., pp. 250-252.

[24] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 9 (April, 1957), 383-400. Also see Daniel Goldrich for a theoretical inquiry into system legitimacy and politicization, Political Inheritance: Disestablishment or Debris?, Chapter I, (forthcoming).

[25] Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1959); and Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New Nations," World Politics, 12 (April, 1960), 329-368.

[26] The system legitimacy index is based on responses to the following four items:

(1) In general, do you feel that government and politics has been good for the country, bad for the country, neither good nor bad for the country?

(2) Do you feel that politics and government have been honest, dishonest, neither honest nor dishonest?

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV-continued

(3) Only if society changes very much will I get the political influence I want. (Likert-type, six interval agree-disagree response.)
(4) All politicians are worthless. (Likert-type, six interval agree-disagree response.)

See Appendix B for the construction of this index.

[27] The output legitimacy index is based on responses to the following three items:

(1) Do you think that the national legislature has been doing a good job for the people, a bad job for the people, neither good nor bad job?
(2) Suppose you were graduated from school and had some question or problem that you had to take to a government office. Do you think they would give your problem and what you say serious attention, or do you think they would generally ignore your problems and what you say?
(3) I don't think public officials care what people like me think. (Likert-type, six interval agree-disagree response.)

See Appendix C for the construction of this index.

[28] Respondents were asked: How do you feel about the political parties in this country? Have they been bad for the country, good for the country, neither good nor bad for the country? They were also asked to agree-disagree with the statement that election campaigns are a waste of time on a Likert-type, six interval response scale.

[29] For the purposes of this study, a maternal family is one in which the respondent and his (or her) mother have exclusively shared a common household while the respondent was growing up in which the father or another adult male has not generally been present. This definition does not exclude the possibility that brothers and sisters of the respondent may have resided in the same household.

A nuclear family is one in which the respondent, his father, and his mother have all shared a common household exclusive of other adults while the respondent was growing up. See: M. J. Levy Jr., and L. A. Fallers, "The Family: Some Comparative Considerations," The American Anthropologist, 61 (August, 1959), 647-651; and Nancie L. Solien, "Household and Family in the Caribbean: Some Definitions and Concepts," Social and Economic Studies, 9 (March, 1960), 101-106.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV-*continued*

[30] See Appendix A for the objective social class index.

[31] Because of the small cell frequencies among upper class females in maternal families, little significance can be attached to differences found among this class in Table 14.

[32] Because of the small cell frequencies among middle class females in maternal families, little significance can be attached to the difference found among this class (Table 16.)

[33] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 384-385; and Campbell *et al.*, *American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 480-481.

[34] See Chapter 6 for a discussion of family politicization. Nuclear families are found to be more politicized than maternal families.

[35] See Chapter 6 where the relation of group and institutional politicization to the development of political efficacy is examined more extensively, not only in the family, but in the peer and school environment as well.

[36] Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*

[37] In their five-nation study, Almond and Verba included a question which might be used as a gross index of maternal dominance in nuclear families. The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan anticipates using the same question in their future study of political socialization among high school seniors in the United States.

[38] George E. Murdock, "World Ethnographic Sample" in Frank W. Moore (ed.), *Readings In Cross-Cultural Methodology* (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1961), pp. 193-216.

[39] See Chapter II for a discussion of the quasi-longitudinal design and the assumptions upon which it is based.

[40] Private communication, Kingston, Jamaica, May 1964.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV-continued

[41] The Daily Gleaner, May 1, 1964, p. 8.

[42] The Daily Gleaner, March 17, 1964, p. 7.

[43] After the student leaves the secondary school his partisan attitudes may increase in intensity to the extent that he assumes an active political role within the system. Clearly a longitudinal study is needed to establish this pattern.

[44] Sara Lee Dickens and Charles Hobart, "Parental Dominance and Offspring Ethnocentrism," Journal of Social Psychology, 49 (May, 1959), 297-303; Alfred L. Baldwin, "Socialization and Parent-Child Relationship," Child Development, 19 (September, 1948), 127-136; and Robert F. Peck, "Family Patterns correlated with Adolescent Personality Structure," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 57 (November, 1958), 347-350.

[45] Eleanor E. Maccoby, et al, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Spring, 1954), 23-39.

[46] Respondents were asked: "In your case has your family been very strict and wanted to have a lot to say about what you did, your friends and the places you went with them, never letting you have your say, or have they been pretty free with you and let you make your own decisions?" The structured responses can be seen in the questionnaire in the appendix: question number 19. The response code is used as an index of family authoritarianism (Table 26). The autocratic nature of the respondents' family environment increases as one moves from code four to code one. Respondents in code one are from a highly autocratic family environment; respondents in code four are from the most permissive family environment.

CHAPTER V

THE PEER GROUP AND SCHOOL

Now that we have explored the role of family and family structure in the political socialization process and inferences have been made concerning the stability of these early socialized attitudes over time, the influence of certain intermediary socialization agencies such as the student peer group and school will be more closely examined to determine their role in the political socialization process. Particular attention will be paid to the respective reinforcement and resocialization roles of homogeneous and heterogeneous class environments within the peer group and school.

Family Environment and Intermediary Socialization Agencies

As the individual matures and begins to explore beyond the family environment, he may well confront other groups and social institutions which will play important roles in his socialization to politics. Many of his new experiences will take place within the context of his school and, especially during adolescence, in the peer group. These new experiences and agencies may support the attitudes and behavior patterns established in the earlier family environment, but they may also be instrumental in counteracting earlier socialization while developing new expectations and behavior of political relevance.

The socializing influence of such intermediary agencies as the peer group and school may in itself be affected by early family socialization.[1] For example, it was found in Chapter IV that respondents from authoritarian families are more likely to deviate from family party preferences and to identify with those of their peers than are respondents from less authoritarian families. When the influence of family structure is examined, we find that students from maternal families are appreciably more outgroup oriented[2] in seeking political advice and more outgroup oriented on whom they think influenced their political opinions the most than are respondents from nuclear families (Table 28).

Apparently students from the less politicized maternal family, where the mother often has less time for politics because of her increased economic responsibilities, must seek political advice (and its concomitant perception of political influence) outside of the family.

Before turning more directly to a discussion of the peer group and school and their roles in the political socialization process, a final example is given of how different family environments may pre-condition the impact of these intermediary agencies. Students were asked: "How much do you think your parent's social position [i.e., their station in life] will hurt your chances for success?" It was hypothesized that an individual who feels that the social status of his family impedes his own chances for success is more likely to turn away from his family and to be influenced politically by his school peer group than a respondent who is less alienated from his family.

TABLE 28.--Relation of Family Structure to Outgroup Political Orientations among Jamaican Secondary School Students

Family Structure	Dependent Variable			x^2
	To Whom Would You Go for Political Advice on Voting?			
	Family	Outgroups	N	
Nuclear Family	71	29	417	
Maternal Family	51	49	83	.001
	Who Has Had the Most Influence on Your Political Opinions?			
	Family	Outgroups	N	
Nuclear Family	61	39	297	
Maternal Family	28	72	53	.001

Subjective perceptions of influence on the part of the respondent are used as a proxy of the relative influence of the family and peer group upon students' political opinions. The influence of the peer group upon the political opinions of the respondents is found to increase uniformly with the strength of the individual's alienation from his family (Table 29). Thus as reaction against what is felt to be the disadvantageous social status of one's family increases, the influence of the peer group over the political opinions of the respondent also increases, while that of his family is attenuated.

TABLE 29.--Relation of Alienation from Family Social Status to the Relative Political Influence of the Peer Group and Family

Family Alienation	Political Influence of:			
	Family	Peer Group	N	x^2
Very Much	52	48	44	
Somewhat	63	37	73	
A Little	64	36	143	
None	67	33	369	.30-.20

The Peer Group

The influence of the group upon the perceptions and expressed opinions of an individual is one of the better documented generalizations in the small group literature. The dramatic demonstration of this influence in the experimental situation has been reviewed by James C. Davies and Sidney Verba.[3] This influence has been found in on-going as well as experimental groups.[4]

When we turn to more manifestly political orientations, studies of voting behavior indicate that individuals within non-familial face-to-face groups tend to hold homogeneous party preferences. And, what may be more important evidence of the effect of the group upon the individual's political attitudes, if there is some heterogeneity of political views within the group there will be pressure on the deviant individual toward attitude change and homogeneity.[5]

James S. Coleman has documented in a striking manner the power of a non-familial socialization agency--the student peer group--in setting the values of its members.[6] The writings of Robert A. LeVine and Theodore M. Newcomb suggest roles that informal peer groups might perform in the process of political socialization.[7]

Perhaps one of the foremost functions of the peer group is to transmit the culture of the wider society of which it is a part. While a peer group may be said to have a subculture of its own, it also teaches the adult subculture of which it is a part and reinforces the norms and social patterns held by adult society.[8] Social class, religious and ethnic subcultures may be transmitted through the peer group. A child who grows up in a working class family learns the working class way of life. If he enters a school peer group composed of students from the same social class, this may act to reinforce as well as elaborate the class attitudes and expectations learned in the family. Certainly one of the first points to emerge in Hyman's summary of the literature is the relative lack of discontinuity in the socialization process in the United States.[9] While there are some discontinuities, more impressive is the general acceptance of the political orientations of one's parents. Peer groups appear to reinforce adult political values and partisan preferences.

This important reinforcing role of the peer group which involves an elaboration and specification of general dispositions learned in the family is not limited to complex and more structurally differentiated sociopolitical systems such as found in the United States--in fact, it may be rarer in such systems. LeVine documents the strong reinforcing role of the peer group in the less "modern" and structurally differentiated Buganda society.[10] As the broader Buganda social system moves along the road toward modernization and adopts more universalistic values in contrast to the more particularistic views of the family, certain strains and discontinuities in the socialization of adolescents may be expected to arise.[11]

In addition to its function of transmitting or reinforcing the political culture of the society, the peer group may provide a new social system in which the individual learns new attitudes and behavior. For example, while the peer group with a homogeneous class composition may operate to reinforce the class way of life and associated political orientations of its members, a lower class boy or girl entering a heterogeneous class peer group where he interacts with individuals of higher social status may learn from them new ways of behaving and believing. These higher status peers may become especially significant as models of identification. It is they whose behavior and ideas the lower class student is particularly responsive.

In her study of selected midwestern schools, B. Neugarton found that lower class children and adolescents generally deferred to the higher status students in heterogeneous class schools by ascribing more favorable personality traits to them than to students of their own class.[12] Interestingly enough, when studying the children of Brasston, C. Stendler found that out-of-school peer groups were generally more class-homogeneous, while there was a greater tendency for peer groups within the school to cross class lines.[13] Whether by administrative fiat or natural geographic selection, this illustrates that the socialization environment of the school peer group may be more conducive to resocialization than informal cohort groups from without the school.

To the extent that persons at higher socioeconomic levels have different norms from those at lower levels, the literature on social mobility suggests that it is reasonable to expect upwardly mobile individuals to experience a shift in attitudes toward those held by individuals of higher status as they begin to associate with these latter people and seek social acceptance from them.[14] In her attempt to test this hypothesis with young voters, Eleanor Maccoby finds that those persons who interact with higher status individuals seek to identify with their political values, but those who are downwardly mobile cling to the beliefs and orientations of their former status.[15]

Aside from status difference which may account for a part of the attitudinal change, and political resocialization which is assumed to be more strongly associated with heterogeneous rather than homogeneous class peer groups, Lazarsfeld and others have developed the concept of "opinion leadership" which is a useful addition to the explanation of opinion formation and change in small groups.[16] They reason that in every social group there are individuals who are "particularly active and articulate. They are more sensitive than others to the interests of their group, and more anxious to express themselves on important issues."[17] More important, group members are found to acquire much of their information and many of their ideas through interaction with these opinion leaders.

This concept may be particularly instructive in heterogeneous class peer groups where the opinion leaders are from the higher social classes,for this may lend a class interpretation to information they pass on to the lower status members in the group. Katz and

Lazarsfeld discover, for instance, that "public affairs" opinion leaders are more likely to be found among those persons of higher social status.[18] Interestingly enough, it will be seen later that it is the middle class respondents in this study who are found to be the most politically articulate within heterogeneous class peer groups.

The preceding discussion has led us to examine more closely the reinforcement and resocialization functions of the student peer groups. It is hypothesized that the primary function of homogeneous class peer groups in the political socialization process is to reinforce the way of life and associated political orientations of the different social classes in the society, and thus, to maintain the political and cultural cleavages which exist between these classes. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that heterogeneous class peer groups play an important political resocialization role which functions to reduce the political cleavages between social classes, particularly those between the working class and the higher classes in society.

That a consistent pattern of political cleavages does exist among the different classes can be seen in Table 30. Working class students are more likely than those from the middle or upper classes to be committed to economic aggrandizment at the expense of political freedom--a commitment which may provide a potentially fertile base for political dictatorship. Working class students are also less likely to have a positive orientation toward voting,[19] less likely to support the civil liberties of Jamaican minority groups,[20] and are less politicized spectators than middle and upper class students.[21]

Although there is no significant relationship between social class and the system legitimacy index, when the item which accounted for the most variance in the legitimacy index is correlated with class a significant relationship develops.[22] There is a linear increase in support and decrease in ambivalence as social class decreases. There appears to be no relationship between class and opposition to the political system.

The relatively stronger support and less political cynicism found among the working class may be explained in terms of the charismatic nature of Jamaican politics. Both political parties in Jamaica have attempted to project the charisma of their respective leaders before the working class Jamaican. Most successful political appeals have combined charisma with "bread and butter" trade union issues. While the working class has found the charismatic tone of Jamaican politics particularly appealing it has only tended to make the more educated classes increasingly suspicious of "mob appeal" and intolerant of alleged corruption and waste.

Students were also asked to give their opinions on certain economic issues. Some of these issues impinge directly upon

TABLE 30. --Relation of Social Class to Assorted Political Variables

Social Class	Dependent Variable				x^2
	Economic Security Is More Important Than Political Freedom				
	Agree		Disagree	N	
Working Class	54		46	465	
Middle Class	43		57	278	
Upper Class	39		61	334	.001
	It Won't Matter Much to Me if I Vote or Not When I become an Adult				
	Agree +3-1		Disagree -2/-3	N	
Working Class	42		58	461	
Middle Class	34		66	275	
Upper Class	31		69	341	.01-.001
	Rastafarians Should Not Be Allowed to Hold Public Meetings Even if They Gather Peacefully and Only Make Speeches*				
	Agree		Disagree	N	
Working Class	57		43	408	
Middle Class	51		49	237	
Upper Class	43		57	301	.01-.001
	Spectator Politicization				
	Low	Medium	High	N	
Working Class	40	30	30	488	
Middle Class	34	30	36	286	
Upper Class	27	32	41	347	.10-.05

*For an earlier discussion of the Rastafarian sect see Chapter III, footnote number 23.

TABLE 30.--Continued.

Social Class	Dependent Variable System Legitimacy Support	 Ambivalent	 Oppose	 N	x^2
Working Class	40	46	14	462	
Middle Class	33	53	14	272	
Upper Class	28	55	17	338	.02-.01

class prerogatives (Table 31). Generally the findings conform to the well documented proposition that the lower class tends to be less economically "conservative" than the higher classes. For example, there is a linear increase in agreement to government ownership of basic Jamaican industries as we move from the upper to the working class. Although all classes are generally opposed to putting a 10,000 pound ($28,000) ceiling on individual earnings, the working class is more in agreement with the establishment of such a ceiling than is either the middle or upper class. The general hesitation of secondary school students to impose earning limits is probably a reflection of their awareness that a secondary school education places them in a potentially advantageous economic position as compared to the rest of the school age population--a position which they do not wish to see encumbered by earning limits.

When asked if the "rich should give up their privileges" the same pattern develops. The majority in each class feels that

TABLE 31.--Relation of Social Class to Assorted Economic Issues

Social Class	Dependent Variable			x²
	Basic Industries Like Mining and Manufacturing Should Be Government Owned			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Working Class	47	53	377	
Middle Class	42	58	227	
Upper Class	32	68	284	.001
	10,000 Pound a Year Upper Limit on Individual Earnings			
	Yes	No	N	
Working Class	42	58	274	
Middle Class	33	67	191	
Upper Class	36	64	249	.10-.05
	Rich Should Give Up Their Privileges			
	Yes	No	N	
Working Class	31	69	456	
Middle Class	26	74	274	
Upper Class	20	80	322	.01-.001

the rich should not have to give up their privileges. The most frequent comment was that "they should be able to keep what they earned"--hardly the cry of a revolutionary. Again, however, there is a linear relationship with the working class more disposed against the privileges of the rich (31 per cent) than the upper class (20 per cent).

Although the differences between the various social classes on the preceding political and economic issues are not great in the Jamaican society, it has been hypothesized that peer groups may play an important intermediary role in reinforcing or resocializing such class attitudes as do exist. It was speculated that heterogeneous class peer groups, in particular, function in an important way to resocialize the attitudes of working class members in the direction of their more "democratic," tolerant, and politicized upper class peers.

Table 32 reports the relationship between class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and the attitude of working class respondents on the issues discussed above.[23] It is found that homogeneous peer groups function to reinforce working class political norms and the existent political cleavage between the working class and other social classes.[24] On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class peer groups (hetpeers) are resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[25] For hetpeers are less committed to economic aggrandizement at the expense of political liberty, more disposed towards fulfilling their voting obligation, less intolerant of minority groups, and more politicized than their classmates in homogeneous class peer groups (hompeers). Peer heterogeneity appears to have no effect upon the development of highly politicized students. They are found in equal percentages both in homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups. While the class environment of such intermediary socialization agencies as the peer group adds important explanatory power to the movement from low to medium politicization among working class students, other explanatory variables must be sought--such as family and peer group politicization--to explain the development of high spectator politicization.

Apparently interaction with higher class peers, who tend to be more suspicious of the charismatic tone of Jamaican politics and of alleged political corruption, has a "rationalizing" influence upon working class students. Working class hetpeers are significantly less supportive and more ambivalent toward the political system than are hompeers (Table 32).

TABLE 32.--Relation of Peer Class Environment to Assorted Political Attitudes among Working Class Students

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			x^2
	Economic Security is More Important Than Political Freedom			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Homogeneous	58	42	207	
Heterogeneous	47	53	196	.05-.02

TABLE 32.--Continued

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable				x^2
	It Won't Matter Much to Me if I Vote or Not				
	Agree	Disagree	N		
Homogeneous	49	51	203		
Heterogeneous	36	64	195		.02-.01
	Rastafarians Should Not Be Allowed to Hold Public Meetings Even if They Gather Peacefully				
	Agree	Disagree	N		
Homogeneous	62	38	183		
Heterogeneous	47	53	165		.01-.001
	Spectator Politicization				
	Low	Medium	High	N	
Homogeneous	44	26	30	215	
Heterogeneous	34	36	30	205	.05-.02
	System Legitimacy				
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	
Homogeneous	45	42	13	206	
Heterogeneous	33	51	16	193	.05-.02

This influence of the heterogeneous class peer group upon legitimacy attitudes is effective despite the fact that it is contrary to the message in Jamaican "civics" textbooks which emphasizes support. It suggests that the political information the respondent hears informally which represents "real" political attitudes is more significant in the socialization process than the formal education he receives. Wylie makes the same observation regarding informal vs. formal political socialization of French school children.[26]

When the influence of peer group class environment upon the economic attitudes of working class students is examined, we find that those students in heterogeneous class peer groups appear to move away from the more liberal attitudinal positions held by their classmates in homogeneous groups toward the more conservative economic orientations of the middle and upper classes (Table 33).

TABLE 33.--Relation of Peer Class Environment to Assorted Economic Attitudes among Working Class Students

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			x^2
	10,000 Pound a Year Upper Limit on Individual Earnings			
	Yes	No	N	
Homogeneous	46	54	118	
Heterogeneous	35	65	116	.20-.10
	Basic Industries Should Be Government Owned			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Homogeneous	52	48	175	
Heterogeneous	45	55	157	.20-.10

TABLE 33.--Continued.

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			x^2
	Rich Should Give Up Their Privileges			
	Yes	No	N	
Homogeneous	36	64	215	
Heterogeneous	23	77	205	.01-.001

When the influence of peer class environment upon the attitudes of middle and upper class students is examined a pattern develops similar to that found among the working class. Middle class students in heterogeneous class peer groups are: less likely to be committed to economic aggrandizement at the expense of political freedom; more likely to be positively disposed toward participation in voting; more tolerant toward the political rights of minority groups; and more politicized than middle class hompeers. Middle class students also become much more ambivalent and less supportive of the political system when they are members of heterogeneous class peer groups (Table 34).

The same pattern is found among upper class students on two of the political attitude dimensions; however, their attitudes in general are not as susceptible to change in the heterogeneous peer environment as are those of the working and middle classes. Upper class hetpeers are more disposed toward voting and more tolerant of the political rights of minority groups than are upper class hompeers. However, there is no significant relationship between peer environment and the resocialization of upper class attitudes on economic security vs. political freedom, spectator politicization, and system legitimacy.

It is very possible that the relatively high degree of politicization within the upper class may effectively counteract any hypothesized effect of peer class environment on spectator politicization. In addition, as will be seen in the later summary and interpretation of the peer socialization data, upper class students may have less reason to change their political orientations in heterogeneous class peer groups than do working and middle class students.

TABLE 34.--Relation of Peer Class Environment to Assorted Political Attitudes among Middle Class Students

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			x^2
	Economic Security is More Important Than Political Freedom			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Homogeneous	53	47	131	
Heterogeneous	35	65	138	.01-.001

TABLE 34-Continued.

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable				x^2
	It Won't Matter to Me if I Vote or Not				
	Agree	Disagree	N		
Homogeneous	38	62	128		
Heterogeneous	29	71	127		.20-.10
	Rastafarians Should Not Be Allowed to Hold Public Meetings Even if They Only Gather Peacefully				
	Agree	Disagree	N		
Homogeneous	57	43	108		
Heterogeneous	47	53	110		.20-.10
	Spectator Politicization				
	Low	Medium	High	N	
Homogeneous	38	28	34	134	
Heterogeneous	30	32	38	132	.50-.30
	System Legitimacy				
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	
Homogeneous	37	45	18	126	
Heterogeneous	28	59	13	128	.10-.05

It will be remembered that working class hetpeers were generally more economically conservative than were working class hompeers. The same pattern is reported in Table 35 for middle class students. However, it is only on one out of the three attitudinal dimensions that heterogeneous class environment has any significant effect upon the economic attitudes of the upper class (Table 36). Again, as will be explained later, the upper class hetpeer does not have the same status and mobility motivation for changing his attitudes in an increasingly conservative direction as do working and middle class hetpeers.

TABLE 35. --Relation of Peer Class Environment to Assorted Economic Attitudes among Middle Class Students

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			x^2
	10,000 Pound a Year Upper Limit on Individual Earnings			
	Yes	No	N	
Homogeneous	39	61	79	
Heterogeneous	28	72	100	.20-.10
	Basic Industries Should Be Government Owned			
	Agree	Disagree	N	
Homogeneous	43	57	102	
Heterogeneous	35	65	105	.30-.20
	Rich Should Give Up Their Privileges			
	Yes	No	N	
Homogeneous	30	70	130	
Heterogeneous	22	78	125	.20-.10

TABLE 36.--Relation of Peer Class Environment to Attitude toward 10,000 pound Limit on Annual Individual Earnings among Upper Class Students*

Peer Class Environment	Yes	No	N	x^2
Homogeneous	44	56	108	
Heterogeneous	27	73	117	.01-.001

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*No relationships of a significant magnitude were found between peer class environment and upper class attitudes toward Government ownership or the privileges of the rich.

Now to summarize and provide additional interpretation to the preceding discussion. First, the political and economic orientations of the various social classes are examined. A consistent pattern develops in which the working class is more committed to economic aggrandizement than political liberty, less disposed toward voting, less tolerant of the civil rights of minority groups, less politicized, and more supportive and less ambivalent toward the political system than middle and upper class respondents. Working class students are also found to be significantly more "liberal" on economic issues than the middle and upper classes.

The relationships are linear in most cases with the working and upper class occupying opposite ends of the various dependent indices.

When the relationship between the class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and the isolation of working class students from higher class political norms is examined, it is found that homogeneous peer groups reinforce the political cleavages between classes. Heterogeneous class peer groups, on the other hand, function to resocialize working class students to the political norms of the higher classes. Working class hetpeers are significantly less likely to express a commitment to economic security at the expense of political liberty, less likely to be negatively disposed toward voting, and less likely to be intolerant of minority political rights than are working class students in homogeneous class peer groups.

When the influence of peer class environment upon the same political attitudes is investigated among middle and upper class respondents, the same general pattern establishes itself that is found among the working class. However, peer class environment has no visible effect upon the attitudes of upper class students toward economic security vs. political freedom.

Peer group heterogeneity has less of an effect upon politicization and legitimacy orientations than on previous political attitudes--particularly among the upper classes. The effect of a heterogeneous class environment upon the degree of politicization among the already highly politicized upper classes is non-existent and it is not particularly strong among the less politicized middle class students. It is only among the least politicized working class that a fairly strong relationship develops between increased spectator politicization and heterogeneous class peer environment.

Again on the system legitimacy question, there is no relationship between peer class environment and the legitimacy attitudes of the upper class. It is only among the working and middle classes that peer class heterogeneity has an important effect on reducing the amount of support enjoyed by the system as a whole while increasing feelings of political ambivalence.

Finally, peer class environment is found to have an important effect upon economic attitudes. Working class students in heterogeneous class peer groups are more likely to move away from the more liberal attitudes held by working class hompeers toward the more economically "conservative" orientations of the middle and upper classes. Middle class hetpeers are also consistently more conservative than students of the same class in homogeneous class peer groups. However, the differential influence of peer class environment upon the economic attitudes of the upper class is minimal. Only on one of the three economic issues is there a significant relationship, and in this case, as is true among the working and middle classes, hetpeers are more conservative than hompeers.

It can be seen throughout this discussion that the direction of attitudinal change for all classes in heterogeneous class peer groups is toward the attitudinal positions which are most strongly held by the middle and upper classes.

The direction of change on political issues or dimensions can probably be explained in part by the social status differences found in heterogeneous class peer groups. The literature on social mobility, some of which was reviewed earlier in this chapter, suggests that working and middle class respondents are more likely to defer to the attitudes of peers with higher rather than lower social status. For behaving in the appropriate or valued manner, the higher class group members are in a position to reward members of lesser status by bestowing approval, attention, leadership, or by giving permission to participate in peer activities or to employ certain symbols.[27] Thus, the higher status peermates may become especially significant as models for identification. It is their good will which is sought and to whose behavior and ideas the lesser status individual is particularly responsive.[28]

Similarly, if upper class hetpeers change their political orientations at all, they would seem to have less status reasons for change in the direction of lower class peers than in the direction of equal or higher status peermates. It is the relative lack of higher status peermates with whom the upper class hetpeers can identify and defer which may account in part for the minimal effect of peer class environment upon their political orientations.

Another reason for the change in heterogeneous class peer groups toward more "democratic" and less intolerant attitudes could be the greater diversity of viewpoints being communicated in this type of peer group. The divergent viewpoints expressed within the heterogeneous group may make it more difficult to maintain the close-minded attitudinal positions and simple clichés that might be held with greater ease in a class exclusive peer group.

When the amount of political discussion in each type of peer group is explored with social class controlled, the per cent of working and upper class respondents who never discuss politics is less in heterogeneous than in homogeneous class peer groups (7 per cent in each case). However, it is the middle class student who is most expansive in the heterogeneous class environment. Only one half as many hetpeers in this class (17 per cent) as compared with hompeers (31 per cent) never discuss politics within their peer groups.

It is the middle class student who acts as the political catalyst and possibly the "opinion leader" in the heterogeneous class environment.

The rationale for the direction of attitude change on economic issues among respondents in heterogeneous class peer groups is more difficult to interpret than for political attitudes. Certainly as before, status deference may help explain working class and to some degree middle class movement toward the more conservative attitudes of their higher class peers. By the same token, the lack of higher status models may help account for the minimal effect of heterogeneous class environment upon the economic attitudes of upper class students.

Another interpretation which might account for some of the conservative change among the higher classes is as follows: The degree to which an action or issue is felt to endanger an individual's security is important in determining the effect of peer heterogeneity upon the direction of his attitudinal change.

It seems feasible that the more esoteric attitudes of the working class toward voting and the civil rights of a low status minority group are not perceived by the higher class hetpeers as a direct threat to their security. But the attitudes of the working class on economic issues may be perceived by the middle and upper classes as less ambiguous. Such specific attitudes as "salary limits" and the curbing of private enterprise may be seen as a much more immediate and direct danger. In this context, interaction with working class peers who hold such threatening opinions may serve only to increase middle and upper class anxieties and the rigidity of their conservative convictions.

Since the effect of peer class atmosphere upon the economic attitudes of upper class students is minimal, the lack of higher status identification models rather than the "threat hypothesis" would seem to be a better explanatory model for that class. As for the middle and working classes, further research will determine to what degree status deference, increased dialogue and "open minded" atmosphere, and "threat" each contribute to the effect of heterogeneous class peer environment on the political and economic attitudes of their members.

The net effect of homogeneous class peer environment is to reinforce the political and economic attitudinal cleavages between the classes. On the other hand, the function of heterogeneous peer groups is to move the classes toward more common political ground and in this sense to reduce class cleavages which many political and social theorists suggest may contribute to the instability of the political system.

The School

Like the peer group and family, the school is one of the major socialization agencies in society.

The school transmits the wider social and political culture by both formal and informal means. Formally, the school tries to provide the student with the intellectual tools he will need (reading, writing, analytical reasoning, etc.). Through formal teacher-student interaction and its varied curriculum, the school transmits the political history of the society and the political and cultural achievements of the past. It attempts to orient the student to the culture in which he will participate as an adult. Generally, as an agency guided by established educators, business and professional men, the school system is expected to reinforce the values of conventional society and maintain the status quo.

However, in societies where elites are interested in rapid modernization and political change, they may depend heavily upon the conscious use of the school system as a resocialization agency.[29]

Yet within school systems where self-conscious indoctrination does not take such a massive form, educators are prone to point out that the major socialization effects of the school may come through the less planned aspects of the institutional environment.

There is a saying that students "learn not what is taught, but what is caught."[30] Certainly some evidence and the observations of many scholars indicate that curriculum and formal instruction do not have great effect upon student values.[31] As a transmitter of social values, the classroom teacher has been judged to be in a weak position. It is likely that those adults who are most significant in the school socialization system are those who control role assignments which are important *within the adolescent culture*, for example, the athletic coach or driving teacher.[32]

Data in this study indicate that the relative political influence of the institutionalized role of teacher might be less than the informal student environment. When political discussion outside the family is broken down into two categories, teacher and school friends, we find that while 72 per cent of this discussion is directed toward fellow students, only 26 per cent is with teachers. Since teacher "strictness" might effect student-teacher political discussion, this association is investigated and no significant relationship is found. Thus while there is manifest political contact between teacher and student, it is the informal student social system within the school which seems to afford maximum political interaction for the respondents.

That the informal social climate of the school has an important effect upon the resocialization of party identifications and the development of political interest has been documented by Martin Levin and David Riesmann.[33] One of the more systematic studies of political socialization is Newcomb's famous research on Bennington College females. The change from conservative political and economic attitudes to more liberal orientations among Bennington students was attributed primarily to the informal student culture.[34]

The institutional setting for political attitude change (or reinforcement) explored by the above authors would seem worthy of generalization to the Jamaican secondary school: the relative isolation of students in an atmosphere of homogeneous or heterogeneous class values combined with conformity pressure to maintain old or acquire new sociopolitical orientations.

The school (like the peer group) may actually reinforce social and political class differences by the virtue of the fact that it is composed of students of the same social class. On the other hand, if students from various classes are assigned to a school, the resulting environment may be promoting the social mobility and resocialization of working class students by grouping them with adolescents of higher social status.

We have already seen the important effect peer class environment has on the political orientations of the different social classes. Does the class environment of the school have the same effect? For example, are the political orientations of working class students in homogeneous class schools more sharply differentiated from middle and upper class political norms than those of students in heterogeneous class schools?

In order to test this hypothesis, the schools in the sample were placed on a class scale (Table 37). The per cent of working class students in the school increases as one moves from code 3 to code 1. Schools in code 1 have the most dominant working class environment and, for working class students, are the closest analog to homogeneous class peer groups. School class environment becomes more heterogeneous for working class students as we move from code 1 to code 3. The school in code 3 has the most balanced distribution of classes and thus can be considered the closest analog to the environment of the heterogeneous class peer group.

TABLE 37.--School Class Environment of Selected Jamaican Secondary Schools

School Class Environment		Social Class			
		Working	Middle	Upper	N
Homogeneous	1	61	21	18	514
	2	50	22	28	168
Heterogeneous	3	41	31	28	106

It is hypothesized that while homogeneous class schools tend to reinforce the way of life and associated political orientations which the working class students bring with them to the secondary school, the heterogeneous class school plays an important role in resocializing their political attitudes in the direction of those held by the higher classes.

In Table 38 a familiar pattern is reported. Homogeneous class schools function to reinforce working class political norms and to maintain the political cleavage between the working class and the other social classes.[35] On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class schools are resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[36] They are less committed to economic aggrandizement at the expense of political liberty, more disposed toward fulfilling their voting obligation, and more tolerant of minority groups.

In general, working class students are less politicized than middle or upper class students. However, working class students in heterogeneous class schools are closer in the degree of politicization to higher class students than are their classmates in homogeneous schools. When legitimacy attitudes are examined, working class students in heterogeneous schools are less supportive and feel more ambivalent toward the political system than their counterparts in homogeneous schools. Both of the relationships correspond to the findings when peer heterogeneity is examined.

When the effect of school class environment upon economic attitudes is investigated, only on two of the three issues does school class environment have any effect. On the question of salary limits and the privileges of the rich, working class students in heterogeneous class schools are slightly more likely to adopt conservative orientations than their counterparts in homogeneous schools. However, the relationships are curvilinear and weak.

It is possible that among the working class, economic attitudes may be more "hard core" and resistant to change than the more esoteric political attitudes. This may be particularly true within the wider school environment where the pressures to conform and

TABLE 38. --Relation of School Class Environment to Assorted Polical Attitudes among Working Class Students

School Class Environment		Dependent Variable				x^2
		Economic Security is More Important Than Political Freedom				
		Agree	Disagree		N	
Homogeneous	1	61	39		289	
	2	58	42		84	
Heterogeneous	3	22	78		40	.001
		It Won't Matter Much to Me If I Vote or Not				
		Agree	Disagree		N	
Homogeneous	1	44	56		289	
	2	45	55		82	
Heterogeneous	3	26	74		39	.10-.05
		Rastafarians Should Not Be Allowed to Hold Public Meetings Even if They Gather Peacefully				
		Agree	Disagree		N	
Homogeneous	1	64	36		253	
	2	53	47		73	
Heterogeneous	3	42	58		36	.02-.01
		Spectator Politicization				
		Low	Medium	High	N	
Homogeneous	1	48	28	24	310	
	2	34	31	35	85	
Heterogeneous	3	23	27	50	44	.01-.001

TABLE 38-Continued.

School Class Environment		Dependent Variable				x^2
		System Legitimacy				
		Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	
Homogeneous	1	45	42	13	284	
	2	46	45	9	83	
Heterogeneous	3	24	64	12	42	.10-.05

defer to higher class norms may not be as great as in the small face-to-face heterogeneous peer group. The rigidity with which these attitudes are held may vary between cultures. We might find adherence to economic aggrandizement less a part of the working class culture in more affluent societies. This will also depend, of course, on the visibility of class differences in the society.

The Peer Group and School Environment

The interaction between the wider school environment and the socializing processes within the peer group pose intriguing questions and manifest the need for further research. To what degree, for example, has the school class environment outside the peer group contributed to the reported differential influence of peer class environment upon political socialization? Do we still find the reported effect of different peer class environments within schools with relatively homogeneous class environments?

Does peer class environment have the same effect upon the political attitudes of working class students in both homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools? If working class students in homogeneous class peer groups (hompeers) are to have contact with the political culture of the higher classes, it seems likely that this contact will have to be made in the broad school environment outside of the class exclusive peer group. Therefore, the school class environment may play a crucial role in counteracting the class-exclusive conformity pressures among hompeers. On the other hand, the broad class environment of the school might be expected to have a more marginal effect upon working class hetpeers. These students are in more immediate proximity to the middle and upper class political culture within their peer group, and accordingly, the degree of class heterogeneity outside the peer group may have less effect on their attitudes. Thus while peer class environment may have the predicted effect upon political attitudes in schools with relatively homogeneous class environment, the effect may be somewhat diminished within heterogeneous school environments. For this latter school atmosphere may provide hompeers with access to higher class political culture while having minimal effect upon hetpeers.

Finally, what is the comparative effect of peer and school class environment? Do we find them both contributing to the socialization of political attitudes? Does school environment have a minimal effect upon economic attitudes (as reported before) while peer class environment proves to be the most significant socialization agent?

In attempting to shed some light on these questions, Table 39 reports the relation of peer group class environment to assorted political and economic attitudes among working class students in heterogeneous and homogeneous class schools.

In all tables (A-H), the effect of peer class environment upon the political socialization process within homogeneous class schools is generally the same as reported before. It is only in sub-table D that the peer group effect within homogeneous schools is somewhat mixed. Apparently with regard to spectator politicization, it is the school rather than peer class environment which is the most significant socialization agent. While 51 per cent of the hompeers and 43 per cent of the hetpeers rank low on spectator politicization within homogeneous schools, only 20 per cent of the hompeers and hetpeers rank low on spectator politicization in heterogeneous class schools.

When the effect of peer class environment within heterogeneous class schools is investigated, the results are not as consistent. In tables B, E, F and H, the same pattern is revealed that was found

TABLE 39.--Relation of Peer Group Class Environment to Assorted Political and Economic Attitudes among Working Class Students in Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Class Schools

Peer Class Environment	Homogeneous School				Heterogeneous School			
A	Economic Security More Important Than Political Freedom							
	Agree	Disagree	N		Agree	Disagree	N	
Hompeer	65	34	122		8	92	13	
Hetpeer	55	45	105		32	68	25	
B	It Won't Matter Much to Me if I Vote or Not							
	Agree	Disagree	N		Agree	Disagree	N	
Hompeer	52	48	121		31	69	13	
Hetpeer	36	64	105		21	79	24	
C	Rastafarians Shouldn't Be Allowed to Hold Public Meetings							
	Agree	Disagree	N		Agree	Disagree	N	
Hompeer	69	31	107		43	57	14	
Hetpeer	56	44	91		43	57	21	
D	Spectator Politicization							
	Low	Medium	High	N	Low	Medium	High	N
Hompeer	51	21	28	128	20	20	60	15
Hetpeer	43	35	22	113	20	32	48	25

TABLE 39-Continued.

Peer Class Environment	Homogeneous School				Heterogeneous School			
E	System Legitimacy							
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N
Hompeer	50	40	10	119	33	53	13	15
Hetpeer	35	45	20	105	17	71	12	24
F	10, 000 Pound Earning Limit							
	Yes	No	N		Yes	No	N	
Hompeer	52	48	71		55	45	9	
Hetpeer	38	62	13		23	77	13	
G	Basic Industries Should Be Government Owned							
	Agree	Disagree	N		Agree	Disagree	N	
Hompeer	51	49	107		54	46	11	
Hetpeer	41	59	82		60	40	20	
H	Rich Should Give Up Their Privileges							
	Agree	Disagree	N		Agree	Disagree	N	
Hompeer	35	65	121		29	71	14	
Hetpeer	24	76	105		18	82	22	

among homogeneous class schools: homogeneous and heterogeneous class peer groups serve as important reinforcement and resocialization agencies, respectively, within the political socialization process.

In sub-table A under heterogeneous schools, the small number of units in the upper left-hand cell (N=1) should cause the reader to interpret this relationship with caution. The lack of any significant relationship in sub-tables C and D may be indicative of the process suggested earlier: heterogeneous class school environment may expand working class hompeers' access to higher class political culture while having minimal effect upon the political attitudes of hetpeers. This would tend to reduce the differential effects of peer class environment in heterogeneous class schools. The relationship in sub-table G under heterogeneous schools is contrary to that reported for economic attitudes in sub-tables F and H and earlier in the chapter in the peer group section. It is possible that this reversed relationship is the reflection of a sensitive issue among the working class--government ownership. Operating in the more "hostile" heterogeneous class school environment may cause a defensive "hardening" of working class attitudes. However, it is equally likely that this rather weak relationship (6 per cent), in contrast to those in sub-tables F and H, is a result of random error.

In both sub-tables C and D as well as B and E,[37] heterogeneous class school environment plays an equal if not greater role than peer class environment in accounting for the resocialization of working class political attitudes in the direction of their higher class schoolmates. However, the effect of school environment upon the economic attitudes of the working class is minimal as compared to peer groups. Thus it may be only within the small face-to-face heterogeneous class peer group where pressures to conform and defer to high class norms are most intense that any resocialization of working class economic attitudes takes place.

It is evident that the class environment of both the school and the peer group play an important role in the political socialization process. A homogeneous class environment tends to reinforce the different political and economic orientations of the classes. On the other hand, a heterogeneous class environment serves to reduce the class cleavages which many political and social theorists suggest contribute to the instability of the political system, and moves the working class, in particular, toward more common attitudinal ground with the higher classes.

If, as seems to be the case, peer groups and schools are important agencies of change, then the question many educators may ask is as follows: How can we take advantage of students' potentialities for change--and of the power of peer and school environment to induce change--in such ways that change will most probably occur in the direction of our educational, social, and political objectives?

The social scientist would suggest on the basis of the preceding discussion and findings that the potential for introducing "modernizing" norms to the lower classes via heterogeneous class environments is manifest. He might also point out that the organization of vocational and technical schools for the working class,as is being done in many less industrialized countries,may reinforce existent political-culture cleavages within the society. However, the results of this study also indicate that any manipulation of peer grouping or the class environment within the schools should be preceded by a careful value analysis. For it must be remembered that working and middle class members of heterogeneous class peer groups and working class students in heterogeneous class schools generally tend to be more politicized, more ambivalent toward and less supportive of the political system, and to have more conservative economic beliefs as well as haveing more "democratic" attitudes, giving greater support to civil liberties, and having more positive orientations toward voting.

This means that the existence of potential system "pathologies" in the form of political class cleavages may be less threatening to long run stability than the resocializing effect of heterogeneous class school and peer environment, which while reducing class cleavages creates an enlarged category of students who are not only more politicized but also less supportive of the political system--certainly a potentially dangerous output in a national political system in its early stages of development.

However, the problems which the socializing function of different peer group and school environments may create for the political system does not mean that the planner must seek to enable the lower classes to live comfortably with their "inferior" social and cultural status, à la Huxley. What it does mean is that the creation of heterogeneous class socializing environments to promote the stability of democratic political systems will be maximized when the higher classes are generally supportive of the political system. In Jamaica this may happen as the charismatic working class appeal of the parties becomes more "rationalized," and greater efforts are made to deal with allegations of political corruption.

Need for Further Cross-Cultural Research

The effect of heterogeneous class environment upon political and economic attitudes was explained partially in terms of status deference and the more give-and-take atmosphere of the heterogeneous environment which makes the maintenance of simple clichés more difficult.

But what would happen if an anglicized society like Jamaica where class deference seems relatively strong was compared with a society in which there seems to be relatively less class deference? Would class heterogeneity play a less important political socializing role in the less deferential society or would the lack of deference be balanced by less sublimation and greater give-and-take in the heterogeneous situation?

In communist states where working class values are theoretically maximized, is attitudinal change within heterogeneous class schools and peer groups in the direction of working class norms? Or does the direction of attitudinal change depend upon what stage of the revolution is being investigated?

Finally, most research showing lower class deference to people of higher social status has been done in western countries. It is possible, for example, that in other political cultures deference may flow by political ideology rather than occupational or educational status.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

[1] Charles E. Bowerman and John W. Kinch, "Changes in Family and Peer Orientations of Children Between the Fourth and Tenth Grades," *Social Forces*, 37 (March, 1959), 206-211.

[2] Outgroups consist primarily of peer groups, school teachers, and a miscellaneous assortment of "others."

[3] James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 170-172; and Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 22-23, 90-109.

[4] See Leon Festinger, *et al.*, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York: Harper, 1950), Chapters 5 and 6; Sherif, Mazafer and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements* (New York: Wiley, 1947), pp. 312-345; Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-175.

[5] Herbert McClosky and Harold E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (September, 1959), pp. 757-776; Bernard R. Berelson, *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 88-93.

[6] James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961).

[7] Robert A. LeVine, *American College Experience as a Socialization Process* (Unpublished Manuscript); and Theodore M. Newcomb, "Student Peer-Group Influence" in Robert L. Sutherland *et al.* (eds.), *Personality Factors on the College Campus* (Austin, Texas: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1962), pp. 69-91.

[8] Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, *Society and Education*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1962), Chapter 5.

[9] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

[10] Robert A. LeVine, "Political Socialization and Cultural Change" in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 280-303.

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[11] S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), Chapter I.

[12] Bernice L. Neugarten, "Social Class and Friendship Among School Children," The American Sociological Review, 51 (January, 1946), 305-313.

[13] Celia B. Stendler, Children of Brasstown (Urbana: Bureau of Research and Service of the College of Education, University of Illinois, 1949).

[14] Ralph H. Turner, "Upward Mobility and Class Values," Social Problems, 11 (Spring, 1964), 359-371; and Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

[15] Eleanor Maccoby, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Spring, 1954), 35.

[16] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al., "The Process of Opinion and Attitude Formation" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 231-242; and E. Jackson Baur, "Public Opinion and the Primary Group," American Sociological Review, 25 (April, 1960), 208-219.

[17] Ibid., p. 239.

[18] Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 324-325. Also see Sidney Verba, op. cit., p. 239, for a relevant discussion of social status and group leadership.

[19] It has been generally observed that working class Americans have a lesser sense of citizenship duty and disposition to vote than those of higher social status. Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 157-160.

[20] H. H. Remmers found that American high school students from the lower classes were least tolerant of civil liberties. Purdue Opinion Poll, Number 30, November, 1951.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V-continued

[21] American Students from low income and less educated families have been found to be less politicized than their counterparts from higher classes. Hyman, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

[22] This item was: "Do you feel that politics and government have been honest, dishonest, neither honest nor dishonest?" This question might also be considered a measure of general political cynicism.

[23] The class homogeneity-heterogeneity of the respondent's peer group was based on his subjective evaluation. Respondents were asked if their best friends in school were in the same social class as they or a different social class. House and money criteria were given as class indices. Students who responded "the same social class as you" were categorized as being members of homogeneous class peer groups. Those who responded that their best school friends were from higher, lower, as well as the same social class as theirs were categorized as being members of heterogeneous class peer groups.

If, for example, a respondent has an objective working class status and he says that his best friends in school are members of the same social class as he, then for the purposes of this study, that school peer group will be considered to be of a generally homogeneous, working class nature.

[24] If one compares carefully the percentage in the upper left-hand cell in each of the bivariate sub-tables in Table 32 with the upper left-hand cell in each of the bivariate sub-tables in Table 30, he shall see that in each case working class students in homogeneous class peer groups assume an attitudinal position which is farther from that of the middle and upper classes than is the attitudinal position of the working class in general.

[25] The differences found between hompeers and hetpeers is explained primarily as a function of the resocialization process in heterogeneous class peer groups. However, this difference might also be explained by a process of selection, i.e., heterogeneous class peer groups only select working class members who have the same values as they do.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V-continued

Serious doubt is cast on the validity of this alternative explanation when the analogous influence of school class atmosphere upon the socialization process is examined later in this chapter. Using objective criteria of class atmosphere, controlled selection, and the same dependent variables, the same relationships between homogeneous-heterogeneous class environments and the dependent variables are found as in the peer groups.

[26] Lawrence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1964), pp. 207-209.

[27] In her study in Jonesville, Neugarten found that students in heterogeneous class environments continued to defer to the perceived "favorable characteristics" of upper class students from elementary school through high school. While in the higher grades in secondary school there was no tendency to defer to lower class students and deference to higher status students was still clearly operative, adolescents were increasingly disposed to defer horizontally in more complex ways. In other words, being the student council president or the captain of the football team might make one equally if not more subject to deference as being from an upper class family. However, as Mary C. Jones has so cogently observed, higher social status is highly associated with access to prestigous student offices in the high school. Bernice L. Neugarten, "Democracy of Childhood," in William Lloyd Warner, et al. (eds.), Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper, 1949), Chapter 5; and Mary C. Jones, "A Study of Socialization Patterns at the High School Level," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 93 (September, 1958), 87-111.

The extent to which social class differences are operative in the minds of students may also vary between societies. S. Stansfield Sargent, "Class and Class-Consciousness in a California Town," Social Problems, 1 (June, 1953), 22-27. That Jamaican secondary school students are class conscious can be seen when 44 per cent of them respond that their family's social status will hurt their chance for success to some degree.

[28] Leon Festinger's important concept of "cognitive dissonance" combined with the process of status deference may bring additional explanatory power to the direction of attitude change within heterogeneous

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V-continued

class peer groups. Festinger maintains that an individual desires to reduce the unpleasantness of a situation of "cognitive dissonance" between his views and the views of other group members. This pressure plus the tendency of those who are upwardly mobile to defer to the values of those of higher status may help explain in part attitudinal change and its direction in heterogeneous peer groups. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1957).

[29] Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Directed Cultural Change in the Soviet Union: Some Soviet Studies," American Anthropologist, 64 (April, 1962), 328-339; Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Soviet Methods of Character Education: Some Implications for Research," American Psychologist, 17 (August, 1962), 550-564; and Franklin Houn, To Change a Nation (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[30] Havighurst and Neugarten, op. cit., p. 154.

[31] R. LeVine, op. cit., p. 15; and Philip E. Jacob, Changing Values in College (New York: Harper, 1957).

[32] Albert D. Ullman, "Sociology and Character Education," in Franklin Patterson, et al. (eds.), The Adolescent Citizen (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 206-223; R. M. Collier and H. P. Lawrence, "The Adolescent Feeling of Psychological Isolation," Educational Theory, 2 (August, 1951), 110; and C. Wayne Gorden, The Social System of the High School (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).

[33] Martin L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596-606; and David Riesman, Faces in the Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 559.

[34] Theodore M. Newcomb, Personality and Social Change (New York: Dryden, 1943).

[35] If for example, one compares the percentage in the upper left-hand cell in the first bivariate sub-table (Table 38) with the upper left-hand cell in the first bivariate sub-table in Table 30, he

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V-continued

shall see that working class students in homogeneous class schools assume an attitudinal position which is farther from that of the middle and upper classes than is the attitudinal position of the working class in general.

[36] It is possible, of course, that differences found between working class students in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools could be due to selection rather than the operation of different school environments. In other words, working class students with the attitudinal syndrome found among working class students in heterogeneous class schools may actually seek out the more heterogeneous class school to matriculate. Fortunately, the Jamaican Ministry of Education was able to provide information on this matter.

The top 100 scholarship students on the island may go to any school of their choice and normally pick the high prestige schools (i. e., generally upper class schools). The only predominantly upper class school in the sample drawn for this study was excluded from the homogeneous-heterogeneous index used in this chapter. The rest of the government aided students are generally restricted to the secondary school in their geographical area so there is little opportunity for the aforementioned systematic selection process to function. The geographical areas in which each school included in the index is located have been examined by myself and other cooperating Jamaican scholars. The consensus is that there is nothing peculiar about the respective geographical areas which would significantly precondition the working class students prior to their entrance into secondary schools.

This leaves approximately two per cent of the Jamaican students in government aided schools who are not being subsidized by the government. These students may generally go to any school they wish if their grades are sufficient, they can pay the tuition, and there is space available. Generally these students gravitate to the upper class schools of high prestige. There is no logical reason why there should be any systematic gravitation of these types of students to either the homogeneous or heterogeneous class schools in the sample.

In summary, there is no evidence that differences in political attitudes between working class students in homogeneous-heterogeneous class schools is due to selection rather than the socializing influences of the school class environment.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V-continued

[37] As mentioned before, the small number of units in the upper left-hand cell under heterogeneous schools in sub-table A makes this table suspect.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL EFFICACY

In Chapter IV, important relationships were found between respondents' sense of political efficacy, on one hand, and their political participation and legitimacy attitudes on the other. Since the distribution of these two dependent variables may prove crucial to the stability of the political system, this chapter will be devoted to a more extensive examination of those primary and intermediary social agencies which might be assumed to play important roles in socializing adolescent feelings of political efficacy.

The effect of family socialization was discussed before and will be further investigated. In addition, the influence of the peer group and school will be examined and their relative effects considered. Finally, the influence of early family socialization upon the socializing effects of the peer group and school is explored.

It is hypothesized that the development of an individual's sense of political efficacy is explained in large part by the degree of politicization within the groups or social institutions in which he participates. Individuals who are raised or participate in group or school environments where the general atmosphere is more politicized will be more likely to develop the view that politics is amenable to their personal manipulation, i. e., they feel more politically efficacious.

Family Politicization and Political Efficacy

The variation found between respondents from nuclear and maternal families on the political efficacy dimension was interpreted in Chapter IV as being due in part to the different levels of politicization associated with the different family structures.

Although the differences are not great, Table 40 reports the relation of family structure to family politicization. Parents in maternal families are less politicized than those in nuclear families.[1]

TABLE 40. --Relation of Family Structure to Family Politicization.

Family Structure	Family Politicization				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Nuclear family	31	62	7	369	
Maternal family	42	53	5	62	.30-.20

The influence of a politicized family atmosphere upon students' feelings of political efficacy is more readily seen in Table 41. Children reared in families where parents are interested in politics, discuss politics among themselves, and also participate in political activities, are less likely to have developed a low sense of political efficacy than those students from less politicized families. The relationship between politicized families and the development of political efficacy among their children is manifest.

TABLE 41.--Relation of Family Politicization to Students' Sense of Political Efficacy

Family Politicization	Students' Sense of Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Low	36	56	8	317	
Medium	22	66	12	608	
High	13	75	12	82	.001

Peer Group Politicization and Political Efficacy

The peer group is an important intermediary socialization agency between the individual's family and his adult role in the political system. To investigate the politicization-political efficacy hypothesis within the peer group, these groups were arrayed on a politicization continuum based upon the amount of political discussion within the peer group.[2]

Those respondents in the least politicized peer groups where they and their friends "never" discuss politics are the most likely to have a low sense of political efficacy (Table 42). There is a uniform decrease in low efficacy as we move from the least to the most politicized peer groups.

To control for selection and to again test our hypothesis, the relationship between grade level and efficacy is examined for each level of peer politicization (Table 43).

TABLE 42. --Relation of Peer Group Politicization to Student Members' Sense of Political Efficacy

Peer Group Politicization	Students' Sense of Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Low	40	52	8	316	
Medium	24	66	10	656	
High	18	66	16	171	.001

Approximately the same percentage of eighth grade students from highly politicized peer groups are low in efficacy as are those in peer groups with a low level of politicization (38 and 39 per cent, respectively). This suggests that the more politicized peer groups are not recruiting only efficacious members, and that differences in political efficacy found between groups at different levels of politicization are due to the socializing effects of group political environment.

This is further corroborated by the comparative examination of the development of feelings of political efficacy from the eighth to the twelfth grades in different peer-politicization milieu. The expectation is that there will be a greater development of political efficacy in the more politicized peer groups than in the less politicized groups.

Table 43 reports that the difference between the per cent of efficacious respondents in the eighth and twelfth grades in peer groups of high and medium politicization is 32 and 20 per cent, respectively. In peer groups with a low level of politicization there is no significant difference between the level of political efficacy in the eighth and twelfth grades.

TABLE 43.--Peer Group Politicization and the Development of Political Efficacy

	Students' Sense of Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Low Peer Politicization:					
Eighth Grade	39	55	6	169	
Eleventh Grade	40	51	9	77	
Twelfth Grade	43	47	10	70	.70-.50
Medium Peer Politicization:					
Eighth Grade	38	56	6	220	
Eleventh Grade	18	71	11	228	
Twelfth Grade	18	69	13	208	.001
High Peer Politicization:					
Eighth Grade	38	53	9	56	
Eleventh Grade	10	71	19	68	
Twelfth Grade	6	73	21	47	.001

It is evident that politicized peer groups, as well as the family, play important roles in developing feelings of political efficacy among Jamaican adolescents.

Does the atmosphere of the more politicized peer group overcome the differential effects of earlier family environment upon respondents' sense of political efficacy? Or, can the lingering effects of earlier family socialization be traced from the eighth to the twelfth grade among respondents in politicized peer groups?

In Table 44 the influence of family politicization upon the development of efficacy in politicized peer groups (politics is discussed "often" or "sometimes") is assessed. Forty-five per cent of the adolescents from lowly politicized families compared to 28 per cent from highly politicized families entered politicized peer groups in the eighth grade with a low sense of political efficacy. The influence of family background at the eighth grade level is unmistakeable.

There is--as would be expected from our previous discussion--a significant increase in political efficacy between the eighth and twelfth grades among these respondents in politicized peer groups. Yet twelfth grade respondents from the least politicized families are still less efficacious (76 per cent) than those from medium (91 per cent) or highly politicized families (95 per cent). The latent effect of the adolescent's family background continues through the duration of his membership in secondary school peer groups.

Table 44 gives us a better idea of the political socialization process through which the most highly efficacious student has traveled.

TABLE 44.--Influence of Family Politicization upon the Development of Political Efficacy in Politicized Peer Groups

Grade Level	Low Family Politicization			Medium Family Politicization			High Family Politicization		
	Efficacy			Efficacy			Efficacy		
	Low	Med-High	N	Low	Med-High	N	Low	Med-High	N
Eighth Grade	45	55	76	35	65	123	28	72	25
Twelfth Grade	24	76	45	9	91	149	5	95	19
x^2	.02-.01			.001			.20-.10		

We can see that primary and secondary socialization agencies may have a cumulative effect upon the development of political efficacy. For example, the most efficacious twelfth grade student is likely to have come from a highly politicized family and to have been a member in a politicized peer group.

School Politicization and Political Efficacy

A school that has a permissive political atmosphere which allows political debate and discussion might be expected to have an effect on the development of political efficacy similar to the politicized family and peer group.

In order to explore the more formal political atmosphere in the schools, respondents were asked how often they were given an opportunity to discuss and debate political and social issues in their respective schools. On the basis of their answers the schools were ordered by "political permissiveness" or politicization. In this ordering, one school is set apart from the others. Only 18 per cent of its students say that they are "never" allowed to discuss or debate politics in school. The "never" answers in the other schools cluster at a much higher percentage, averaging 51 per cent.

My own visitation to this more permissive school as well as reports from knowledgeable Jamaican educators corroborate the students' view that the social--as well as political--atmosphere in this school is less regimented and more conducive to free inquiry then that found in the other schools.

Table 45 reports the relationship between school politicization and political efficacy. Within the school, as in the family and peer group, there is a significant relationship between respondents' participation in a politicized institutional atmosphere and their sense of political efficacy.

If the politicized school environment is to have an effect on the development of efficacy consistent with that found among more politicized peer groups, the increase in feelings of efficacy between the eighth and twelfth grades should be greater in the more politicized school than in the less politicized institutions. As can be seen in

TABLE 45. --Relation of School Politicization to Students' Sense of Political Efficacy

School Politicization	Students' Sense of Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Low School Politicization	35	54	11	823	
High School Politicization	20	71	9	464	.001

Table 46, the difference between the eighth and twelfth graders' sense of political efficacy in the politicized school is 26 per cent, or almost twice the difference found in less politicized schools.

The politicized school, like the politicized peer group, plays an important intermediary role in developing a sense of political efficacy among Jamaican adolescents. When the effect of these two agencies is compared, we find that the relationship between politicized peer environment and the development of political efficacy is stronger (Table 43: Kendall Tau chi = .235) than between politicized school environment and the development of a sense of political efficacy (Table 46: Kendall Tau chi = .193).[3]

Apparently the political milieu within the small, face-to-face peer group has a somewhat greater effect upon the development of adolescent efficacy than does the less personal, wider school environment.

TABLE 46.--The Relation of School Politicization to the Development of Political Efficacy among Jamaican Adolescents

	Students' Sense of Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High	N	x^2
Low School Politicization					
Eighth Grade	43	51	6	306	
Eleventh Grade	32	56	12	275	
Twelfth Grade	30	55	15	242	.001
High School Politicization					
Eighth Grade	35	58	7	207	
Eleventh Grade	8	81	11	140	
Twelfth Grade	0	81	10	117	.001

Does the atmosphere of the more politicized school tend to overcome the differential effects of earlier family socialization upon respondents' sense of political efficacy? Or, can the lingering effect of the students' family political milieu be traced throughout his secondary school experience?

Table 47 reports the influence of family politicization upon the development of political efficacy within the most politicized school. Respondents from less politicized families entered the eighth grade feeling less efficacious than respondents from more politicized families. Forty per cent of the students from the least politicized families compared to 15 per cent of those from highly politicized families entered school with feelings of low political efficacy.

Although this sense of inefficacy decreases as we move to the twelfth grade, respondents from less politicized families still display more inefficacy (16 per cent) than those from medium (4 per cent) or highly politicized families (none).

TABLE 47.--Influence of Family Politicization upon the Development of Political Efficacy in a Politicized School

Grade Level	Low Family Politicization			Medium Family Politicization			High Family Politicization		
	Efficacy			Efficacy			Efficacy		
	Low	Med-High	N	Low	Med-High	N	Low	Med-High	N
Eighth Grade	40	60	45	34	66	93	15	85	20
Twelfth Grade	16	84	25	4	96	76	0	100	5
x^2		.05-.02			.001			.20-.10	

Thus the influence of family socialization can be traced throughout the students' enrollment in the secondary school, and it continues to shape his perceptions of personal political efficacy as he is about to assume the responsibilities of an adult in the political system.

Before turning to a general summary, we should note the cumulative effect of both a politicized family and school environment upon students' attitudes in Table 47. One hundred per cent of these respondents have developed a medium or high sense of political efficacy by the time they are in the twelfth grade. Because the marginals are small these data must be interpreted with some caution; yet they strongly suggest the types of socialization agencies through which the most politically efficacious student has traveled.

In summary, it has been found that the politically efficacious student is more likely to be politically active and to feel more supportive and less ambivalent toward the political system than his less efficacious contemporary.

It was hypothesized that the development of feelings of political efficacy is explained in large part by the degree of politicization within groups or social institutions in which individuals participate. A number of socialization agencies were investigated and it was found that the more politicized the social institution, whether it be family, peer group or school, the more likely were its members to feel politically efficacious.

When the influence of the politicized school and peer group were compared, the development of political efficacy was more strongly associated with the peer group than the school environment. Apparently the political milieu within the smaller, face-to-face peer group has a somewhat greater effect upon the development of adolescent efficacy than does the less personal, wider school environment.

When we attempted to trace the socialization process through which the politically efficacious adolescent had traveled, we found that primary and secondary socialization agencies had a cumulative effect upon the development of political efficacy. In other words, the highly efficacious person was most likely to have come from a politicized family and to have been a member in a politicized peer group or school.

Finally, the interaction between the politicized intermediary agencies and the family was investigated to see if the former effectively overcame the differential effects of early family socialization upon respondents' sense of political efficacy.

Both the politicized peer group and school environment had significant effect upon the development of political efficacy among the respondents. However, the influence of the political milieu within the family was traceable throughout the student's peer group and secondary school experience. It was found to still have a significant differential effect upon the respondent's sense of political efficacy as he was about to leave the secondary school and assume his adult role within the political system.

Further research and data of the type summarized here will enable us to "map" more thoroughly the political socialization process within a society and to make inferences about the functional contribution of selected primary and intermediary socialization agencies.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

[1] See Appendix D for Family Politicization Index.

[2] Respondents were asked how often they discussed politics with their best school friends. "Often," "sometimes," or "never" were the structured response categories. As a proxy of peer group politicization, students who answered "often" were considered to be members of the most highly politicized peer groups while those who answered "never" were considered to hold membership in the least politicized peer groups.

[3] Notice that the numerical values of tau chi seem relatively small in spite of what on inspection appears to be a pair of moderately strong relationships. However, Blalock has observed: "since it can be shown that tau can reach unity only when all cells are empty except those in the diagonal, we can seldom expect to get a value of tau approaching unity." Because the numerical upper limit of tau is dependent upon marginal totals, this statistic is used here only for comparative purposes. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 323.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem in this study was to inquire into the process, as mediated through various social agencies, by which an individual acquires politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behavior patterns. With this task in mind an organizational framework for the study of political socialization was presented in the first chapter of this report. The subsequent data and analysis on the political socialization of Jamaican secondary school students--the case in point--has been an attempt to add empirical substance to this framework.

A great deal of literature has concerned itself with the relation between social institutions and attitudes, and between attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately there has been little research which has attempted to connect all three: the environmental agency to the psychological disposition and the disposition to politically relevant behavior.[1] If we are interested in explaining the socialization process and find that feelings of political efficacy, for example, are related to political behavior, we must also ask how these attitudes are formed and investigate the important socialization agencies in the process. The stability of these early-learned attitudes and behavior should not be treated as a premise; instead, appropriate research designs should be utilized to test their constancy over the life cycle. Finally, intermediary socialization institutions should be investigated and their reinforcement and resocialization roles explicated. The study of their influence on the stability of political attitudes and behavior developed in primary institutions must be given an important place in research on socialization.

The Family

Because of the conceptual and empirical emphasis given to the family in the literature on socialization, it was selected as the first environmental unit of analysis. The family is the setting for the first and quite possibly some of the most important socialization experiences. At the same time its role raises one of the major questions in the study of political socialization: Is the family so far removed from the political system that its influence is irrelevant?[2] Is the influence of intermediary agencies such that they effectively counteract the differential effects of early family socialization?

One can assume that primary environmental agencies like the family have a significant impact upon the political system, yet to establish a precise empirical connection is more difficult. The demonstration of this connection or its absence means that the student of political socialization must examine adults as well as adolescents and children, and intermediary as well as primary socializing institutions. It also means that he must utilize quasi-longitudinal and longitudinal research designs as well as cross-sections in his research.

Family Structure and Political Socialization

It was assumed that politically relevant learning takes place within the family environment. Therefore the high incidence of maternal families in the Jamaican population that led us to hypothesize the differential effects of family structure in the political socialization process.

After examining empirically the political relevance of the dependent variables, it was hypothesized that family structure would have a differential effect upon the socialization of these attitudes. We expected to find that respondents from maternal families had more authoritarian attitudes, felt less politically efficacious, and were less interested in politics than those from nuclear families. In addition, it was maintained that male respondents would be more affected by the environment of the maternal family and the absence of the father than would female respondents.

More specifically, it was first hypothesized that males from maternal families were more likely than females to react to their insecure paternal identification with compensatory closed belief systems as measured by a general authoritarian scale. Second, the absence of a paternal political stimulant and role model in the maternal family was more likely to retard the development of political interest among male than female respondents. Third, maternal dominance would have a more debilitating effect on male than female children. Therefore, male respondents from maternal families should feel less politically efficacious than female respondents.

The hypotheses concerning the differential effects of family structure were generally confirmed. The pattern remained when a control for social class was introduced. It was only on the efficacy dimension that the differential effect of family structure was found to be essentially a working class phenomenon. In this case, the more efficacious middle and upper class political culture appeared to counteract the differential effects of family structure.

Within the maternal family a predicted pattern developed in which father absence and maternal domination were shown to have an important impact upon the authoritarian attitudes and political interest of male students while having little effect on females. On the efficacy dimension, however, no sexual differentiation was apparent: both male and female students from maternal families were significantly less efficacious than their counterparts from nuclear families. An intervening variable, family politicization, was used to explain this lack of sexual differentiation. Maternal families were less politicized than nuclear families and family politicization was significantly related to the development of respondents' sense of political efficacy. Therefore, we speculated that the lower sense of political efficacy among male respondents from maternal families was the result of two confounded factors: less politicized family environment and maternal dominance. The lower level of politicization in maternal families also caused female students from these families to be less politically efficacious than their counterparts in nuclear families.

Approximately 25 per cent of the Jamaican families are maternal. This factor plus the significantly high incidence of mother-child families reported in the World Ethnographic Sample indicate the significance of the findings in this study on the differential effects of family structure. However, the array of dependent variables is not so broad nor is the magnitude of the differences so large as to give support to the rather easy generalizations concerning the almost singular impact of early family socialization upon the political system.

In addition, more research is needed on the cross-sex effects of maternal domination as an explanatory factor in the maternal family environment. Future students are advised to select dependent variables which are politically relevant, but are not as strongly bound to the less politicized environment of the maternal family. Ego strength may be such a variable.

The impact of family experiences upon the political system depends heavily on the ways in which predispositions learned in the family are mediated by the intermediary socialization agencies within the society. It is the stability of these early learned attitudes and behaviors that provides the crucial link between the family and the political system.

A quasi-longitudinal research design was employed in this study to inquire into the continuing influence of early family socialization in nuclear and maternal families throughout the secondary school experience. It was found that respondents from maternal families entered the secondary school with more authoritarian attitudes, feeling less politically interested and less politically efficacious, than their colleagues from nuclear families. More important, this relationship continued through the twelfth grade.

Although students from both maternal and nuclear families increased their political interest and sense of political efficacy as they moved through the secondary school, the greatest increase was among respondents from nuclear families. The debilitating effects of maternal family living appeared to insulate their offspring to some degree from the socializing influence of the school environment. However, the decrease in authoritarian attitudes through the secondary school experience was significantly greater for students from maternal families than those from nuclear families. This is not surprising. The student who leaves the particularistic and closed family system and enters into the more universalistic and rationalized educational environment of the school may find it more difficult to maintain the simple clichés and close-minded beliefs that characterized his more authoritarian outlook in the family.

Thus we find that early family socialization pre-determines to a significant degree the socializing influence of intermediary agencies in the social system. Moreover, the differential socializing effect of family structure appears to follow the student throughout his enrollment in the secondary school and remains a significant variable in explaining an adolescent's perception of his role in the political system as he is about to enter adulthood.

The Family and Political Partisanship

There has been an intensification of partisan political conflict in Jamaica over the last decade which some observers suggest may endanger the country's evolving system of limited political competition. Over one-half of the students in the sample were found to have strong partisan attitudes. Since the family is an important primary institution which may inculcate a form of partisanship that is intolerant of opposition and suspicious of extra-party contact, it became the focus of this analysis.

It was hypothesized that adults who were actively engaged in this increasingly hostile process were more likely to instill strong partisan feelings in their children. Therefore we predicted that students from politicized families were likely to have strong partisan orientations. This hypothesis was strongly confirmed.

There was a significant reduction in partisan feelings after the students enrolled in secondary school and presumably interacted less with their family. Yet the lingering effect of early family socialization was still manifest. Students from politicized families entered the eighth grade and were about to graduate from the twelfth grade with significantly more intense partisan feelings than those from less politicized families. Equally important, the socializing effects of the family were again found to pre-determine the influence of the intermediary agency to an important degree. There was an inverse linear relationship between the politicization of the student's family and the reduction in the intensity of his political partisanship over the secondary school experience.

The contention of classical democratic theory for higher politicization and citizenship participation might create important problems for the stability of the Jamaican political system. This would seem particularly true if the same citizens are not benefited by the moderating effect of secondary education. For given the highly antagonistic tone of Jamaican politics, politicization is generally associated with a type of intense partisanship which is likely to be suspicious of extra-party contact and cooperation. Moreover, this highly partisan atmosphere is being reinforced and inculcated among the more politicized families within the Jamaican political system.

The Authoritarian Family and Adolescent Party Identification Deviancy from Family to Peer Group

A considerable body of literature has been devoted to the influence of authoritarian child rearing practices upon adolescent attitudes and behavior. In this study an attempt was made to measure the strictness and rigidity of parental control in the family. This was based on a number of considerations. First, is overstrict parental control likely in the Jamaican culture to be manifested among respondents as deviancy from family party identifications? Second, does the rigidity of parental control pre-determine to some extent the influence of the peer group upon adolescent party identifications? In other words, are respondents from authoritarian families more likely to deviate from parental party preferences toward those of their peer group than students from less authoritarian families? Third, do we find a rebellion-conformity threshold of family authoritarianism beyond which family dominance discourages rather than encourages political deviancy? Finally, is political deviancy higher when politics is a salient issue in the family than when the family is less politicized?

The data revealed an increase in respondents' deviancy from the party preferences of their parents toward those of their peers as family authoritarianism increased. However among the most authoritarian families the relationship became curvilinear. This seemed to indicate a conformity-rebellion threshold of family authoritarianism beyond which the respondents rivaled those from the least authoritarian families in their compliance with parental party preferences. The same threshold emerged when a control for family politicization was used. Apparently parental dominance in the most authoritarian household is so oppressive that it discourages rather than encourages political deviancy.

The few empirical studies on the relationship of overstrict parental training methods to political deviancy suggest that deviancy will be greater when politics is salient to the family, in other words, when it is available as an object of protest. Our data was not consistent with these findings. In fact, students from the more highly politicized families tended to be more conforming than those from less politicized families. It is possible that political saliency may be as indicative of a process of indoctrination as an object of protest. Further cross-cultural research would seem necessary to establish more definitely the relationship between political saliency and intergenerational change in party preference as a manifestation of protest.

Generally, the family and family structure were found to have a significant effect upon the political socialization of a select strata of Jamaican adolescents.

Further study utilizing a longitudinal research design would allow us to follow these students over a greater duration of their life cycle and to make statements about the effect of adult socialization on the constancy of early-learned attitudes and behavior. However, the employment of a quasi-longitudinal design has permitted us to infer that the differential socializing effect of the family follows the student throughout his enrollment in secondary school and remains a significant variable in explaining an adolescent's perception of the political system, and his role in it, as he is about to enter adulthood.

Social Institutions and Political Efficacy

Important relationships were found between students' sense of political efficacy, on one hand, and their political participation and legitimacy attitudes on the other. Since the distribution of these two dependent variables may prove crucial to the stability of the political system, the family was again examined as to its role in the socialization process. Although it is in the family where the study of political socialization may well begin, it cannot end there. For this reason the socializing role of the peer group and school were considered as well.

It was hypothesized that the development of an individual's sense of political efficacy is explained in large part by the degree of politicization within the groups or social institutions in which he participates. Individuals who are raised or participate in group or school environments where the general atmosphere is more politicized are more likely to develop the view that politics is amenable to their personal influence, in other words, they feel more politically efficacious.

This hypothesis was generally confirmed as it was found that the more politicized the social institution, whether it be family, peer group, or school, the more likely were its members to feel politically efficacious.

When the influence of the politicized peer group and school were compared, the development of political efficacy was more strongly associated with the peer group than the school environment. The political milieu within the smaller, face-to-face peer group had a somewhat greater effect upon the development of adolescent efficacy than did the less personal, wider school environment.

We attempted to trace the socialization process through which the politically efficacious adolescent had traveled. Primary and secondary socialization agencies were found to have a cumulative effect upon the development of political efficacy. In other words, the highly efficacious person was likely to have come from a politicized family and to have been a member in a politicized peer group or school.

Finally, the interaction between the politicized intermediary agencies and the family was examined to see if the former effectively overcame the differential effects of early family socialization on respondents' sense of political efficacy.

The politicized peer group and school both played a significant role in developing feelings of political efficacy among the respondents. Yet the influence of the political milieu within the family was traceable throughout the student's peer group and secondary school experience. It still had a significant differential effect upon the respondent's sense of political efficacy as he was about to leave the secondary school and assume his adult role within the political system.

The Peer Group and School

As the individual matures and begins to explore beyond the family environment, he will confront other groups and social institutions which may play important roles in his socialization to politics. Many of his new experiences will take place within his school and, especially during adolescence, in the peer group. The secondary school and peer group are somewhat closer to the political system than is the family. Yet the individual enters into these secondary socialization institutions after many dispositions to politics have already been learned. We have already seen that family socialization pre-determines to some extent the influence of these intermediary agencies in the political socialization process.

These secondary socialization agencies may reinforce political dispositions learned in the family, but they also may be instrumental in counteracting earlier socialization while developing new expectations and behavior of political relevance. We speculated that the class atmosphere of the intermediary agency could be crucial in determining its socializing function, particularly among working class students.

It was hypothesized that a major function of homogeneous class peer groups and schools was to reinforce the way of life and associated political orientations of the different social classes in the society, and thus to maintain the political cleavages which exist between these classes. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that heterogeneous class peer groups played an important resocialization role which functioned to reduce the political cleavages between social classes, particularly those between the working class and higher classes in society.

The influence of class environment upon the attitudes of the working class was tested both in the peer group and school. Both hypotheses were generally confirmed. Homogeneous class peer groups and schools tend to reinforce the political and economic attitudes of the working class, while heterogeneous class groups and institutions functioned to resocialize working class students to the political norms of the higher classes. However, the heterogeneous environment of the school had less of an effect upon the economic attitudes of the working class than did that of the peer group.

It is very likely that among the working class, economic attitudes may be more "hard core" and resistant to change than the more esoteric political attitudes. This may be particularly true within the wider school environment where the pressures to conform and defer to higher class norms may not be as great as in the small, face-to-face heterogeneous class peer group.

The influence of class environment upon the attitudes of the middle and upper classes was tested in the peer group setting. It was found that middle class students reacted in a similar manner to the working class students in the two different types of peer environments. However, the peer group had less effect upon the attitudes of the upper class.

The interaction between the wider school environment and the socializing process with the peer group was examined. Peer class environment had its predicted effect in schools with relatively homogeneous class environment, but the differential effect of homogeneous-heterogeneous class peer groups was diminished within heterogeneous school environments. These findings were explained in the following way. If working class students in homogeneous class peer groups (hompeers) are to have contact with the political culture of the higher classes, it is likely that this contact will have to be made in the broad school environment outside of the class-exclusive peer group. Therefore, the degree of class heterogeneity in the school environment may play a crucial role in counteracting the class-exclusive conformity pressures among hompeers. On the other hand, the broad class environment of the school might be expected to have a more marginal effect upon working class students in heterogeneous class peer groups (hetpeers). These students are in more immediate proximity to the middle and upper class political culture within their peer group, and accordingly, the degree of class heterogeneity outside the peer group may have less effect on their attitudes. Thus while peer class environment may have the predicted effect upon political attitudes in schools with relatively homogeneous class environments, the effect may be somewhat diminished within heterogeneous class schools. For the class environment in the heterogeneous school may provide hompeers with access to higher class political culture while having minimal effect upon hetpeers.

It is evident that the class environment of both the school and peer group play an important role in the political socialization process. Although affected by the interaction between school and peer environments, the net effect of a homogeneous class environment is to reinforce the different political and economic orientations of the classes. On the other hand, a heterogeneous class environment serves to reduce the class cleavages which may contribute to the instability of the political system, and moves the working class, in particular, toward more common attitudinal ground with the higher classes.

The Limitations of this Study and the Need for Cross-Cultural Research

The major objective of this research was to inquire into the nature of the pre-adult socialization process to learn how politically relevant attitudes and behaviors are developed. This necessitated an investigation of the influence of selected environmental socialization agencies over time.

Inferences concerning the stability or change of attitudes and behavior were facilitated by a research design based on a set of cross-sections (measurements made at one point in time), and which assumed quasi-longitudinal conditions. That is, students were sampled in the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth grades and assumptions were made about development over time as if students in the eighth grade closely resembled the students in the twelfth grade after a passage of four years. Although the drop-out rate was so low as to have no significant impact upon these assumptions, this writer feels that change and stability of attitudes and behavior would be more accurately portrayed if a longitudinal design was utilized. In a longitudinal design the same people would be surveyed at different points in time. This would alleviate the necessity for quasi-longitudinal assumptions.

Another limitation or gap in this research is that it has focused exclusively upon the pre-adult socialization process. If we are interested in building empirically based analytical theory which explains the socialization process throughout the life cycle, a theory which makes a definitive linkage between the socialization process and the political system, then emphasis must be given to adult socialization as well. Even though adolescents often play crucial political roles in less industrialized countries, a comprehensive theory would explain, for example, why they so often become less radical and more conservative in adult life.

It is with this problem in mind that I anticipate a future longitudinal study which will investigate the continued socialization of respondents identified in this study after they assume adult statuses in the society.

A final limitation in this study is that many of the findings have their empirical roots only in Jamaican society. The role of gross family structure, peer and school class environments, and the rebellion-conformity threshold of family authoritarianism, for example, have yet to be tested in other cultures. Although I am confident that with some limitations the findings in this study can be generalized to other political systems, one case does not make a generalization.

The major objective in this study was to inquire into the process by which an individual acquires politically relevant attitudes and behavior patterns. An organizational framework for the study of political socialization was presented early in this report. The subsequent data and analysis have been an attempt to add empirical substance to that framework--the secondary school adolescent in Jamaica being the case in point.

This research has been of scientific interest to the extent that it has provided a base for cumulative knowledge and enabled us to make empirical statements explicating the functional contribution of selected primary and intermediary socialization agencies while mapping more thoroughly the political socialization process within a society.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

[1] A behavioral criteria does not mean, for example, that legitimacy attitudes or dispositions toward authoritarian political leadership would not have political significance in time one, but this is dependent to a major degree on whether they can be used to explain and predict future behavior--either on the part of the masses or the leadership--in time two.

[2] Such "irrelevance" would not lack conceptual significance. At a minimum it would mean that one of the most potentially potent socialization agencies has little impact upon the structuring of the political system. It may also point to the greater socialization load being placed upon other institutions in the system and an unstable intergenerational transmission of political norms and values. See Sidney Verba, The Comparative Study of Political Socialization (A paper delivered at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), pp. 1-5.

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APPENDIX A

SOCIAL STATUS INDEX

Two variables are used in the construction of the social status index: occupation and education. Occupation is determined by the occupation of the respondent's father or that of the chief money-earner in the family, whichever is highest. Education level is based on the education of the mother, or father, or of the most important person in raising the respondent, whichever is higher.

The cutting points for occupation are established between high, medium and low status occupations. These three categories correspond to supervisory white collar, clerical white collar, and blue collar type employment, respectively. High status occupations are assigned 2 points, medium status 1 point, and low status 0 points.

The cutting point for education is determined by computing the median for the education variables. As the median does not fall precisely between coded categories, it has been placed between the category break closest to the median, in other words, between those who have completed primary education and those who also have had some secondary schooling. All respondents falling below the median receive a 0 educational score and those above the median receive a score of 1.

APPENDIX A-continued

All respondents receiving a total score of 0 or 1 are placed in code 1 of the index. Total scores of 2 or 3 are placed in codes 2 and 3, respectively. Respondents in code 1 are referred to as "working class," code 2 as "middle class," and code 3 as "upper class."

APPENDIX B

SYSTEM LEGITIMACY INDEX

This four item index is taken from questions 38, 59, 76, and 78 (Appendix F). Its score ranges from 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates the respondent supports the political system while 5 indicates he opposes the system.

The questions are trichotomized in the following manner:

Opposition: Question 38 (2) ; 59 (2) ; 76 (1, 2) ; 78 (1, 2, 3)
Support: Question 38 (1) ; 59 (1) ; 76 (5, 6) ; 78 (5, 6)
Ambivalence: Question 38 (3) ; 59 (3) ; 76 (3, 4) ; 78 (4)

A support response is given a (+), opposition responses (-), ambivalent responses (0). Response sequences are assigned in the following manner:

			One NA
1)	Support	++++	+++
		+++0	++0
2)	Tend toward support	+++-	
		++00	++-
		++-0	
3)	Ambivalent	+000	+00
		0000	000
		-+00	+-0
		-000	-00
4)	Tend toward Opposition	++--	
		--+0	--+
		--00	
5)	Opposition	---+	--0
		---0	---

Response series with only (1) no answer (NA) are also assigned as shown.

APPENDIX C

OUTPUT LEGITIMACY INDEX

This three item index is taken from questions 43, 51, and 56. Scores range from 1 indicating support to 5 indicating opposition.

The items are trichotomized in the following manner:

Support: Question 43 (5, 6) ; 51 (1) ; 56 (1)
Opposition: Question 43 (1, 2) ; 51 (2, 3) ; 56 (2)
Ambivalence: Question 43 (3, 4) ; 51 (4) ; 56 (3)

Support responses are given a (+), opposition (-), and ambivalence (0).

Response sequences are assigned and coded in the following manner:

			One NA
1)	Support	+++ ++0	
2)	Tend toward support	++-	++NA
3)	Ambivalence	+00 000 +-0 -00	00NA
4)	Tend toward opposition	--+	--NA
5)	Opposition	--0	

Response series with only one (1) no answer (NA) are coded as shown.

APPENDIX D

FAMILY POLITICIZATION INDEX

This index is constructed from questions 22, 23, and 24 in which the respondents are asked to recall their parents' political interest and activity. The items are dichotomized so that the family of a respondent could obtain one point each--for a total of three points--for answering the questions in the following way: questions 22 (3,4), 23 (1,2), 24 (3,4). No points are given for answering the questions in the following way: questions 22 (1,2), 23 (3,4), 24 (1,2).

The index is coded from 1 to 3. Families with a score of 0 are in code 1 and designated as families with a relatively low level of politicization. Families with a score of 1 or 2 are coded 2 and designated to be of medium politicization. Families with a score of 3 are coded 3 and designated to be highly politicized. When only one of the three items is a "no" answer or "don't know," the family is assigned according to its total score as follows:

	One NA Scores
Low:	0
Medium:	1
High:	2

APPENDIX E

SPECTATOR POLITICIZATION INDEX

This index is constructed from questions 32a, b, c, d, e, f, and 64. Questions 32a, b, and e deal with political discussion within the family, question 32c with teacher, 32d with school friends, and 32f with politicians. Question 64 asks the frequency in which political articles are read in the national newspaper.

If respondents discussed politics "often" or "sometimes" with any one or all family members they are given 1 point, if "never" they are scored zero. They could gain an additional four points by answering "often" or "sometimes" to each of the other three discussion items and "everyday" or "3-4 times a week" to the reading frequency question.

The index is coded from 1 to 3. Respondents with a score of 0 or 1 are placed in code 1 and given a "low" spectator politicization rating. Scores of 2 are coded 2 and given a "medium" politicization rating. Scores of 3, 4, or 5 are coded 3 and given a "high" politicization rating.

APPENDIX F

QUESTIONNAIRE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

#________________________

OPINIONS OF JAMAICAN STUDENTS

We would appreciate your co-operation in completing this questionnaire. All questionnaires will be held in strictest confidence. No questionnaire or individual replies will be seen by the staff of your school, your family, or anybody except the staff of this study. From your answers we hope to learn a great deal about the opinions and plans of Jamaican students.

This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers (except, of course, questions like age, year in school, etc.). We just want your opinions on a number of questions that are being given to a large group of secondary students throughout Jamaica. We realize that some of the questions deal with complex issues and the choice of answers you are given may not express your exact opinion. But it is important that every question be answered to the best of your ability, and then you may feel free to write in any comments you want to add.

APPENDIX F-continued

Pay no attention to the little numbers next to the blank spaces. They are for coding purposes and help us to record your answers faster.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Your Name (Please Print) ________________________________

APPENDIX F-continued

MOST OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HAVE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. MARK (✓) THE ANSWER THAT IS CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL OPINION.

1. What is your present age?

_____**1) 10 years or less**
_____**2) 11**
_____**3) 12**
_____**4) 13**
_____**5) 14**
_____**6) 15**
_____**7) 16**
_____**8) 17**
_____**9) 18 or more**

2. What is your sex?

_____**1) Male**
_____**2) Female**

3. What form are you in now?

_____**1) First**
_____**2) Second**
_____**3) Third**
_____**4) Fourth**
_____**5) Fifth**
_____**6) Sixth**

4. Where did you live for the longest time before coming to the Secondary school?

_____**1) Kingston**
_____**2) middle-sized city, population 10,000-25,000 (For example, Port Antonio, Spanish Town, Montego Bay etc.).**
_____**3) small town, population 5,000-10,000**
_____**4) rural village**
_____**5) in the country**

4a. What is the name of the city, small town, or rural village that you lived in for the longest time?

____

APPENDIX F-continued

5. What religion do you favor?

_____1) Catholic
_____2) Jewish
_____3) Protestant (WHICH DENOMINATION?)______________
_____4) Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)______________
_____5) None

5a. How often do you attend church?

_____1) Once a week or more often
_____2) Less than once a week
_____3) Never

6. Did you attend a public or private primary school?

_____1) Public
_____2) Private
_____3) Both
_____4) Neither

7. Please give the NAME AND LOCATION of all the primary schools you attended before entering your present school.

Name	Location
______________	______________
______________	______________
______________	______________

8. Do you hold a free place scholarship?

_____1) No
_____2) Yes

9. If you were asked to use one of these names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in?

_____1) Upper Class
_____2) Middle Class
_____3) Working-Class
_____4) Lower Class

APPENDIX F-continued

10. What is the chief job (work) of your Father? (If he is retired or dead, what was his main job?) PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

Father: ______________________________

11. How much education do your parents have? Check the HIGHEST Education that each has: (READ COMPLETE LIST BEFORE ANSWERING)

	Mother	Father
1) None		
2) Some Primary Education		
3) Completed Primary Education		
4) Teacher Training Education		
5) Some Secondary Education		
6) Completed Secondary Education		
7) Some University Education		
8) Completed University Education		
9) Other (Specify)		
x) Don't Know		

12. Who provided most of the money for the family in which you grew up? (Please state what his or her relationship is to you, for example: Father, Mother, Mother's Father, Mother's Brother etc.).

____

APPENDIX F-continued

12a. What is this person's chief job (work)? If he (or she) is retired or dead, what was his (or her) chief job? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

____

13. Which of the following is closest to what you think the monthly income of your family was during the last five years? (Pounds)

_____1) Under 5 pounds
_____2) 5 - 10
_____3) 10 - 20
_____4) 20 - 50
_____5) 50 - 75
_____6) 75 - 100
_____7) 100 - 200
_____8) 200 - 300
_____9) 300 - 400
_____x) 400 and over

14. Has your mother had a regular job outside the home while you were growing up?

_____1) Yes
_____2) No
_____3) Don't Know

14a. If you answered yes, what was your mother's regular job outside the home? PLEASE BE SPECIFIC.

____

15. Which of your relatives or family (not including your brothers and sisters) regularly lived with you while you were growing up? (Check as many as regularly lived with you).

_____1) Your mother
_____2) Your mother's mother
_____3) Your father
_____4) Your father's father
_____5) Your father's mother
_____6) Others
____
_____7) None

APPENDIX F-continued

16. Do your Mother and Father usually work together on the family farm?

_____1) Parents don't have a family farm
_____2) Usually
_____3) Sometimes
_____4) Never

16a. If your Mother and Father worked together on the family farm, how often did you work with them?

_____1) Never
_____2) Seldom
_____3) Often
_____4) Very often

17. Which ONE person do you feel has been most important in raising you from a child?

_____1) Your mother
_____2) Your father
_____3) Your mother's mother
_____4) Your father's mother
_____5) Your mother's father
_____6) Your father's father
_____7) Other: PLEASE SPECIFY_____

17a. Which political party do you think this person favors?

_____1) People's National Party (Manley)
_____2) Jamaican Labour Party (Bustamante)
_____3) Other (Specify) _____
_____4) None
_____5) Don't Know

17b. What is the highest education that this person has had? (PLEASE BE SPECIFIC).

_____

APPENDIX F-continued

18. Which political party do you think the following people favor? (Check as many people as you can).

	1) People's National Party	2) Jamaica Labour Party	3) Other Specify	4) None	5) Don't Know
Your mother					
Your father					
Your mother's mother					
Your mother's father					
Your father's mother					
Your father's father					

19. In your case, has your family been very strict and wanted to have a lot to say about what you did, your friends and the places you went with them, never letting you have your say, OR have they been pretty free with you and let you make your own decisions?

_____1) Family has always been very strict and never let me have my say.
_____2) Family has been strict most of the time and hardly ever let me have my say.
_____3) Sometimes the family has been strict, but sometimes they would let me have my say.
_____4) Family has been very free with me and I have pretty much made by own decisions.
_____5) Don't know.

20. How interested were you in politics when you were in primary school?

_____1) Very interested
_____2) Somewhat interested
_____3) Not very interested
_____4) Not at all interested

APPENDIX F-continued

21. On the whole, how strict do you feel the teachers have been that you have had in secondary school?

_____1) Very strict _____3) Not very strict
_____2) Strict _____4) Not strict at all

22. How interested would you say your family has been in politics?

_____1)Not at all interested _____3) Somewhat interested
_____2)Not very interested _____4) Very interested
_____5) Don't know.

23. How often have your parents discussed politics?

_____1) Very often _____3) Not very often
_____2) Often _____4) Not at all

24. How often have your parents participated in political activities (attended election meetings, talked to politicians, run for political office, etc.)?

_____1) Not at all _____3) Often
_____2) Not very often _____4) Very often
_____5) Don't know

25. How much do you think your parents' social position (i.e. their station in life) will hurt your chances for success?

_____1) Very much _____3) A little
_____2) Somewhat _____4) Not at all

26. Which political party do you favor?

_____1) People's National Party _____3) Other
_____2) Jamaica Labour Party (Specify)_____________
_____4) Undecided

APPENDIX F-continued

27. How often are students in your secondary school given an opportunity to discuss and debate political and social issues?

_____1) Often _____2) Occasionally _____3) Never

27a. If such discussions and debates were allowed, how often did you take part in them?

_____1) Often _____2) Occasionally _____3) Never

28. Suppose you had graduated from school and the national legislature was considering a law that you thought was harmful or bad for the country. What do you think you would do?

_____1) Try in some way to change the law
_____2) There is nothing I could do

29. If you had graduated from school and you wanted to influence a decision of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT which ONE of the following would you most likely do? (READ ENTIRE LIST BEFORE ANSWERING).

_____1) Directly contact political leaders or the press either by letter or face to face.
_____2) Get friends and neighbours interested in the problem and help you protest by writing letters, signing petitions, etc.
_____3) Work through a political party.
_____4) Vote against the official who helped pass the bad law at the next election.
_____5) Just protest.
_____6) Take violent action.
_____7) Work through a formal group like a labour union, church, professional group etc.
_____8) Directly contact administrative (non-elected) officials.
_____9) Organise a protest demonstration.
_____X) Other _______________________________
_____Y) Don't Know

APPENDIX F-continued

30. Suppose you had graduated from school and your LOCAL TOWN or PARISH GOVERNMENT was considering a regulation that you felt was harmful or bad for the people. What do you think you would do?

______1) Try in some way to change the regulation.
______2) There is nothing I could do.

31. If you had graduated from school and you wanted to influence a decision of your LOCAL TOWN or PARISH GOVERNMENT, which ONE of the following would you most likely do? (READ ENTIRE LIST BEFORE ANSWERING).

______1) Directly contact political leaders or the press either by letter or face to face.
______2) Get friends or neighbours interested in the problem and help you protest by writing letters or signing petitions etc.
______3) Work through a political party.
______4) Vote against the official who helped pass the bad law at the next election.
______5) Just protest.
______6) Take violent action.
______7) Work through a formal group like a labour union, church, professional group etc.
______8) Directly contact administrative (non-elected) officials.
______9) Organize a protest demonstration.
______X) Other ______________________________
______Y) Don't Know.

32. How often have you discussed government and politics with the following people? (Check each person or group).

	Often	Sometimes	Never
Mother			
Father			
Teacher			
School friends			
Your Mother's Mother			
Politicians			

APPENDIX F-continued

33. Suppose the voting age was lowered so that you could vote in the elections. Which ONE person or group would you most likely go to for political advice?

_____1) Mother
_____2) Father
_____3) Teacher
_____4) School friends
_____5) Politician
_____6) Other (SPECIFY)
____

34. Generally, which ONE of the following people or groups has influenced your own opinions the most on Jamaican politics?

_____1) Your mother
_____2) Your father
_____3) School friends
_____4) Teachers
_____5) Other (Specify):
____
_____6) Don't Know

35. Generally, would you say your best friends in school are from the same social class as you or a different social class? (If they were from the same social class as you, their parents would probably have a house about as nice as your parents, and you would probably have about the same amount of money to spend as they do).

_____1) The same social class as you.
_____2) A lower social class than yours.
_____3) A higher social class than yours.
_____4) The same social class as yours as well as higher and lower social class.

36. Generally, which political party do your best friends in school favor?

_____1) People's National Party
_____2) Jamaica Labour Party
_____3) Other (Specify):
____
_____4) None
_____5) Don't Know

APPENDIX F-continued

37. How interested are you now in politics?

______1) Very interested
______2) Somewhat interested
______3) Not very interested
______4) Not at all interested

38. In general, do you feel that government and politics has been good for the country, bad for the country, neither good nor bad for the country?

______1) Good for the country
______2) Bad for the country
______3) Neither good nor bad for the country.

39. How do you feel about the political parties in this country?

______1) They have been bad for the country.
✓______2) They have been good for the country.
______3) They have been neither good nor bad for the country.

39a. If you think the political parties have been bad for the country what do you think should be done?

______1) New political parties should be organized.
______2) All political parties should be done away with.
______3) The present political parties should get better people.
______4) Don't know.

Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent you agree or disagree by checking (✓) the appropriate column.

	1) Agree Strongly	2) Agree Somewhat	3) Agree Slightly	4) Disagree Slightly	5) Disagree Somewhat	6) Disagree Strongly
40. To work with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.						
41. No one is going to care much what happens to you.						
42. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.						
43. I don't think public officials care what people like me think.						
44. When people like me become adults we will not have any influence on what government does.						
45. Election campaigns are a waste of time.						
46. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of your.						
47. The political views and activities of students are very important.						
48. It is sometimes necessary to use force to advance an idea one strongly believes in.						
49. So many other people vote in national elections that it won't matter much to me whether I vote or not when I become an adult.						
50. A good job and plenty of money is more important than political freedom.						

APPENDIX F-continued

51. Suppose you were graduated from school and had some question or problem that you had to take to a government office. Do you think these officials would give your problem and what you say serious attention, or do you think they would generally ignore your problem and what you say?

_____1) Give your problem and what you say serious attention
_____2) Give your problem and what you say a little attention
_____3) Ignore your problem and what you say
_____4) Don't know.

52. How important is it to you that the person you marry supports the same political party as you?

_____1) Very important _____4) Of little importance
_____2) Important _____5) Not important at all
_____3) Unsure

53. Thinking about the national government in Kingston, about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so on, have on your day-to-day life?

_____1) Great effect _____3) A little effect
_____2) Some effect _____4) No effect.

54. Now take your local town or parish government, about how much effect do you think its activities have on your day-to-day life?

_____1) Great effect _____3) A little effect
_____2) Some effect _____4) No effect

APPENDIX F-continued

55. We know that the average person has many problems that take up his time. Because of this, what part do you think you should play in the local affairs of your town or district after you graduate? (READ ENTIRE LIST then choose NO MORE THAN TWO of the following which best describe the part you feel you should play).

_____1) Take an active part in local government activities
_____2) Take a general interest in what is going on
_____3) Vote
_____4) Be upright in your personal life.
_____5) Take an active part in community organizations interested in local affairs
_____6) Try to understand and keep informed about local affairs
_____7) Take an active part in political party activities
_____8) Take part in church and religious affairs.
_____9) Do nothing in the local community
_____X) Other ________________________________
_____Y) Don't know

56. Do you think that the national legislature has been doing a good job for the people, a bad job for the people, neither good nor bad job?

_____1) Good job _____2) Bad Job _____3) Neither good nor bad.

57. People who talk politics without knowing what they are talking about should be kept quiet. Do you:

_____1) Agree _____2) Disagree _____3) Don't know

58. The Rastafarians should not be allowed to hold public meetings even if they gather peaceably and only make speeches. Do you:

_____1) Agree _____2) Disagree _____3) Don't know

APPENDIX F-continued

59. Do you feel that politics and government have been honest, dishonest, neither honest nor dishonest?

_____1) Honest
_____2) Dishonest
_____3) Neither honest nor dishonest

60. Have you attended any election or political meetings during the last three years?

_____1) Yes, many _____2) Yes, some _____3) No

61. To how many political organizations do you belong?

_____1) One
_____2) Two
_____3) Three or more
_____4) None

61a. Name these organizations ______________________________

____

62. What is the total number of different student organizations that you have belonged to since you entered secondary school? (including those to which you now belong?)

_____1) One
_____2) Two
_____3) Three
_____4) Four or more
_____5) None

62a. Are you now, or have you been a leader or officer in any of these organizations? _____1) Yes _____2) No

63. Do you plan to become active in politics, full-time, part-time, or not at all, after you have completed your studies?

_____1) Full time
_____2) Part time
_____3) Not at all
_____4) Don't know

APPENDIX F-continued

64. How often do you read articles on government and politics in the Daily Gleaner?

_____1) Every day _____3) About one day a week or less

_____2) 3-4 times a week _____4) Never

65. Should large estates on which the land is not being used be divided up among the poor farmers?

_____1) Yes _____2) No _____3) Don't know

66. Do you agree or disagree that most basic industries like mining and manufacturing should be owned by the government.

_____1) Agree _____2) Disagree _____3) Don't know

67. To which social class would you say your family belongs?

_____1) Upper class _____3) Working class

_____2) Middle class _____4) Lower class

Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent you agree or disagree by checking (✓) the appropriate column.

	1) Agree Strongly	2) Agree Somewhat	3) Agree Slightly	4) Disagree Slightly	5) Disagree Somewhat	6) Disagree Strongly
68. What this country needs is a few strong, courageous and tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith.						
69. Violence should never be used to settle political questions.						
70. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.						
71. Once a politician is elected the people's job is done and it is then the job of the politician to take care of the people.						
72. If a government is doing a good job it should be kept in office, even if this means the putting off of elections.						
73. Democracy will not work in a nation like Jamaica.						
74. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful NOT to give in to those who believe differently from the way we do.						
75. Most people can be trusted.						
76. Only if society changes very much will I get the political influence I want.						
77. The Old Jamaican way of like is disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve it.						
78. All politicians are worthless.						

APPENDIX F-continued

79. Labour unions in Jamaica should NOT have the right to strike. Do you:

______1) Agree ______2) Disagree ______3) Don't know

80. Should there be some upper limit, such as 10,000 pounds a year, on how much any one person can earn in Jamaica?

______1) Yes ______2) No ______3) Don't know

81. Do you agree or disagree that it is up to the government to make sure that everyone has a secure job and a good standard of living?

______1) Agree ______2) Disagree ______3) Don't know

82. Do you think the rich should give up their privileges?

______1) Yes ______2) No

82a. (If Yes) Do you think the rich can be persuaded to give up their riches by peaceful means?

______1) Yes ______2) No

82b. Do you think it will be necessary to use force to make the rich give up their privileges?

______1) Yes ______2) No

83. Mark (✓) each of the following statements as to whether you agree or disagree with it.

	Agree	Disagree
One can suceed in Jamaica with ability and effort.	______	______
I will never get the job I deserve	______	______

APPENDIX F-continued

84. During the 1960 National Census in Jamaica every person was asked about his (or her) racial background. Which of the following do you consider yourself?

_____1) Chinese or Japanese
_____2) East Indian
_____3) Neither

84a. What is your complexion?

_____1) Black
_____2) Dark Coloured
_____3) Brown or medium
_____4) Light coloured
_____5) White

85. In what area do you plan to seek a career or job? (Check (✓) ONE category).

_____1) Business (Manager or owner)
_____2) Government (Managerial level)
_____3) Clerical (Business or Government)
_____4) Farming (Owner or manager)
_____5) Science or engineering
_____6) Skilled labour
_____7) Teaching
_____8) Professions (non-teaching)
_____9) Technical (Dispenser, draftsman, etc.)
_____X) Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)

APPENDIX F-continued

86. Do you plan to get any further education after you leave your present school?

_____1) No (If No) What kind of work do you plan to do after leaving this school?

____

____

_____2) Yes (If Yes) What school do you plan to go to and where?

____

____

What subjects do you plan to study?

____

87. Do you plan to live in Jamaica most of your life?

_____1) Yes
_____2) No (If No) Where do you plan to live?_____________

Name and Address of your Mother or Father (PLEASE PRINT):

Mother____

____

Father____

____

Name and Address of that Person who was most Important in raising you if she (or he) is not your Mother or Father (PLEASE PRINT):

____

____

TYPED BY: DOLORES ROGERS

MULTILITHED BY: MARGARET PLUID